Skipping New Year message, Kim Jong-un signals urgency in managing ties with Trump

Home > Opinion > Columns

Skipping New Year message, Kim Jong-un signals urgency in managing ties with Trump

Published: 09 Feb. 2026, 00:03

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Jeong Yong-soo

The author is an editorial writer and the director of the Unification and Culture Research Institute of the JoongAng Ilbo.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has been unusually active since the start of the year. His 15 public appearances in January mark the highest monthly total since he took power. The figure matches his first year in office in 2012, when he traveled widely to assess conditions across the country. Although he logged 20 appearances in 2021, the year of the Eighth Workers’ Party Congress, only two were unrelated to preparations for the party congress.

North Korea’s state media, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), reported that leader Kim Jong-un presided over a Workers’ Party Politburo meeting on Feb. 7, attended by senior officials including members and alternate members of the Politburo Standing Committee, where the party decided to convene its Ninth Party Congress later this month. [KCNA/YONHAP]

North Korea is expected to convene its Ninth Party Congress soon. In the past, Kim often avoided public appearances ahead of major events such as party congresses, nuclear tests, or summits with Korea, the United States or China. This year’s pattern is notably different. Even more unusual, the regime has not issued a New Year’s message. In earlier years, policy priorities were announced through a New Year’s address by Kim or, under his predecessors, a joint editorial in state media. The silence reflects the leadership’s complicated calculations.

After taking power, Kim delivered annual New Year’s speeches. In recent years, the Workers’ Party Central Committee's year-end plenary meeting has effectively taken on that role. Last year’s plenary session concluded unusually early, on Dec. 12, and did not include remarks outlining policy direction for the new year. This likely reflected expectations that the Ninth Party Congress would take place sooner.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un inspects a livestock facility with senior officials after attending a commissioning ceremony at the Samgwang Livestock Farm under the North Pyongan Provincial Rural Economy Committee on Feb. 2. [KOREAN CENTRAL TELEVISION SCREEN CAPTURE/YONHAP]

However, the congress has been postponed until late February, creating the unusual situation of a year without a New Year policy statement. Instead, Kim has focused on site visits across multiple sectors: economic projects such as the Sinuiju greenhouse complex and the fourth-stage construction of the Hwasong district in Pyongyang; military facilities, including munitions factories and new multiple rocket launch systems; and social events, such as Lunar New Year performances.

He also inspected the launch of a hypersonic missile hours before President Lee Jae Myung visited China, signaling a cautious message toward Beijing. His decision to visit field sites in temperatures below minus 15 degrees Celsius (5 degrees Fahrenheit) rather than concentrate solely on party congress preparations appears aimed at checking progress on the goals set at the Eighth Party Congress in 2021.

Party congresses are the regime’s highest political events, reviewing the previous five years and setting plans for the next five. In military development, North Korea has achieved visible progress, including advances in drones, satellites, missiles and the miniaturization of nuclear warheads. Economic indicators have also shown modest improvement. Manufacturing grew 5.9 percent in 2024, and overall economic growth reached 3.7 percent, according to estimates by the Bank of Korea.

Still, the broader economic picture remains below expectations. International sanctions and resource shortages delayed major projects such as the Pyongyang General Hospital and the Wonsan-Kalma coastal tourism zone for years before completion. Large gaps persist between Pyongyang and provincial economies. Kim’s recent visits to regional factories nearing completion appear aimed at highlighting achievements that can be presented at the upcoming party congress.

North Korea often emphasizes independence and self-reliance, leading to perceptions that it is insulated from global change. While ordinary citizens remain largely cut off from the outside world, the leadership closely monitors international developments. Senior party and government officials are required to review daily reports summarizing foreign media and global trends, and authorized officials can track outside information through approved digital devices.

Recent developments abroad have likely added to Pyongyang’s concerns. The United States’ detention and transfer of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and signs of possible military action against Iran serve as reminders that regime security cannot be taken for granted. At the same time, the complex strategic competition among the United States, China and Russia around the Korean Peninsula complicates North Korea’s choices.

After striking Iranian nuclear facilities last June, the United States has continued to emphasize “peace through strength,” deploying carrier strike groups in the region. Although Pyongyang maintains a doctrine of responding to pressure with greater pressure and highlights its nuclear capabilities, it is likely aware of the limits of its military power compared to that of the United States.

Another development has further complicated North Korea’s calculations. The UN Security Council recently approved sanctions exemptions for 17 humanitarian projects in the country. Given that Washington has led the sanctions regime and the Lee administration has pursued a more conciliatory policy toward Pyongyang, the move can be seen as a coordinated signal encouraging North Korea to return to dialogue.

However, Kim has reportedly instructed officials to avoid even using the word “support,” reflecting the regime’s determination to limit external dependence. Even if the exemptions are viewed as a step toward easing sanctions, Pyongyang is unlikely to return quickly to negotiations. North Korea has argued that its nuclear arsenal is not a bargaining chip and has nearly completed capabilities to strike the U.S. mainland, leading it to see the incentives on offer as insufficient.

From Pyongyang’s perspective, the lifting of some pressure and earlier outreach from President Donald Trump may suggest that its strategy of advancing nuclear and missile programs has strengthened its position.

The Rodong Sinmun, the newspaper of North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party, reported on Jan. 28 that the North Korean People’s Army Missile General Bureau conducted a test launch the previous day to verify the performance of an upgraded large-caliber multiple rocket launcher system incorporating new technology. Leader Kim Jong-un observed the test alongside his daughter, Kim Ju-ae. [RODONG SINMUN/NEWS1]

Yet the remaining time in the Trump administration suggests the opposite pressure. Although nearly three years remain in the term, the final year will be dominated by election politics, leaving little room for major diplomatic initiatives. In practical terms, North Korea may have only about two years to engage.

Unlike the situation after the collapse of the 2019 Hanoi summit, Kim may not have another opportunity to deal with a U.S. president whose approach he understands. While China has warned that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan could disrupt summit diplomacy, Trump is reportedly interested in meeting Kim during a planned visit to China in April.

For Pyongyang, setting its policy toward Washington over the next two months may matter more than preparations for the party congress. The choice could determine whether North Korea attempts to reopen relations with the United States or continues a prolonged period of economic austerity.

The regime may hope to secure both leverage and concessions, but the realities of international politics suggest that even the gains it believes it has achieved could be lost.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.