Finding a Trump–Kim Jong-un opening around an April U.S.–China summit will be key

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Finding a Trump–Kim Jong-un opening around an April U.S.–China summit will be key

Published: 26 Dec. 2025, 00:03

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Koh Yu-hwan

The author is an emeritus professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University and former director of the Institute for Unification Studies.

North Korea’s ninth Workers’ Party Congress, which Pyongyang has signaled will be held early next year, is expected to mark another inflection point on the Korean Peninsula. The party congress sets the broad contours of the country's strategic direction and domestic and foreign policies for the next five years. As the North remains a central security actor on the peninsula, the decisions adopted there could shape regional dynamics for years to come.

Kim Jong-un, chairman of North Korea’s State Affairs Commission, delivers the opening address at the Eighth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in Pyongyang on Jan. 5, 2021, according to a report published the following day by the party’s official newspaper, the Rodong Sinmun. The paper said Kim took the podium at about 9 a.m. alongside members of the Political Bureau of the party’s Central Committee. [RODONG SINMUN/YONHAP]

North Korea defines itself as a form of “real socialism” in which the party comes first. Once the party decides, the state implements. Since the 1980s, however, the Workers’ Party has operated irregularly. Party rules under Kim Il Sung mandated a congress every five years, but after the sixth congress in 1980, North Korea failed to convene another for 36 years. Kim Il Sung’s instruction to raise living standards and proceed to a seventh congress was never realized. That goal referred to what propaganda described as the people’s long-cherished wish to eat white rice with meaty soup, wear silk clothes and live in tiled-roof houses, a stage equated with the “complete victory of socialism.” The third seven-year economic plan launched in 1987 collapsed, followed by the famine years known as the “Arduous March,” during which countless people died of hunger.

Economic hardship also shaped party governance under Kim Jong-il. His theory of the “sociopolitical organism” likened the leader to the brain and the party to the heart. Without regular congresses, that heart could not function properly. Kim Jong-il went so far as to criticize the party as an “aging” or “corpse” party and elevated the military through the doctrine of songun, or military-first politics. Major decisions were made through direct rule centered on close aides rather than party organs. Kim Jong-il’s reluctance to appear in public or deliver speeches contributed to perceptions of a reclusive style of governance.

By contrast, Kim Jong-un, who took power in his late 20s, has focused on restoring party functions and normalizing the party-state system. Since his ascent, party congresses and major meetings have largely followed the schedules set out in party rules and the constitution. North Korea labeled the eighth party congress in 2021 a “turning point.” Over the past five years, it has claimed achievements in strengthening party authority, advancing nuclear capabilities, promoting living standards through initiatives such as the “20×10 regional development policy,” and deepening alignment with China and Russia.

Against this backdrop, the ninth party congress will be closely watched as a compass for North Korea’s ideological line, immediate goals and core policies for the next five years. A key question is whether Pyongyang will formally assess the initiatives launched after the eighth congress and introduce a revised guiding ideology that reflects shifting circumstances. Unlike Kim Jong-il, who sought to preserve his father’s legacy intact under the banner of governing by the final say, Kim Jong-un has shown a greater willingness to differentiate himself from his predecessors. Should his approach be articulated alongside that of his father and grandfather, it would signal a milestone in his bid to stand fully on his own.

Another focal point is how the party will codify policy changes toward the South and unification. In late 2023, Kim Jong-un redefined inter-Korean relations as those between “two hostile states.” That shift makes revisions unavoidable to party language that had described nationwide democratic development as an immediate objective. How Pyongyang addresses concepts such as occupying and incorporating South Korea in wartime, and its decision to abandon terms like "unification" and "reconciliation," will bear directly on the prospects of engagement pursued by the administration of Lee Jae Myung.

Security issues extending beyond the peninsula are also at stake. Kim Jong-un said during a September visit to a defense science institute that the ninth congress would present a line of pursuing nuclear forces and conventional forces in parallel. North Korea’s deployment of troops to the war in Ukraine exposed it to the battlefield impact of drones and other advanced conventional weapons. Seeing nuclear-armed Russia suffer territorial incursions likely reinforced the limits of nuclear deterrence alone. Korea’s growing conventional capabilities and closer integration with U.S. nuclear forces may further shape Pyongyang’s calculations. If North Korea accelerates advanced weapons development under a dual-track strategy, regional arms competition will intensify, as illustrated by its recent disclosure of an 8,700-ton nuclear-powered submarine project following Seoul’s renewed push for such vessels.

Other points to watch include how Pyongyang frames relations with longstanding adversaries such as the United States and Japan, and whether the party signals anything about succession, particularly regarding the leader's daughter, Ju-ae. Party rules set the minimum age for membership at 18, making it unlikely she will hold a formal post soon. Still, symbolic language could offer clues to future plans for the leadership.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, right, and his daughter, Ju-ae, attend the inauguration ceremony for the Wonsan-Kalma coastal tourist zone on June 24 in this image provided by the state-run Korean Central Television on June 26. [KOREAN CENTRAL TELEVISION]

The supreme leader system thrives on crisis. From Pyongyang’s perspective, sustained hostility with Korea and the United States may reinforce regime stability. Fundamental shifts in party doctrine are therefore unlikely until relations with Washington change in ways that permit ideological recalibration. Reducing structural instability on the peninsula requires moving from the armistice to a peace regime. If U.S. President Donald Trump’s vision for peace and Kim Jong-un’s concept of two hostile states fail to find common ground, tensions are likely to rise further.

One encouraging sign is that Pyongyang has not abandoned hopes of improving ties with Washington. Even if the upcoming party congress adopts measures that heighten tension, a future course correction through a summit remains possible. That is why attention is likely to focus on whether a U.S.-North Korea summit could emerge around an expected U.S.-China leaders’ meeting next April.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.