China seeks spheres of influence as Trump abandons strategic consistency

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Park Won-gon

The author is a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University.

“We can't continue to allow China to rape our country.”

“Together, we have the chance to create a future of greater prosperity, cooperation and happiness.”

Both remarks came from U.S. President Donald Trump. The first was delivered during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, while the second came during a toast at last week’s U.S.-China summit. Trump’s China policy, which has swung sharply between extremes, may now culminate in effectively elevating China to equal status alongside the United States, forming a de facto "Group of Two."

Chinese President Xi Jinping was unusually direct in addressing Washington. During opening remarks at the summit, he invoked the “Thucydides Trap,” the theory that war often erupts when a rising power challenges an established hegemon.

According to Graham Allison of Harvard University, the current U.S.-China rivalry represents the 17th historical case of the Thucydides Trap, with roughly 75 percent of previous cases ending in war.

Xi’s decision to raise the concept directly in front of Trump carried a clear message: avoiding conflict requires the United States to recognize China as an equal partner. In effect, Xi was demanding that Washington stop fearing Beijing's rise and formally acknowledge its enhanced status.

Xi’s dinner remarks were equally revealing. He stated that “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and making America great again can go hand in hand.” The “great rejuvenation” refers to China’s long-term strategy, often linked to the “Chinese Dream,” which aims to restore the country to a central global position by 2049.

MAGA, by contrast, increasingly reflects a form of selective isolationism centered on domestic priorities and reduced involvement in regions lacking vital U.S. interests. The Trump administration has translated this into preserving overwhelming U.S. influence across the Western Hemisphere.

Xi’s remarks suggested a broader strategic vision: a division of global influence between the United States and China. Under such a framework, Washington would dominate the Western Hemisphere while Beijing would secure primacy in Asia. The idea echoes Xi’s repeated statement since 2013 that “the vast Pacific Ocean is large enough to accommodate both China and the United States.”

Implicitly, the proposal amounts to a division of spheres of influence, with the United States overseeing the eastern Pacific and China asserting dominance over the western Pacific.

China has framed this approach as a “constructive strategic stability relationship.” According to the Chinese foreign ministry, the concept envisions stability based on cooperation, manageable competition, controlled disagreements and a commitment to peace.

This marks an evolution from Xi’s earlier concept of a “new type of major-power relations,” introduced in 2012. That framework also treated the United States and China as equals, but largely downplayed rivalry while emphasizing mutual respect and shared interests. Washington never fully accepted it.

The new formulation differs in openly acknowledging strategic competition and seeking to manage it rather than denying it. Unlike the earlier proposal, it was explicitly referenced during a formal summit and included in Chinese foreign ministry statements, increasing the likelihood that it could shape real-world diplomacy.

While Beijing arrived at the summit with a coherent strategy focused on establishing equal status with Washington, the Trump administration appeared to lack a clear China strategy altogether. There was little evidence of a consistent framework for managing relations with a rising China.

Instead, the summit was shaped by domestic political pressures, including economic strain linked to the Iran war, falling approval ratings and Trump’s highly personalized approach to international relations.

According to polling analyst Nate Silver, Trump’s approval rating fell to 34 percent as of Friday, marking another low point. Surging oil prices following the Iran conflict reportedly dragged support for his economic policies down to 30 percent.

If those conditions persist, many analysts believe Republicans could lose control of the U.S. House of Representatives in November’s midterm elections. Trump, therefore, needed to frame the summit as a political victory for domestic audiences.

He promoted what he called a “fantastic trade agreement,” highlighting Chinese purchases of 200 Boeing aircraft as well as U.S. oil, energy products and soybeans.

To achieve that outcome, Trump softened his rhetoric dramatically. Criticism of China largely disappeared. Instead, he described Xi as “my friend,” “a great leader” and “a warm person.” The language sharply contrasted with his first term.

More troubling was Trump’s handling of Taiwan. Before departing for the summit, he told reporters that Xi wanted the United States to stop selling weapons to Taiwan and that he intended to discuss the matter.

That statement broke with long-standing U.S. policy established under the Ronald Reagan administration’s “Six Assurances,” which holds that Washington does not consult Beijing in advance regarding arms sales to Taiwan. Trump later acknowledged aboard Air Force One that he had discussed the issue in detail with Xi.

The episode exposed Trump’s willingness to disregard long-standing principles and norms in U.S. foreign policy while showing personal affinity toward powerful leaders regardless of ideology or political system.

This summit may ultimately be remembered as a turning point in which China formally secured recognition as a geopolitical equal to the United States. Competition between Xi’s strategically patient China and Trump’s transactional United States could increasingly tilt in Beijing’s favor for the remainder of Trump’s term.

At each summit, Xi is likely to push one step further. Trump, meanwhile, may continue responding with improvised diplomacy lacking strategic consistency. If the United States continues retreating from strategic coherence, Korea’s diplomatic options will inevitably narrow.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.