Iran war signals cracks in global order and new pressures on Korea
Published: 17 Mar. 2026, 00:03
Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI
Park Won-gon
The author is a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University.
The war between Israel and Iran that U.S. President Donald Trump initiated on Feb. 28, promising a short campaign, is expanding rather than ending. Early in the conflict, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth — heading the U.S. Department of Defense — insisted that the military attacks have an end. But Iran's response has indicated the opposite.
Tankers sail in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, in the United Arab Emirates on March 11 amid the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran. [REUTERS/YONHAP]
Tehran has elevated the hard-line Mojtaba Khamenei as its new supreme leader and is signaling its determination to fight to the end. Most notably, Iran has effectively moved to close the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic chokepoint that can raise global oil prices and expose a critical vulnerability for the United States.
The impact has already been felt domestically in the United States. Gasoline prices have increased roughly 20 percent compared to the first week of the war, approaching $4 per gallon. Because fuel prices are among the most visible economic indicators for voters, the surge quickly affected Trump’s approval ratings and domestic political pressure. What the U.S. president expected to be a quick victory over Iran now appears to be caught in Tehran’s strategy.
The consequences of this unpredictable war for the global order and the Korean Peninsula can be examined from three perspectives.
First, the conflict is undermining the foundations of the liberal international order. Since the end of World War II in 1945, the international system built around the United Nations has relied on several principles: the respect for sovereignty, the preservation of territorial integrity and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Central to that framework is Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force by member states except in cases of self-defense.
Trump argued that Iran posed an “imminent threat” without presenting concrete evidence. The United States then chose to take military action while negotiations with Iran were still underway, effectively attempting to alter the status quo through force.
A deeper problem is that permanent members of the UN Security Council — the states meant to safeguard international order — have themselves become agents of its erosion. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, followed by U.S. attacks on Venezuela and Iran, has weakened the authority of the UN system. The vision of U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who hoped cooperation among major powers would prevent another global war after the devastation of World War II, appears increasingly fragile.
Second, the conflict raises the possibility that the United States may once again fall into what scholars call an “imperial overstretch.” After the Sept. 11 attacks in 2001, the United States spent nearly two decades absorbed in the “war on terror.” The decision by the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden to abruptly withdraw from Afghanistan was intended to free Washington from prolonged Middle Eastern entanglements.
But the Trump administration has once again become deeply involved in the region. If the closure of the Strait of Hormuz continues to drive oil prices higher, the United States may find itself tied to Middle Eastern conflicts for the long term.
Washington’s own strategic documents point in another direction. The National Security Strategy released in November 2025 and the National Defense Strategy announced in January identified the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific as the country’s primary strategic regions. They also made clear that the United States aims to deter China through military strength in the Indo-Pacific.
However, the United States now faces simultaneous challenges in multiple theaters: Europe, where the Russia-Ukraine war continues; the Indo-Pacific, where tensions with China persist; and the Middle East, where a new war is unfolding.
This situation suggests that the United States is no longer acting as an overwhelmingly dominant hegemon. Instead, it risks becoming what some analysts call a “fatigued hegemon” by expending national power across several fronts without resolving any of them. This diffusion of power creates openings for revisionist states seeking to change the status quo.
Neither China nor Russia appears ready to replace the United States in providing global norms or public goods. As a result, the current moment resembles not a stable multipolar order but an unmanaged chain of crises.
Third, Iran’s strategy of horizontal escalation offers a troubling lesson for weaker states confronting stronger adversaries. By expanding the battlefield beyond its own territory, Iran has managed to alter the conflict's dynamics.
Tehran has launched strikes not only against Israel but also against U.S. bases, ports and oil facilities across the Gulf region. The attacks have effectively drawn at least nine countries into the conflict zone. When missiles cross the skies above financial and tourism hubs such as Dubai, the United Arab Emirates, and Doha, Qatar, the war quickly became a global crisis that disrupts energy markets and investor confidence.
This model may prove attractive to Russia, China and North Korea. Pyongyang could seek to develop a similar strategy, in which a conflict is not confined to the Korean Peninsula but spreads to U.S. bases in Japan, Guam or even Hawaii across the Pacific.
Such developments could significantly affect the Korean Peninsula. One likely outcome is growing fatigue and friction within political alliances. As the United States becomes involved in multiple theaters simultaneously, it will inevitably demand an expanded role from its allies.
Europe will be asked to continue supporting Ukraine and rebuilding its military capabilities. Middle Eastern partners will face greater responsibilities for maritime security and energy stability. In the Indo-Pacific, allies will be expected to serve as the front line in deterring China.
Trump has already moved in that direction. On Saturday, he requested that five countries, including South Korea, dispatch naval vessels to the Strait of Hormuz. His message was that nations affected by a blockade should work with the United States to keep the waterway open and secure.
Washington may also press South Korea to assume a larger role in the Indo-Pacific. U.S. strategic documents emphasize cooperation among South Korea, Japan and India in countering China, urging these countries to invest in the capabilities needed for that mission.
Gen. Xavier Brunson, the commander of United States Forces Korea, underscored this expectation in December of last year when he said that South Korea possesses the ability, experience and strategic location to contribute to stability in the Indo-Pacific. Demands for greater responsibility from key U.S. allies are already becoming a reality.
U.S. President Donald Trump speaks at Verst Logistics in Hebron, Kentucky, on March 11. [AP/YONHAP]
At the same time, doubts may grow about how long and how far partners should participate in U.S. wars.
The Iran war, therefore, represents more than another Middle Eastern conflict. It marks a moment when the postwar international order exposes its deeper fractures. As great powers weaken the rules that once governed their behavior, smaller states are responding by widening the battlefield.
The result is a system increasingly defined by disorder and cascading crises. In this kind of environment, regional conflicts can quickly connect and escalate into broader instability.
The Korean Peninsula will not be immune. As the United States faces growing strategic burdens, it will demand greater contributions from its allies. At the same time, North Korea may look for opportunities to exploit strategies that expand the battlefield.
Ultimately, the current war serves as a warning that South Korea must reassess its alliance policies, security strategy and approach to crisis management on the peninsula in a rapidly changing international environment.
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.





with the Korea JoongAng Daily
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