Ruling party needs consensus between rival factions

Lee Sun-woo

The author is a professor of political science and international relations at Seoul National University.

The relationship between a president and the ruling party under a presidential system is a delicate one. The ruling party produces the president and serves as a partner in governing. Yet its lawmakers are members of the legislature and therefore expected to check the executive branch and its leader. The party thus faces an inherent conflict between these two roles.

When congressional politics began in the United States, the original presidential system, the concept of political parties was weak. The Founding Fathers largely regarded parties as factions to be shunned. Lawmakers acted independently, with only fluid factions occasionally emerging. Early presidents, therefore, had little practical understanding of the dynamics of interacting with governing and opposition parties.

Korea’s first president, Syngman Rhee, and Russia’s first president, Boris Yeltsin, embraced antiparty politics. Both saw themselves as standing far above individual lawmakers and believed they should, or could, lead the legislature.

That approach could not last. Lawmakers naturally formed shifting coalitions and opposed presidents on particular issues. Presidents needed stable groups in Congress or parliament to support them ideologically and politically. Some lawmakers likewise realized that generally siding with the president could help their re-election prospects, constituency development or chances of receiving government posts. This was how ruling parties emerged under presidential systems.

Yet ruling parties did not necessarily support presidents blindly. From the early 20th century through the 1980s, the ruling parties of the United States remained relatively independent of presidents and party discipline was comparatively weak. Lawmakers generally agreed with their president’s broad ideology and policy direction but frequently opposed specific measures through cross-party voting.

Individual lawmakers might have done so because of ideological convictions or constituency interests. In the context of separation of powers, however, they were fulfilling their proper role as legislators checking the executive.

This became regarded as a model for presidential government and helped persuade many new postwar democracies to adopt the system. During this golden age of U.S. presidentialism, presidents had little choice but to constantly talk and negotiate with lawmakers from both parties, adjusting their policies accordingly. As Richard Neustadt, a pioneer of presidential studies, observed, leadership through persuasion was a president’s essential virtue and resource.

The model, however, was rarely replicated elsewhere. Like Rhee and Yeltsin, presidents often created ruling parties themselves and controlled them vertically to manage complicated legislative politics. Opposition parties also became more cohesive and confrontational. In many presidential democracies, including the United States, polarization eventually hardened politics into two opposing camps: the president and ruling party on one side and the opposition on the other.

In Korea, the Democratic Party’s recent leadership election ended with former Prime Minister Kim Min-seok, a key ally of President Lee Jae Myung, defeating former party leader Jung Chung-rae. Jung performed strongly, but amid political polarization and with the ruling party holding a parliamentary majority, most members and supporters appear to have preferred a party that empowers the president as a governing partner rather than one that checks him as part of the legislature.

That preference deserves respect and will probably shape politics for some time. But it does not mean the ruling party should abandon its responsibilities as the National Assembly’s majority and its most accountable political force.

It may be unrealistic to expect Korea to immediately recreate the golden age of American presidentialism amid severe polarization. But President Lee and his allies can respect critical voices from other factions and seek coexistence through compromise. Indeed, they must.

A struggle by the pro-Lee faction for hegemony ahead of the next general election and presidential election would not benefit Lee in the medium or long term. A dominant faction may find it useful to reshape a party entirely in its own image while in opposition, even at the risk of division. In government, however, the party’s fortunes become tied to presidential approval, increasing the risk of failure.

With the opposition People Power Party also struggling with severe internal divisions, this is an opportunity for the ruling party to experiment first with internal diversity. Mainstream and nonmainstream factions should therefore operate the party through consensus.

Several members of the new leadership are aligned with Jung, making efforts toward coexistence especially important. The Jung faction must also cooperate where agreement is possible rather than resorting to unconditional opposition or attempts to undermine the party leader. Signs that the party’s large membership is dividing between hard-liners and moderates make internal deliberation increasingly urgent. Failure could plunge the ruling camp into crisis and even raise the possibility of a party split.

If a multiparty system remains distant, guaranteeing diversity within parties, as during the golden age of American presidentialism, is the path a responsible ruling party should take. It is also the most realistic first step toward easing Korea’s political polarization, which has been reinforced by both camps’ insistence on internal uniformity today.