Cherry blossoms shadowed by a Hormuz bill

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Cherry blossoms shadowed by a Hormuz bill

Published: 18 Mar. 2026, 00:04

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Park So-young

The author is an editorial writer at the JoongAng Ilbo.

Each March, cherry blossoms that tint the Potomac River basin in Washington with pink are seen as a symbol of the U.S.-Japan friendship. The tradition began in March 1912, when Tokyo Mayor Yukio Ozaki donated about 3,000 Yoshino cherry saplings to Washington. At the time, he faced criticism in Japan for offering what some called “the spirit of Japan” to a country that might one day become an adversary. Ozaki did not waver. The trees survived two world wars and today serve as a form of soft power strengthening bilateral ties.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi gestures as U.S. President Donald Trump delivers his speech during their visit to the aircraft carrier USS George Washington at the U.S. Navy's Yokosuka base in Yokosuka, south of Tokyo, on Oct. 28, 2025. [AP/YONHAP]

More than a century later, on March 19, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi will arrive in Washington. Marking the 250th anniversary of U.S. independence in July, she plans to donate 250 additional cherry trees and stage a fireworks display showcasing Akita Prefecture’s signature pyrotechnics. Behind the symbolism, however, lies an unusually cold “bill” from an ally.

U.S. President Donald Trump has been explicit. With military tensions with Iran at a peak, he has pressed key allies, including Korea and Japan, to dispatch naval forces to the Strait of Hormuz. The argument begins with a blunt premise: Countries should protect the vessels that carry their energy supplies. It escalates into a test of alliance credibility, with Trump emphasizing that the request is not due to a lack of U.S. military capacity but a way to gauge how allies respond. His transactional view of alliances is now directed squarely at partners such as Japan.

For Takaichi, the request goes beyond a military decision. It is a major test of her leadership. Having presented herself as the political heir to former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and an advocate of a “strong Japan,” she now faces a moment to demonstrate the effectiveness of the security legislation Abe established. Japan’s Self-Defense Forces conducted minesweeping operations in the Persian Gulf after the 1991 Gulf War. In 2015, the Abe administration revised security laws to enable the limited exercise of collective self-defense, explicitly citing mine removal in the Strait of Hormuz as a possible scenario. The legal basis, at least in principle, is in place.

Yet, a closer legal assessment complicates matters. Within the Japanese government, there is a cautious view that the current situation with Iran may not meet the legal thresholds of a “survival-threatening situation” or an “important influence situation” under existing security laws. Japan holds substantial oil reserves equivalent to about 254 days of supply, and providing rear-area support to U.S. forces during active hostilities could risk exceeding the limits set by the pacifist Constitution. As a result, any deployment is likely to be confined to escorting Japan-related vessels under the framework of maritime security operations.

Luojiashan tanker sits anchored in Muscat, as Iran vows to close the Strait of Hormuz, amid the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Muscat, Oman, March 7. [REUTERS/YONHAP]

Public opinion further constrains the government. Skepticism over the legitimacy of the conflict has grown following a reported U.S. airstrike in southern Iran last month that mistakenly hit a girls’ elementary school in Minab, killing 175 students. Japanese public sentiment has hardened. A recent Asahi Shimbun poll found that 82 percent of respondents opposed the U.S. attack on Iran. More than half also criticized Takaichi for remaining silent on the justification for the strike. Even within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, concerns have been raised that the situation represents a moral dilemma distinct from the pragmatic approach taken under Abe, who often relied on indirect measures to balance domestic and alliance considerations.

Despite these pressures, Takaichi is heading to Washington for another reason: China. Shortly after taking office, she made strong remarks linking a potential Taiwan contingency to Japan’s own security. In response, China imposed export restrictions on rare earth materials, a move that has put Japan’s industrial sector under strain. Takaichi is expected to seek U.S. support on this issue, hoping Trump will raise it in an upcoming summit with China.

Japan’s willingness to offer concessions reflects this urgency. Participation in the United States’ next-generation missile defense initiative, known as the “Golden Dome,” a significant increase in defense spending and expanded investment in the United States are all being considered. Tokyo appears to be navigating a delicate and potentially risky bargain, balancing security commitments with economic interests.

The summit on March 19 is not merely a bilateral event. For Korea, which faces similar pressure over troop deployments and defense cost-sharing, it offers a closely watched case study. The outcome may serve as a reference point for how to respond to the evolving demands of alliance politics under the current U.S. administration.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.