The Democratic Party’s push to accelerate bills and curb filibusters risks weakening safeguards meant to protect both deliberation and minority checks.
A revision to the National Assembly Act shortening the review period for bills designated for fast-track handling passes during a plenary session of the National Assembly on Aug. 20.YONHAP
Kim Hyoung-gu
The author is an editorial writer at the JoongAng Ilbo.
The ruling Democratic Party (DP) pushed a revision to the National Assembly Act through parliament on Thursday despite opposition protests. The amendment sharply shortens the maximum review period for bills designated for fast-track handling from 330 days, or about 11 months, to 90 days, or roughly three months.
The maximum review period in a standing committee will fall from 180 to 60 days, while review by the Legislation and Judiciary Committee will be cut from 90 to 30 days. A separate waiting period of up to 60 days before a bill is placed on the plenary agenda will be eliminated.
The DP argues the change is necessary for a “working National Assembly.” Despite its name, the fast-track system can take nearly a year to move legislation through parliament, effectively becoming a “slow track.”
That argument has some merit. According to a 2020 National Assembly Research Service analysis of the 20th National Assembly, bills that ultimately passed took an average of 146.3 days to process. Ordinary legislation can therefore clear parliament in about five months, while placing a bill on the fast track can paradoxically extend the process to nearly a year. At a time when advanced technologies are rapidly transforming society, there will be occasions when legislation must respond more quickly.
But the DP should consider why the fast-track system was created. The National Assembly Advancement Act, introduced through bipartisan agreement in 2012, sought to prevent politics based on force — whether the numerical strength of the majority or physical obstruction by the minority.
While sharply restricting the speaker’s ability to unilaterally bring legislation to a floor vote, the law also prevented minority parties from holding up bills indefinitely. The 330-day fast-track process was designed to give legislation time to mature before advancing.
The law also revived the filibuster, or unlimited debate during a parliamentary session, as a legitimate tool for minority parties. Its power was demonstrated in February 2016, when the DP was the opposition and tried to block an antiterrorism bill promoted by the ruling Saenuri Party, the predecessor of the People Power Party (PPP). Thirty-eight opposition lawmakers spoke for a combined 192 hours and 25 minutes.
With the fast track and filibuster as its two pillars, the Advancement Act was designed as a compromise: restraining majority domination and minority obstruction while allowing time for dialogue.
Yet the DP now appears ready to alter the filibuster as well. The DP and other parties in the ruling bloc, including the Rebuilding Korea Party, are seeking to ease requirements for submitting a motion to end a filibuster. They also want to allow the speaker to suspend a session if attendance falls below the quorum during a filibuster. The DP says parliament must “break the chains of legislative paralysis.”
But the National Assembly is not a factory where speed and efficiency are the only measures of performance. Good laws require deliberation. That is why legislation passes through multiple filters: introduction, standing committee review, consultation, revision, legal and technical review by the Legislation and Judiciary Committee and debate on the plenary floor.
Adequate deliberation is especially important for legislation governing elections, where rules can be distorted depending on who holds power, and for changes to the judicial system that can profoundly affect people’s lives.
It is therefore questionable whether every fast-track bill should face a uniform 90-day deadline. The review period could instead differ between urgent livelihood-related legislation and major bills requiring deeper deliberation.
If the DP uses its overwhelming majority to drastically shorten fast-track review periods and then weakens the filibuster, the carefully constructed balance underlying the Advancement Act will tilt sharply toward the majority.
Opposition efforts to delay legislation cannot be justified unconditionally either. In a democracy, the opposition has the power and responsibility to check the majority, not an absolute veto. Opposition parties should identify flaws and propose alternatives rather than simply obstruct legislation.
What both sides need is restraint. The DP must not misuse its majority, while the PPP must not abuse the obstruction available to a minority.
Neither the fast-track system nor the filibuster is inherently at fault. The problem is partisan politics that forgets the Advancement Act’s fundamental principle of checks and balances — rewriting parliamentary rules whenever convenient or opposing legislation without credible alternatives.
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
