Police tape cordons off a palm tree farm in Hallim, Jeju City, on Aug. 26, where the body of Jang Mi-ran was found 104 days after she went missing following the police’s false closure of her missing persons case.NEWS1
Kim Ye-won
The author is a lawyer at the Disability Rights Law Center.
Jang Mi-ran, who went missing on Jeju Island, was found dead after 104 days. A police officer at Jeju Seobu Police Station falsely entered information indicating that her safety had been confirmed, then closed the case. Public shock deepened when hundreds of missing persons cases handled similarly by the same officer were reopened for review.
Was this merely one officer’s misconduct? That question goes to the heart of investigative oversight.
Police traditionally secured initial evidence and established the facts, while prosecutors reviewed case records to determine whether evidence was sufficient or anything had been overlooked. Investigations can change direction as new evidence emerges, and human judgment is always fallible. For that reason, Korea’s criminal justice system maintained a structure of “a second look” for 70 years.
The 2021 adjustment of investigative powers between police and prosecutors was intended to reduce prosecutors’ direct investigations, leaving police to investigate while prosecutors focused on oversight and indictments. But prosecutorial direction of police investigations was abolished, police gained authority to close cases and some cases no longer reached prosecutors at all.
The past five years have shown how a poorly designed system can weaken investigative capacity. Then, late last month, a Criminal Procedure Act revision pushed through by the Democratic Party removed what remained of substantive oversight. Prosecutors can no longer conduct supplementary investigations themselves.
Investigative oversight is not a complaints procedure for receiving reports or hearing opinions. Its essence is the authority to change an erroneous conclusion. Modern criminal justice therefore gave prosecutors, as legal professionals, responsibility for reviewing records and ensuring the legality of investigations and indictments. Allowing victims to inspect records or meet prosecutors cannot constitute meaningful oversight if prosecutors lack authority to correct a flawed investigation.
Particularly difficult to understand is the claim that the revision protects vulnerable people. Lawmakers say separate laws will require all cases involving seven categories of crimes against vulnerable groups to be transferred to prosecutors. Yet they have not adequately considered how this will work.
Whether a case falls into one of those categories depends on the investigator’s judgment. Even if mandatory transfer applies, a case could move back and forth between police and the Serious Crimes Investigation Agency following a request for supplementary investigation from the prosecution service.
Nor is it clear why only seven crime categories warrant mandatory transfer. Voice phishing, large-scale fraud, embezzlement, breach of trust, stock manipulation, organized crime, crimes involving powerful figures and leaks of corporate secrets or national intelligence are excluded, despite the importance of legal review in such cases.
Vulnerability cannot be determined by the name of an offense. Vulnerable people can also become victims of voice phishing, jeonse fraud, embezzlement or other fraud. Creating separate procedures for seven categories merely increases procedural confusion.
Claims that complainants’ right to object has been restored are similarly misleading. In practice, the right is limited to complainants comparable to crime victims who have a direct interest in a case, and investigators ultimately determine who qualifies.
Giving victims access to records and meetings with prosecutors is no solution either. Access must inevitably be restricted because investigations require confidentiality. More importantly, prosecutors will lack authority to correct an investigation themselves. Oversight once performed automatically by the state has effectively been divided into multiple procedures and shifted onto victims.
Some argue that internal oversight can replace prosecutorial oversight. But their functions are fundamentally different. Both police and the Serious Crimes Investigation Agency investigate cases. There are limits to any institution’s ability to correct its own judgments. Prosecutors were therefore tasked with legally reviewing entire case records and correcting erroneous conclusions.
Investigating crime and uncovering the truth are responsibilities of the state. They should not depend on victims’ legal knowledge, ability to navigate procedures or financial capacity to hire lawyers. Making procedures more complicated while weakening oversight in the name of protecting vulnerable people risks harming those who are weakest first.
The Jang Mi-ran case cannot end with punishing one police officer. The state must build safeguards that prevent another such case.
Yet politics is moving in the opposite direction. Authorities are eliminating the power to correct flawed investigations while placing more procedures and responsibility on victims. If another Jang Mi-ran case occurs, it should not be dismissed as an accident. It would also be the consequence of a system that removed safeguards designed to catch human error.
Investigative oversight must be restored before it is too late. Otherwise, responsibility will lie not only with individuals who make mistakes but also with the system that stripped away the mechanisms intended to prevent them.
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
