Columns

Is the proposed presidential term appropriate?

A proposed "3+2" or "3+3" presidency could strengthen accountability and curb the risks of concentrated executive power.

Published
President Lee Jae Myung arrives for work at the Blue House on May 6. Presidential chief of staff Kang Hoon-sik is at left.


Yeom Jae-ho

The author is the president of Taejae University.


The central issue in Korea’s current constitutional reform debate is a four-year presidential term with the possibility of re-election. Korea experienced such a system during the First Republic (1948-60) and Third Republic (1963-72), but the real model is the United States.

The United States invented the four-year presidency nearly 250 years ago after rejecting hereditary monarchy. Its political structure was designed around checks and balances among the executive, legislative and judicial branches. Power was further divided between federal and state governments, the Senate and House of Representatives and federal and state courts.

The presidential system subsequently became a model for many countries. Yet even the United States today is struggling with political polarization, an increasingly powerful presidency and a broader crisis of democracy.

Presidential elections also involve an inherent information asymmetry. Voters must choose between the candidates of two major parties without knowing how the winner will actually govern. Inaugural addresses are filled with graceful promises to listen to the people and unite the country. Once in office, however, presidents often become imperial, seeking to dominate their parties and micromanage state affairs with immense power.

Since Korea’s democratization in 1987, presidents have generally seen their initial approval ratings plunge within three years of taking office. Pollsters including Gallup Korea show three-year approval ratings of 44 percent for Lee Myung-bak and 47 percent for Moon Jae-in. Roh Tae-woo stood at 12 percent, while Roh Moo-hyun was at 27 percent. Yoon Suk Yeol was at just 19 percent before declaring martial law.

Even Moon, who recorded the highest fourth-year approval rating of any Korean president, was at only about 34 percent by then. If public support typically collapses within three years, is maintaining a guaranteed five-year term really appropriate?

A president’s first year is largely a honeymoon period spent reorganizing government, appointing ministers and designing policies. Once policies are implemented in earnest, voters begin evaluating the administration. Yet however unfavorable that assessment becomes, the president is guaranteed five years in office. An imperial president can therefore stubbornly pursue the same course until the end.

Korea has already experienced the consequences of intense political conflict: One president was impeached after massive candlelight demonstrations and another after declaring martial law. How long should the country repeat such tragedies?

Research by the Pew Research Center found that cabinets in European parliamentary democracies lasted only about two years on average from the end of World War II through 2022. Angela Merkel was an exception, governing Germany for 16 years, but she survived five general elections while forming various governing coalitions.

Britain offers another example. Before Andy Burnham became prime minister in July, Liz Truss served only 49 days, Rishi Sunak about 1.7 years and Keir Starmer roughly two years. In Japan, prime ministers have served an average of only about two years over the past three decades.

Ultimately, the only way to overcome the information asymmetry inherent in elections is to let leaders govern and then ask voters whether they still have confidence in them.

The 2025 local elections in Britain produced a striking rejection of the traditional two-party system. Labour lost 189 seats and the Conservatives 674, while Reform UK, which had won none in the 2021 contests, captured 804 of 1,637 seats. One explanation is that younger voters had for years been mocking the traditional Labour-Conservative duopoly through memes on social media.

In “The End of Power” (2013), Moisés Naím argued that the end of information monopolies would also erode power. Ordinary citizens can now obtain information easily through social media and YouTube, while that information spreads rapidly. Assessments of a president’s performance circulate just as quickly, making governments appear to exhaust their political lifespan within two or three years.

For voters in the AI era, including younger generations accustomed to watching videos at double or triple speed, even a five-year presidency can feel long. A four-year term renewable once, potentially allowing eight years in power, may feel longer still.

If constitutional reform toward a parliamentary or semi-presidential system that ensures political accountability is impossible, Korea should at least consider shortening the presidential term in an era of rapid change and asking voters for renewed confidence sooner.

This is no longer an age when a newly established state requires one leader to design national policy over an extended period. Why not give more political leaders opportunities to govern and hold them accountable more quickly?

Such a system might also constrain imperial presidential power and encourage parties to develop policies continuously rather than constantly watching the president for signals.

Instead of assuming that constitutional reform must mean four-year terms allowing as many as eight years in office, Korea could consider a three-year initial term followed by a confidence vote or re-election for another two or three years — in effect, a "3+2" or "3+3" presidency.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.