Kim Jong-un’s cemetery politics and the use of the dead

Jeong Yong-soo

The author is an editorial writer and the director of the Unification and Culture Research Institute of the JoongAng Ilbo.

Since taking power, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has focused heavily on modernizing Pyongyang. High-rise apartment blocks have been built along the Taedong River, including in districts such as Mirae Scientists Street and Ryomyong Street. Terrace-style housing has also been developed near the Botong River, where Kim Il Sung once resided until the 1970s. Since 2021, the regime has pursued a plan to construct 10,000 housing units annually in areas such as Songsin, Songhwa and Hwasong on the outskirts of the capital.

Despite persistent economic difficulties, these projects aim to refurbish the city’s aging appearance and create the impression of improving living standards. They also function as a form of “construction politics,” signaling a people-oriented image and differentiating Kim Jong-un’s leadership from the austerity of the Kim Jong-il era, when citizens were often told to tighten their belts.

Alongside housing construction, another notable aspect of the current leader's domestic policy is his emphasis on cemetery development. Shortly after assuming power in December 2011, following his father's death, Kim Jong-un moved to sanctify the grave of his mother, Ko Yong-hui. Ko died in France in 2004, but her burial site had long remained relatively neglected compared to the nearby Taesongsan Revolutionary Martyrs’ Cemetery, which honors key figures from the anti-Japanese struggle.

Soon after consolidating power, Kim Jong-un ordered renovations to Ko’s grave. A new burial mound was constructed, the surrounding area was landscaped and marble paving was laid along approach routes and a small plaza. Parking facilities were also added. The changes appear intended to elevate the status of his mother, who had previously been kept largely out of the public eye, while making the site more accessible for visiting officials and organized delegations.

According to Ryu Hyun-woo, a former North Korean acting ambassador to Kuwait who defected in 2019, visits to Ko’s grave have since been incorporated into an official itinerary alongside the revolutionary martyrs’ cemetery. In his memoir "Kim Jong-un’s Hidden Secret Fund" (2023), he recalled visiting the site with his father-in-law in 2014, describing how the two locations had effectively become a single pilgrimage route.

Kim Jong-un expanded these efforts in July 2013 by establishing a cemetery for war veterans on Sokbak Mountain in Pyongyang’s Sosong District. At the time of its creation, the site was said to house the remains of around 600 individuals, including those who died in the 1950-53 Korean War, the Vietnam War and other operations such as the 1996 Gangneung submarine infiltration. Although North Korea already maintained national cemeteries, including the Revolutionary Martyrs’ Cemetery and the Patriotic Martyrs’ Cemetery in Sinmi-ri, Kim chose to create an additional memorial space marking the 60th anniversary of the Korean War armistice.

While Kim Jong-il established burial sites for figures once classified as politically hostile, reflecting shifts in inter-Korean relations around the 2000 summit, Kim Jong-un has used war-related cemeteries to emphasize continuity across generations of revolution and to reinforce his own legitimacy as successor.

This cemetery-centered political approach has continued into his 15th year in power. North Korean media reported on April 3 that he inspected the construction site of a memorial dedicated to overseas military operations, referring to North Korea’s deployment of more than 10,000 troops and weapons to support Russia in its war in Ukraine.

After initially avoiding acknowledgment, Pyongyang confirmed in April of last year that it had participated in operations in Russia’s Kursk region. Since then, references to overseas deployment have appeared regularly in military parades and political events, underscoring deepening ties between Pyongyang and Moscow. Kim also held a ceremony honoring those involved in the deployment and announced plans to build a memorial commemorating their achievements.

Construction is underway not only for the memorial itself but also for an adjacent cemetery to house the remains of fallen soldiers. Kim has shown unusual interest in the project, reportedly visiting the site five times this year alone. During a visit in January, he was even shown driving a forklift carrying his wife, daughter and senior officials, a staged display of personal involvement in the project.

Cemeteries have also long played a role in North Korea’s external political messaging. After Kim Il Sung’s death, his residence was converted into the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, where his embalmed body is displayed. Following Kim Jong-il’s death, his remains were placed alongside his father’s, and the site became a central location for state ritual. Citizens are required to pay respects there on major anniversaries, and foreign visitors are often expected to do the same.

Kim Jong-il consolidated power by invoking his father’s legacy through slogans such as the “eternal life” of Kim Il Sung. Kim Jong-un has adopted similar practices, including symbolically designating his predecessors as representatives at major party congresses. The continued invocation of the deceased reflects a pattern of legitimizing authority through inherited revolutionary tradition.

What distinguishes Kim Jong-un is his attempt to extend cemetery politics into foreign policy. The overseas military memorial is expected to be completed in mid-April, marking the anniversary of operations in Russia. It is likely to be used both as a symbol of alignment with Moscow and as a signal directed at the United States.

Kim Jong-un's approach combines domestic messaging and external strategy. Housing construction is used to project concern for citizens, while cemetery projects reinforce regime stability and diplomatic positioning. Yet questions remain about how such policies are perceived, particularly when funding is drawn from citizens in a country still facing economic hardship.

Since the era of Kim Il Sung, cemeteries have served as tools for strengthening internal cohesion and emphasizing revolutionary continuity. Whether their expanded political use under Kim Jong-un will gain broader acceptance remains uncertain, especially when they are built at the expense of ordinary citizens.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.