What we are missing about the war in Ukraine

Lee Jae-seung

The author is a professor of international studies at Korea University and head of the Ilmin International Relations Institute.

A diplomatic rift has emerged between Korea and Ukraine. When President Volodymyr Zelensky publicly disclosed plans to transfer North Korean prisoners of war to the South, Seoul summoned Kyiv’s ambassador to protest what it described as a violation of a confidential agreement.

Claims such as “Zelensky’s greed and incompetence are prolonging the war” and “restoring relations with Russia is in Korea’s practical interest” frequently surface across the country. Criticism based on national interest is necessary, but reducing the issue to a leader’s personal disposition or a simple narrative about the power balance makes it easy to miss the conflict’s essence.

The structuralist argument that NATO’s eastward expansion heightened Russia’s threat perception has some validity. But the more important question is this: Why did Central and Eastern European countries choose NATO? The war launched under the stated aim of “preventing NATO expansion” produced the paradoxical outcome of formerly neutral countries Finland and Sweden joining the organization.

Promises of eventual membership without a concrete timetable, coupled with the lukewarm sanctions imposed on Russia after it annexed Crimea, have left Ukraine in a “diplomatic vacuum.”

From Ukraine’s perspective, this war is not simply a proxy war between great powers. It is a war of independence and identity that will determine whether Ukraine once again becomes a Russian vassal state or rebuilds itself as part of Europe. Its determination to decide for itself who it will be and how it will live cannot be dismissed.

But before mocking Zelensky as a former comedian, we should ask why voters who were disillusioned with the established political establishment chose him.

Ukraine has been pushed into a corner. But as much as we criticize its leadership or debate reducing support, none of this justifies armed aggression or serves as grounds to diminish a smaller state’s right to self-determination. This war has a clear aggressor and a clear victim. The norm that great powers cannot redraw borders by force is hardly irrelevant to Korea, which was once itself a weaker state. If we remember how easily the trusteeship of the Korean Peninsula was decided through a great-power deal in 1945, then refusing to turn our backs on a weaker nation fighting for its sovereignty and independence is the minimum common ground that we should share with the international order.

We should also reconsider whether Korea’s position is being adequately explained to the international community. The decision to pursue the transfer of prisoners of war confidentially reflected concerns about their safety and the situation on the peninsula. But it may be difficult to understand why South Korea, facing North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles and the North Korea-Russia alliance, is so eager to improve relations with Pyongyang and Moscow. If Seoul explains the safety of the prisoners and their families in the language of human rights, it can win understanding. But if it rushes to improve relations while remaining silent about North Korea-Russia military cooperation, its position will be judged not as one of principle, but of ambiguity.

Before welcoming U.S. President Donald Trump’s suspension of sanctions against Russia and moving to change its own position, South Korea should also coordinate its approach to ensure consistency with the U.S. Congress and its allies. As Korea’s delicate diplomatic balance begins to break, what lies below may not be solid ground but a cold quagmire.

The costs borne by Korea from supporting Ukraine and joining sanctions against Russia are diplomatic “trust capital,” strengthened security and economic resilience.

Korea will assume the Group of 20 (G20) presidency in 2028 and, beginning next year, will join the G20 troika system, taking on a leading role in multilateral diplomacy.

The essence of diplomacy lies in calculating the consequences without being swept away by emotion. Pragmatism is not a formula for adding up the short-term choices that appear most advantageous; instead, it is sometimes the courage to endure and swallow things that one dislikes. Rather than dwelling on how much Ukraine has done wrong, Korea should reflect on why supporting the self-determination of smaller states matters to its own security and credibility. What is needed now is not heightened emotion but cool reason and skillful diplomacy.