Prosecutorial reform must not become a war of revenge

Lee Hyun-sang

The author is a columnist at the JoongAng Ilbo. 

Behind the Democratic Party (DP)’s campaign to strip prosecutors of their investigative powers lies a lingering trauma over the death of former President Roh Moo-hyun. Many within the party believe that Roh’s attempt to reform the prosecution led to the retaliation he faced after leaving office.

That sentiment was on display in March, shortly after the National Assembly passed legislation creating a new public prosecution office and a serious crimes investigation agency. Jung Chung-rae, then party leader, visited Roh’s grave in Bongha Village and wiped away tears as he declared that the abolition of the prosecution service had finally been achieved.

The experience of the Moon Jae-in administration also weighs heavily on the party. Prosecutors under Yoon Suk Yeol, initially enlisted to pursue the Moon government’s anti-corruption campaign, later turned their attention to the administration itself during the scandal involving former Justice Minister Cho Kuk. For hard-liners in the DP, the episode confirmed their belief that democratic control over prosecutors through personnel changes or political oversight is impossible and that dismantling the institution is the only solution.

The future of prosecutors’ supplementary investigative powers has consequently become a fault line between pragmatists and hard-liners. Pragmatists, including Justice Minister Jung Sung-ho, have warned of the side effects that could accompany a sudden restructuring of the criminal justice system. Their opponents, however, have portrayed such concerns as a form of political betrayal.

Broadcaster Kim Eo-jun alleged on his YouTube channel that President Lee Jae Myung’s camp had sought to preserve prosecutors’ supplementary investigative powers in exchange for easing the president’s legal troubles. Political commentator Rhyu Si-min, Roh's former health and welfare minister, went further, arguing that the complete separation of investigation and prosecution had been delayed because Lee himself opposed it.

The debate has intensified following allegations that police mishandled and concealed evidence in the Jang Yun-gi case. A Gallup Korea survey released on July 17 found that 61 percent of respondents favored retaining prosecutors’ supplementary investigative authority, while only 23 percent supported abolishing it.

Even among DP supporters, 46 percent favored preserving the powers and 39 percent backed abolition. The findings differed sharply from a Gallup poll last September that showed majority support for separating prosecutorial and investigative functions.

Yet there has been little change in the positions of DP politicians competing ahead of the party convention on Aug. 17, including Jung, Kim Min-seok and Song Young-gil. Only lawmaker Ko Min-jung has attempted to distinguish herself, arguing that a governing party should not abolish safeguards designed to protect vulnerable groups.

The candidates’ indifference to public opinion reflects the influence of the party’s most fervent supporters. Eleven DP lawmakers recently proposed legislation that would preserve prosecutors’ supplementary investigative powers in cases involving socially vulnerable victims. Their reward was a barrage of abusive messages.

The episode once again illustrates one of the chronic ailments of Korean politics: the widening gap between public opinion and partisan loyalty. It is a phenomenon that transcends ideology.

Some argue that prosecutors need only the authority to request additional investigations. But it is far from certain that such a limited power would have uncovered the truth in the Jang case. Investigators accused of concealing cable ties suspected of being linked to a sexual crime and ordering the destruction of black-box memory cards might not have responded earnestly to a prosecutor’s written request if they had already decided to protect a fellow officer.

Interior Minister Yoon Ho-jung has announced measures including a new anti-corruption unit within the police, an internal inspection body and a rotating personnel system. Yet these proposals amount to little more than temporary fixes.

Under the government’s plan, prosecutors would be allowed to demand the replacement of investigative teams that refuse requests for supplementary inquiries, but they would lack the authority to enforce such orders.

The debate has become unnecessarily complicated because policymakers are avoiding the simplest answer. The clearest solution would be to preserve prosecutors’ supplementary investigative powers within carefully defined limits through broad social consensus.

Concern over the concentration of investigative authority is not an attack on the police. It reflects a broader truth: monopolized power tends to become corrupt. Prosecutors themselves wielded excessive influence in the past because effective checks were absent.

In a system where the police alone determine how investigations begin and end, public fears that cover-ups like those alleged in the Jang case could become commonplace are hardly unreasonable. By dismissing such anxieties as anti-reform sentiment, hard-liners in the DP risk provoking public backlash. Prosecutorial reform driven by hostility and divorced from public opinion is not reform at all. It is merely a dangerous campaign of political revenge.