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Kim Jong-un assassination film revives mystery of the Ryongchon explosion

Published: 11 Feb. 2026, 00:03

Jang Seok-kwang

The author is the general secretary of the Academy of National Intelligence.

“The enemy always comes in ways you cannot imagine.” In the world of intelligence, the greatest danger is not a lack of information but a lack of imagination. Successful operations rarely reveal themselves.

On Jan. 3, North Korean television aired “Day and Night of Confrontation” (2025), a film depicting an attempted assassination of the country’s “supreme leadership.” The story follows anti-regime forces conspiring with a foreign intelligence agency to kill Kim Jong-il and concludes by foreshadowing another infiltration attempt targeting Kim Jong-un two decades later.

North Koreans stand in front of damaged houses near a railway station in Ryongchon, North Korea, April 24, 2004. [REUTERS/YONHAP]

The film appears designed to evoke memories of a real disaster 22 years ago. Its plot features an international freight train crossing paths with Kim Jong-il’s itinerary, an explosion disguised as an accident using chemical fertilizer and a fictional station that closely resembles an actual location.

At 2 p.m. on April 22, 2004, a massive explosion occurred at Ryongchon Station in North Pyongan Province. The blast killed 154 people and injured about 1,300. Buildings within a 500-meter (1,640.4-foot) radius were largely destroyed and debris was scattered as far as 4 kilometers (2.5 miles).

Twenty trucks carrying South Korean relief supplies for victims of the Ryongchon explosion in North Korea head north along a road beside the Gyeongui railway line on May 7, 2004, crossing the southern boundary of the demilitarized zone. [BYUN SUN-GOO]

North Korea’s official explanation was that the explosion resulted from a railway accident. State media reported that ammonium nitrate fertilizer detonated after contact with an overhead power line during switching operations. Yet, the technical account failed to end speculation.

One alternative narrative framed the explosion as an assassination attempt against then North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. That interpretation has persisted in part because it shifts responsibility for systemic failure to external enemies and reinforces internal control. However, available information indicates that Kim had passed the station eight to nine hours before the blast, weakening the claim.

Another theory that drew attention in intelligence circles suggested the involvement of Israel’s Mossad. The hypothesis was based on several unusual circumstances surrounding the incident. Twelve researchers from Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center who were reportedly aboard the train were killed.

Some reports also claimed that the U.S. National Security Agency intercepted suspicious communications between northeastern Syria and Pyongyang earlier that year and shared them with Israel. Author Gordon Thomas, in “Gideon’s Spies” (1999), later suggested that Mossad had been tracking the travel of Syrian military officers and scientists heading to North Korea.

Additional questions arose when North Korean authorities suspended mobile phone service nationwide and collected roughly 10,000 handsets after the explosion. Reports that a taped mobile phone was found near the site fueled speculation that authorities suspected remote detonation. There were also unconfirmed claims that Canadian officials investigated whether a Mossad operative using a stolen passport had been present in North Korea.

Despite these accounts, no concrete or publicly verified evidence of Mossad involvement has emerged. Most of the claims remain circumstantial and inferential. Yet the narrative continues to resurface.

The new film reinforces that storyline. It depicts foreign intelligence agencies infiltrating other countries through front companies and collaborating with domestic dissidents to carry out targeted assassinations. Elements such as covert overseas operations, corporate cover and leadership elimination align with the popular image of Mossad.

In this narrative, the Ryongchon explosion is recast not as an accident or internal failure but as part of a broader foreign plot against the regime. The question is why North Korea would emphasize such a theme now.

The film appears less concerned with revisiting a single event than with recalling a long history of perceived external threats. If the Ryongchon incident is interpreted as an operation targeting Syrian scientists, Mossad becomes more than a foreign intelligence service. It becomes a force capable of precision strikes against leadership itself. In that sense, Ryongchon serves as a symbolic starting point.

Subsequent events in the Middle East likely reinforced that perception. Israel’s 2007 airstrike on a suspected Syrian nuclear facility, the assassination of military and missile specialists linked to foreign programs and other targeted operations demonstrated operational reach.

More recent incidents appear to have strengthened these concerns. Coordinated explosions involving communications devices used by Hezbollah across Lebanon and Syria in 2024 recalled the scale and synchronization associated with the Ryongchon blast. During the Israel-Iran conflict the same year, drone strikes targeting senior commanders and nuclear scientists suggested that pre-emptive decapitation strategies remained central to Israeli doctrine.

In July last year, Kim Jong-un reportedly cited Mossad operations directly while ordering stronger countermeasures against leadership-targeting scenarios. Officially, the directive focused on military preparedness for contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. Unofficially, it may reflect personal security concerns. As international discussion increasingly references potential assassination or removal scenarios involving senior regional leaders, such threats may be perceived less as theoretical risks than as operational possibilities.

U.S.-based North Korea outlet NK News reported on Feb. 8 that North Korea’s Korean Central Television (KCTV) recently aired the action film “Days and Nights of Confrontation” (2025), which centers on a plot to assassinate the country’s leader. The image is a captured scene from the film. [NK NEWS CAPTURE]

That anxiety is evident in the film’s tone. Its explicit message calls for absolute loyalty and sacrifice to protect the leader. Reports also suggest that Kim’s security posture was tightened following the broadcast. At the same time, the film’s dramatic emphasis may signal the depth of perceived vulnerability.

The discussion so far rests largely on analytical speculation within intelligence circles. One former field officer’s recollection adds another layer. According to the account, a Mossad team entered Korea in April 2004 under the pretext of monitoring foreign terrorism suspects. Members repeatedly left meetings and maintained satellite contact with a region in Russia’s Jewish Autonomous Oblast, located between Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, where many North Korean logging workers were based.

The team later departed via Sokcho, Gangwon, for Vladivostok, saying it would join colleagues operating locally. Its visit began a week before the Ryongchon explosion and ended three days after it.

Whether coincidence or not, the memory illustrates how intelligence narratives persist when unanswered questions remain. The recent North Korean film has revived not only an old disaster, but also the uncertainty that has surrounded it for two decades.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.