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Time to think bigger

As the government launches Korea 2045, it faces a crucial test: turning favorable conditions into bipartisan support for lasting structural reform.

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Prime Minister Kim Min-seok, right, delivers opening remarks during the inaugural plenary meeting of the Committee for the Korea 2045 Strategy at the Government Complex Seoul in central Seoul on May 27. The committee is tasked with drafting a long-term national development blueprint to mark the centennial of Korea's liberation in 2045.



Cho Min-geun

The author is an editorial writer at the JoongAng Ilbo. 


In October 2007, then President Roh Moo-hyun offered a candid lament about the fate of his administration's long-term national blueprint.

"We presented the bill, saying this much money would be needed, and then got battered again and had to retreat."

His frustration reflected the collapse of "Vision 2030," a comprehensive development strategy that was effectively derailed by fierce attacks from the opposition and indifference within the ruling camp. Judged solely on its substance, however, the plan was neither unrealistic nor poorly conceived. Seeking to pursue economic growth and social welfare simultaneously, the Roh administration proposed 50 major initiatives centered on institutional reform and proactive investment. They included concepts such as universal child care, reduced university tuition, expanded Earned Income Tax Credit benefits and life cycle-based welfare programs. Many of those ideas were later adopted by the conservative administrations of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye. More importantly, Vision 2030 marked Korea's first serious attempt to extend the horizon of national policymaking beyond immediate political cycles and toward a three-decade development strategy.

Yet criticism focused less on the policies themselves than on the political circumstances surrounding them. The report was unveiled with barely a year remaining in Roh's presidency. As the administration entered its final phase, it lacked the political authority needed to build momentum for policies that would largely fall to future governments. Nor could it convincingly explain how it would finance the projected 1.1 quadrillion won ($724 billion) required for implementation, based on today's exchange rate of about 1,520 won to the dollar. Instead, it listed broad options such as issuing government bonds and raising taxes before concluding that financing would ultimately be a matter for public choice. That vague response quickly fueled opposition criticism that the proposal amounted to little more than an election-oriented wish list. Even members of the ruling party hesitated to defend it, fearing renewed accusations of imposing a "tax bomb" after controversy surrounding the comprehensive real estate tax.

Nearly two decades after that painful defeat, the government is making a serious attempt to revive the spirit of Vision 2030. On May 27, it convened the inaugural meeting of the Committee for the Korea 2045 Strategy, which aims to produce a long-term national blueprint by the end of this year to coincide with the centennial of Korea's liberation in 2045. Prime Minister Kim Min-seok, who chairs the committee, explicitly described the new initiative as an heir to Vision 2030. The government's decision to place the Ministry of Planning and Budget at the center of the process and directly link long-term planning with fiscal policy also mirrors the earlier model.

The agenda, however, reflects a different era. While Vision 2030 focused primarily on domestic challenges such as low birthrates, population aging and widening inequality, the new strategy seeks to integrate artificial intelligence with trade, security and supply chain risks into a single national framework.

Reviving long-term strategic planning after years of neglect is a welcome development. It is also essential if the Lee Jae Myung administration hopes to move beyond the limitations of the pragmatism it has championed. Many experts have praised the government's flexible approach to trade, diplomacy and energy policy, but they also argue that it remains overly preoccupied with responding to immediate issues. Critics further contend that the administration has shown little willingness to tackle politically difficult structural reforms requiring the reconciliation of competing interests.

Compared with the Roh administration, today's political environment is considerably more favorable. The government remains in the early stage of its term, while the ruling party enjoys an overwhelming legislative majority. Following the June 3 local elections, no nationwide election is scheduled for the next two years, reducing the likelihood of political distractions. At the same time, an unprecedented semiconductor boom has generated a surge in tax revenue, easing immediate concerns about securing funding for ambitious policy initiatives. In short, many of the practical constraints on policymaking have diminished while the scope for long-term planning has expanded.

The Chinese philosopher Mencius (circa 371-289 BC) argued that success in war depends on three factors: favorable timing, advantageous conditions and harmony among people. Vision 2030 ultimately failed because the Roh administration possessed none of them. By comparison, the current government appears to enjoy the first two advantages. The remaining challenge is the third, which Mencius regarded as the most important.

Although the local elections have ended, prospects for bipartisan cooperation remain dim. Instead of encouraging collaboration with the opposition, the ruling party itself has become consumed by an internal leadership struggle. Under such conditions, politically sensitive reforms involving labor, education, pensions and regulation may prove difficult to advance. There is also a risk that the government will settle for distributing windfall tax revenue under the banners of reducing inequality or accelerating the AI transition rather than pursuing deeper structural change.

Korea should not allow this rare opportunity to slip away. If the country hopes to avoid waiting another 20 years before attempting another genuine long-term strategy, it must focus on the bigger picture rather than short-term political gains. Governments should pursue what is necessary, not merely what is electorally rewarding. By 2045, the target year of the new national strategy, today's young adults will have become the generation leading Korean society. Listening more carefully to the voices of those now in their 20s and 30s would provide a far more reliable guide than chasing the next election.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.