Is now the right time for a U.S.-North Korea summit?

Kim Byung-yeon

The author is a chaired professor of economics at Seoul National University. 

South Korea has policies toward North Korea but no strategy. Strategy is an intellectual contest that weaves space and time to one’s advantage. Yet whenever North Korea arises, our government falls into predictable conservative-versus-progressive thinking. Pyongyang is far more strategic. It conceals its moves, bluffs and uses brinkmanship to compensate for inferior resources. In promoting a U.S.-North Korea summit, Seoul again seems to be pursuing “policy without strategy.” Failure now, however, could cost far more than before by effectively legitimizing North Korea as a nuclear-armed state.

Viewed across the “wide space” of North Korea and geopolitics, a U.S.-North Korea summit clearly should take place. North Korea cannot remain stable while nuclear weapons and economic development work against each other. Reviving the economy requires reform, opening and greater marketization, but those steps threaten Kim Jong-un’s dictatorship. Overinvestment in nuclear weapons and underinvestment in livelihoods gradually erode the regime’s foundations.

The danger grows dramatically when those internal contradictions combine with geopolitical upheaval. The Russia-Ukraine war has already shown how an unexpected external shock can combine with North Korean ambition to create a security crisis. Dialogue must remain open to prevent such a potentially catastrophic convergence.

Within the “narrow space” of politics in Washington, U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term offers a rare opportunity for a summit. Once his presidency ends and a conventional president takes office, North Korea will likely be buried deep among policy priorities unless a sudden crisis erupts. Neglected risks become exponentially more expensive to manage later. Seeking a breakthrough on the Korean Peninsula during Trump’s term is therefore sensible.

But viewed through a “strategy of time,” now is not the right moment. Geopolitically, this is North Korea’s time. In return for supplying Russia with weapons and troops for its war, Pyongyang is gaining military, economic and diplomatic benefits. A summit now would allow North Korea to leverage its higher value to press for de facto recognition as a nuclear state. If Trump settles for a nuclear freeze rather than complete denuclearization and presents it as a diplomatic achievement, Korea’s vital security interests could become secondary. A summit now risks tacitly accepting North Korea’s arsenal while offering little prospect of starting denuclearization.

North Korea’s favorable moment will not last forever. Economic strength ultimately determines prolonged wars. Unlike Ukraine, backed by Western assistance, Russia lacks an international coalition directly financing its war costs. Liquid assets in its sovereign wealth fund, nearly 7 percent of GDP before the war, have fallen below 2 percent. Rising military spending and fiscal deficits have produced high interest rates and depressed private investment, weakening Russia’s economy. The war’s outcome or the terms of a cease-fire could therefore become clearer within Trump’s term. Moscow’s geopolitical boost to Pyongyang cannot last indefinitely.

The Lee Jae Myung administration should learn from the painful failure of the Moon Jae-in administration. After North Korea joined the PyeongChang 2018 Winter Olympics, Seoul rushed into a denuclearization timetable. Beijing, fearing Pyongyang might tilt toward Washington, began providing firmer backing. Summit diplomacy began before economic sanctions had fundamentally altered North Korea’s calculations, leaving U.S. and North Korean expectations to collide sharply in a summit in Hanoi, Vietnam.

It was strategic impatience: Talks began before accumulated sanctions and geopolitical leverage could bring North Korea’s asking price for its nuclear weapons closer to what others were prepared to pay. Today’s government should instead build negotiating leverage while waiting for the temporary opportunity Moscow has given Pyongyang to fade. It should move when the Russia-Ukraine war reaches a turning point and Moscow’s ability to support North Korea and Pyongyang’s strategic confidence weaken.

A "pacemaker," as President Lee refers to Seoul's role in U.S.-North Korea ties, should not merely make a runner move steadily in one direction. The pacemaker must be a strategist who carefully sets the pace. A summit is far preferable to no summit. But success does not lie in the meeting itself. It depends on lowering North Korea’s bargaining power while making the South Korea-U.S. negotiating position more sophisticated.

Seoul must abandon impatience about arranging a summit and focus on building leverage for denuclearization within the dimensions of space and time. Rather than rushing while watching Washington’s clock alone, it must also read how fast the clocks in Moscow and Pyongyang are moving. Control of negotiations comes from a “strategy of time” that identifies the decisive turning point.