President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a Cabinet meeting at the Blue House in Seoul on Sept. 29.NEWS1
Chung Un-chan
The author, a former president of Seoul National University and former prime minister, is the chairman of the Korea Institute for Shared Growth.
In turbulent times, a line from the classics can offer clarity and wisdom. That is why I recently revisited “Han Feizi,” a work of Chinese political philosophy from the late Warring States period.
It divides rulers into three categories: “An inferior ruler exhausts his own strength; an average ruler draws upon the strength of others; a superior ruler draws upon the wisdom of others.”
The lesson is that effective government depends less on a leader’s abilities than on encouraging advisers to offer wisdom and candid criticism. Emperor Taizong of Tang (r. 626-649) understood this. He retained Wei Zheng, a former political adversary known for his blunt advice, helping usher in the Reign of Zhenguan.
Korea’s current governance raises troubling questions. President Lee Jae Myung could become such a superior leader by appointing ministers with experience and conviction. Yet recent controversies suggest that presidential micromanagement may undermine that potential.
When the president initiates and explains every policy, ministers retreat and bureaucrats avoid responsibility. The presidential office stays busy while government responses slow. Anxiety and cynicism grow.
Cabinet appointments signal an administration’s governing philosophy. Ministers need integrity and expertise, but also the ability to manage conflict, build public consent, handle crises and lead organizations.
Recent appointments, however, appear to place loyalty to the president’s reform agenda and defense against his legal troubles above other qualifications. When appointments in relevant fields look like legal protection for a president facing unresolved judicial issues, even legitimate reforms struggle to earn public trust.
Why do ethical controversies, suspected conflicts of interest and unconvincing explanations persist despite Korea’s talent? Perhaps recruitment remains confined to the president’s inner circle. Even that impression discourages capable outsiders, leaving those known to the president or unwilling to challenge him.
When loyalty outranks competence, ministers conceal uncomfortable truths and remain silent about foreseeable consequences. Cabinet meetings risk becoming exercises in taking instructions rather than debating policy. Worse than policy failure is the absence of anyone willing to warn that failure is approaching.
Presidential communication can compound the problem. Posting on social media five or six times daily is not necessarily public engagement. Uncoordinated presidential remarks become confusing signals for markets and officials. Direct intervention in minor issues makes ministerial announcements seem provisional, leaving agencies waiting for the president’s next statement rather than exercising judgment.
Controversy over the delayed investigation of a land mine explosion in the demilitarized zone exposed similar weaknesses. Had the defense minister and military commanders promptly explained the operational circumstances and reasons for delay, could needless suspicion and division have been avoided? The security apparatus should function even while the president attends the United Nations General Assembly abroad.
History offers a lesson. During the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, President John F. Kennedy’s administration suffered from adviser groupthink. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, open debate among advisers helped avert catastrophe.
Neither micromanagement nor neglect is the answer. Presidents should establish priorities, delegate implementation to ministers and hold them accountable for results.
Ministers must explain both the benefits and costs of policies honestly. They should be prepared to tell the president, “That policy will not work in practice.” They must also serve as demanding teachers, clarifying complex issues for both the president and the public.
A government cannot succeed if only its president appears capable. Real strength lies in institutions that manage crises according to principle even when the president is absent.
Korea needs ministers of experience and conviction, not presidential loyalists who merely applaud. Only when the president steps back and welcomes others’ wisdom can ministers assume responsibility and government act decisively. A country whose citizens must worry about its president is an unhappy one.
The distinction is not between a powerful president and weak ministers. It is between a presidency that concentrates every decision and one that builds a government capable of action. Delegation does not absolve the president of responsibility. Rather, it makes responsibility visible, allowing the public to know who made a decision, why it was made and who must answer when it goes wrong.
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
