The paradox of sovereignty

Song Ho-keun

The author is a columnist at the JoongAng Ilbo, a chair professor and director of Doheon Academy, Hallym University.

I have lived my entire life without war. Although the threat of conflict has always loomed, war has never destroyed my life. The wartime generation lived having lost precious parts of theirs. Those who once turned away from their parents' war stories eventually realize that the peace they enjoyed, however precarious, was a stroke of luck, a temporary blessing from heaven.

In 2015, amid growing global tensions, the Nobel Prize in Literature went to Belarusian writer Svetlana Alexievich. Her book “The Unwomanly Face of War” (1985) recounts the suffering of ordinary women swept into war. Yet its humanitarian appeal went unheeded as wars engulfed Ukraine and the Middle East.

A lifetime without war is extraordinary fortune. But such fortune does not arise spontaneously. National security sometimes demands setting aside a leader's governing philosophy and national pride.

During the Qing invasion of Joseon in 1636, Minister Choi Myeong-gil advocated peace negotiations. He did not admire the Manchus. Rather, he feared for civilians facing 70,000 Qing troops equipped with artillery who had advanced from the Yalu River to Jamsil in just seven days.

Principles preserve rulers' prestige, but pragmatism saves lives. Choi chose pragmatism, accepting condemnation as a traitor to the Ming dynasty. Joseon subsequently enjoyed 250 years of peace while much of the world descended into warfare.

Now, in its second year, the administration faces internal Democratic Party divisions and strains in the South Korea-U.S. alliance. Domestic troubles can be endured, but external crises risk provoking war.

What can South Korea gain from antagonizing Washington? U.S. President Donald Trump's unpredictability may destabilize the alliance, but a progressive government should pragmatically adjust its strategic position accordingly.

The pursuit of autonomy and self-reliance in foreign policy began under President Roh Moo-hyun. His ambition to balance continental China and maritime United States initially seemed innovative. Yet relations with Washington remained ambiguous while concessions to Pyongyang produced little tangible benefit.

Autonomy unsupported by military strength is dangerous rhetoric. North Korea possesses an estimated 57 nuclear weapons. Its forces include 1.2 million troops, 545 combat aircraft, 5,500 multiple rocket launchers and 71 submarines, compared to South Korea's 500,000 troops, 315 aircraft, 310 launchers and 22 submarines.

South Korea needs to strengthen its defenses, even if that means relying heavily on the United States. Kim Jong-un's repeated missile launches demonstrate his own faith in military power.

When wartime operational control, or Opcon, was debated in 2016, conventional warfare dominated strategic thinking. Today, wars in Ukraine and the Middle East demonstrate the importance of drones, robotics, intelligence and cyberwarfare.

U.S. restrictions on Starlink reportedly disrupted Ukrainian drone operations. Washington is shifting its Korean Peninsula strategy toward multidomain forces suited to technologically advanced warfare.

U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson says conditions have changed over the past decade. Is that an excuse? No. South Korea's strategic role has changed.

Washington identifies China as a major threat and emphasizes the first island chain linking Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. South Korea effectively serves as an aircraft carrier supporting this defensive network. Would the United States surrender command of that carrier?

Meanwhile, Kim Jong-un has visited the Memorial Hall of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea in Dandong, reinforcing ties with China. As cooperation among North Korea, China and Russia deepens, joining the United States' broader strategy is South Korea's wisest course.

The Defense Ministry spokesperson's insistence that Washington must not “move the goalposts” sounds outdated. Modern warfare has already moved them. Korea must change its approach.

Democratic Party lawmakers condemning Brunson's arrogance and U.S. obstructionism should explain their alternative strategic vision.

Opcon has both South Korean and global significance. For South Korea, it concerns defending against North Korea. For Washington, it involves deterring North Korea, China and Russia.

With 40 percent of global military power concentrated around the peninsula, transferring Opcon could weaken U.S. deterrence. Even accidental inter-Korean clashes might complicate immediate U.S. intervention.

Invoking independent defense while weakening the alliance could endanger national security. The 1636 invasion illustrates this paradox of sovereignty.

The administration's argument that Opcon represents sovereignty presupposes independent nuclear capabilities and military superiority. Without them, what purpose does confrontation with Washington serve?

I want future generations to enjoy lives without war at this dangerous intersection of continental and maritime powers.