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U.S.-Japan-Australia mineral alliance poses both risk and opportunity for Korea

Published: 08 Jan. 2026, 00:04

Kim Kyoung-sook

The author is a senior research fellow of Future Strategy Division at the Institute for National Security Strategy.

Since the launch of Donald Trump’s second administration in the United States, strategic competition between Washington and Beijing has expanded beyond trade and technology into resources and supply chains. In this shift, strategic minerals have emerged as a core variable of national security. Critical minerals and rare earths function as the lifeblood of industries ranging from electric vehicles and semiconductors to defense and renewable energy. The United States made this explicit in its 2025 National Security Strategy, declaring that supply chain security is national security.

US President Donald Trump, right, and Australia's Prime Minister Anthony Albanese display an agreement on critical minerals they signed in the Cabinet Room at the White House in Washington, DC, on October 20, 2025. [AFP/YONHAP]

Washington has gone further by defining external dependence in critical mineral supply chains as a national security risk and redefining critical minerals and rare earths as strategic assets. A sweeping geopolitical design is now underway to reduce China’s influence over resource supply chains and reorganize them around the United States and its allies.

A handout photo taken on November 14, 2024, and received on October 21, 2025, from Lynas Rare Earths Limited shows the company's rare earths processing facility located in Kalgoorlie, in Western Australia. The United States has inked a critical minerals deal with Australia, opening an alternative pipeline of highly sought-after metals as China tightens its grip on production. Government figures show Australia is among the world's top five producers of lithium, cobalt and manganese, which enable things like rechargeable batteries and aircraft jet engines. It is also home to substantial deposits of rare earth elements such as neodymium and praseodymium. [AFP/YONHAP]

Against this backdrop, recent moves by the United States, Japan and Australia to strengthen cooperation across the full mineral value chain, from exploration and mining to refining and recycling, deserve close attention. At the heart of the trilateral partnership is a clear division of labor. Australia focuses on resource extraction, Japan on refining and processing technologies and the United States on providing a vast demand market along with institutional incentives such as those embedded in the Inflation Reduction Act. This is not simply an effort to diversify suppliers. It is the construction of a supply chain ecosystem that integrates rules, finance and technology, and serves as a collective defense mechanism against the weaponization of resources by any single country.

For Korea, the implications of the U.S.-Japan-Australia alignment are significant.

First, supply chain security must be treated as an asset. Korean companies have long relied heavily on Chinese minerals for reasons of cost efficiency. That calculus must change. Critical minerals are no longer inexpensive inputs but strategic assets directly linked to national security. Korea should move beyond bilateral cooperation and actively participate in the multilateral framework being built by the United States, Japan and Australia. A supply chain realignment centered on alliances is no longer a choice. It is an unfolding reality.

Second, Korea should leverage its technological strengths to gain supply chain influence. The biggest bottleneck in strategic minerals lies not in mining but in refining and processing. Korea may lack natural resources, but it possesses world-class smelting technologies and strong capabilities in producing battery cathode materials. This helps explain why the United States recently facilitated a large-scale investment, reportedly worth 11 trillion won ($7.6 million), involving a Korean zinc smelting company.

Just as Japan anchors the trilateral partnership through refining expertise, Korea should deploy its own smelting technologies as a strategic card. In the global restructuring of supply chains, Korea must position itself not as a passive consumer but as a core partner. A more refined division of roles is needed, with Australia handling mining, Korea focusing on refining and processing and the United States and Japan shaping demand and standards.

Third, Korea must redraw its national strategic map for critical minerals. Priorities should be clarified by linking industry-specific demand forecasts with technology road maps. Choices must be made about where to concentrate efforts, whether in exploration, refining or recycling. Battery recycling and the development of alternative materials should be placed at the center of the strategy. A circular economy offers the most realistic and rapid way to reduce supply chain risks.

Fourth, innovation in public-private cooperation models is urgent. The Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security provides a successful example of how the state can share risks associated with overseas resource development. Korea must go beyond declaratory participation in international cooperation and establish institutional mechanisms that deliver tangible results. For strategic minerals, this means formalizing long-term purchase guarantees, expanding policy financing, offering tax incentives and creating risk-sharing arrangements at the national level.

Night view of the Onsan Refinery of Korea Zinc Company, Ltd [KOREA ZINC]

Finally, trade diplomacy must become more sophisticated. As protectionist tendencies intensify, critical minerals can enhance Korea’s negotiating leverage. In return for contributing to U.S.-centered supply chain construction, Seoul needs a carefully calibrated strategy to ensure Korean firms continue to receive concrete benefits, including tax credits under U.S. legislation such as the Inflation Reduction Act.

The U.S.-Japan-Australia partnership presents Korea with both risk and opportunity. Standing apart from allies will only amplify risks. Combining technology with policy can unlock opportunities. Korea must evolve from a passive buyer in global supply chains into an active partner that helps shape the rules and solutions. This is a moment that demands coordinated action by government and business, operating as one team on the vast chessboard of resource security. Missing this golden window for supply chain diversification could leave Korea’s future growth engines dangerously exposed.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.