Academy merger push raises security concerns

Jung Seung-jo

The author is an honorary chairman of the Korea-U.S. Alliance Foundation and a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Sun Tzu's "The Art of War," a military classic in both East and West, begins by saying that military affairs are a matter of vital importance to the state and must be examined with the utmost care. In modern society, the military is subordinate to politics, so armed forces in advanced countries are controlled by civilian authority. This is civilian control.

In "The Soldier and the State" (1957), U.S. political scientist Samuel Huntington divided civilian control into two types. One is "subjective civilian control," in which civilians intervene in every area of the military. The other is "objective civilian control," in which civilians decide national grand strategy while respecting the military’s professional sphere.

Huntington argued that the latter protects both military effectiveness and democracy. Decisions on war or troop deployments belong to politics. But political interference in personnel appointments, education, training and defense capability development is subjective civilian control, which he warned can weaken military power.

The Lee Jae Myung administration is moving quickly to merge the Army, Navy and Air Force academies, a pledge from last year’s presidential campaign. The Ministry of National Defense created a “national armed forces academy task force” in April. President Lee is said to have recently told a Cabinet meeting that implementation, not planning, is what matters, urging speed on the merger.

Concerns are growing in the field that the government is rushing ahead without sufficient military review or study of domestic and foreign cases.

"The Art of War" lists conditions necessary for victory. One is that an army wins when its general is capable and the ruler does not interfere. The lesson is that excessive political intrusion into the military’s professional domain can become a source of national danger. After 2,500 years, that warning remains valid.

As someone who spent decades in uniform, I can say this with confidence. Weapons systems can be acquired in the short to medium term if enough money is invested. But capable officers cannot be bought or trained overnight. It takes at least 20 years for an officer to fully perform his or her role. That is why training elite officers is a national investment made with decades ahead in mind.

Military commanders know better than civilian leaders what capabilities and identity officers need. Officer training should therefore remain the responsibility of military commanders. If academy education is hastily merged, the consequences could create serious side effects for South Korea’s security.

South Korea still faces constant security threats, including North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles. Given the size of the South Korean military, merging only the three service academies without a broader reform plan for the entire military structure would be hard to find a precedent abroad. Such an experiment could endanger national security.

Supporters of integration often cite the need for jointness among the three services. But jointness does not mean one person becomes equally skilled in land, sea and air operations. It is achieved when specialized ground, naval and air units are effectively integrated toward a single objective.

That is why South Korea must pursue both service expertise and jointness without hastily merging the academies.

The Army, Navy and Air Force academies are not merely schools. They are where the spirit, traditions and identity of each service begin. Those qualities translate into the determination to fight and the capacity to win on the battlefield.

The government is trying to push through the merger by citing various goals, including stronger jointness, the demographic cliff, preparation for future battlefields and the need to attract talented recruits. But these goals can be achieved through many other means, such as improving curricula, strengthening joint education and reforming personnel evaluation systems. It is not desirable to rush toward a predetermined answer without sufficient review.

If South Korea is to fundamentally change an officer training system maintained for decades, it must first conduct thorough research and debate, test new models and verify the results. What is needed now is not speed but deliberation. Conclusions should not come before careful review.

The government should pause and reconsider from scratch what kind of academy education reform best serves the South Korean military.