South Korea cannot lose tug-of-war over DMZ

Lee Chul-jae

The author is head of the Institute for Military and Security Affairs and senior defense reporter at the JoongAng Ilbo.

“I still feel pain when I think of our service members who were injured in an unfortunate accident in the demilitarized zone not long ago.”

At first, I wondered whether I had heard correctly. The “unfortunate accident” President Lee Jae Myung mentioned in his Armed Forces Day address on Thursday referred to the Sept. 21 mine explosion in the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Eighteen soldiers from the 25th Infantry Division were clearing a search route when a mine exploded, seriously injuring two. Military authorities and the United Nations Command announced on Monday that North Korean mines caused the blast and that their placement violated the Armistice Agreement.

Calling something “unfortunate” and an “accident” implies it was something unexpected. Would it be going too far to interpret Lee’s words as suggesting North Korea could not have deliberately planted mines to target our troops and that he did not anticipate an explosion?

Judging from the ruling camp’s mood, perhaps not. Rep. Jin Sung-joon of the Democratic Party (DP), chairman of the National Assembly’s National Defense Committee, said on Sept. 29 that if the mines were defensive, “we need to be cautious about a military response.”

There is evidence North Korea could reasonably have anticipated casualties.

The blast occurred about 10 meters (32 feet, 10 inches) south of the military demarcation Line (MDL). North Korean troops created a densely mined area south of the line. Pyongyang knows the two Koreas differ over the MDL baseline in some areas and likely knows Seoul regards the blast site as south of it. When North Korean troops approached the MDL to clear vegetation, plant mines, install electrified fencing and build tactical roads as part of “border fortification,” South Korean troops responded with warning broadcasts and warning shots.

North Korea’s decision to establish a minefield south of the MDL can therefore be read as an attempt to deter Korean search, reconnaissance and ambush operations inside the DMZ. That makes it offensive in character.

North Korea, having completed its nuclear force and enjoying backing from China and Russia, may believe it need not fear South Korea. On Oct. 2, Kim Yo-jong, deputy department director of the Workers’ Party, mocked Seoul, accusing it of creating a suspicious accident and then habitually picking a quarrel because it could not explain what happened.

What matters now is the response. Although North Korean responsibility has been established, the ruling camp appears reluctant to respond forcefully because it prioritizes reducing military tensions. The “corresponding measures” Defense Minister Kang Shin-chul promised in the National Assembly may amount to little more than stern condemnation. The government may argue that proving North Korea’s intent is difficult.

But settling the matter with a condemnation would effectively acquiesce to North Korea’s concept of a “southern border” that disregards the DMZ. That would erode the buffer between the Koreas and increase the risk that an accidental DMZ clash escalates into a localized conflict. South Korea cannot afford to lose this tug-of-war over the DMZ that North Korea initiated.

There is precedent for a tougher response. After the wooden-box mine incident in August 2015, the Park Geun-hye administration resumed loudspeaker broadcasts toward North Korea and answered North Korean fire at South Korean loudspeakers with artillery. Pyongyang then proposed high-level inter-Korean talks and later expressed “regret.”

Jeon Gyeong-joo, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, said North Korean provocations fell from 24 in 2015 to six in 2016, the first such decline since the armistice. “It means North Korea calculated the risks and costs of provocations,” he said.

The government must demand that North Korea acknowledge responsibility, apologize, completely halt its border fortification inside the DMZ and restore the area to its previous condition. If Pyongyang refuses, pressure that hurts the regime, including loudspeaker broadcasts, is essential.

Whether Seoul surrenders the initiative to Pyongyang or creates conditions for improved inter-Korean relations depends on its response. Restraint has value, but deterrence requires showing that violations carry costs. The government must make clear that reducing tensions does not mean accepting unilateral changes to the DMZ or allowing North Korea to redefine the military boundary through facts created on the ground.