Beijing and Pyongyang draw closer as Seoul falls behind

Jo Dong-ho

The author is a professor emeritus at Ewha Womans University and former president of the Institute for National Security Strategy.

On June 8, the day that Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Pyongyang, North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun published an article by Xi, in which he expressed his hope that he and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un would discuss a “grand plan” for advancing bilateral ties. He wrote that the two countries had already prepared a shared “blueprint” through close strategic communication. In effect, he was proposing a concrete plan to deepen cooperation.

The proposal was well received. During the summit, both sides declared that bilateral relations had entered a new stage. Kim described North Korea’s friendship with China as its foremost strategic undertaking and pledged to strengthen what he called a special and durable strategic relationship. Chinese and North Korean media portrayed the summit as the beginning of a new era in relations.

The significance of this shift becomes clearer when viewed against North Korea’s recent history. In 2016, Kim promised a “brilliant blueprint” to improve living standards. Instead, the economy struggled under United Nations sanctions that even China and Russia supported.

Seeking a breakthrough, Kim turned to South Korea and the United States. In 2018, he pursued inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea diplomacy and abandoned the policy of simultaneously pursuing nuclear weapons and economic development. Those efforts collapsed after the summit in Hanoi, Vietnam, ended without agreement in 2019. The Covid-19 pandemic further weakened North Korea’s economy, leaving Kim’s blueprint unrealized.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine changed the situation. For North Korea, it opened opportunities for economic, military and diplomatic recovery. Pyongyang subsequently drew closer to Moscow, declared that the two Koreas were separate states and erected physical barriers along the border. But Russia alone could not satisfy all of North Korea’s needs. Pyongyang, therefore, moved to restore ties with Beijing, culminating in the recent summit.

Chinese statements released during Xi’s visit repeatedly emphasized development and friendship, underscoring a shared determination to strengthen ties. As North Korea deepens relations with both China and Russia, the strategic environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula is changing.

Most notably, the outlines of a North Korea-China-Russia alignment are becoming increasingly visible. Denuclearization was absent from the summit agenda. Russia has long opposed approaches centered on denuclearization, and China now appears less willing to emphasize the issue. Xi’s remarks on improving North Korean living standards also suggested that Beijing may be prepared to relax its commitment to sanctions.

Another notable point was the absence of China’s traditional reference to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. This may indicate growing acceptance of Pyongyang’s two-state approach toward inter-Korean relations.

Xi and Kim also visited the Central Cadres School of the Workers’ Party together, presenting what they described as a model relationship among socialist countries. The symbolism pointed to growing ideological solidarity and practical cooperation in response to the strengthening partnership among South Korea, the United States and Japan.

North Korea’s confidence appears to be growing. What was once merely a blueprint may now be viewed as a realistic development plan. The two sides agreed to expand economic cooperation and discussed reopening border crossings and transportation links.

Unlike previous plans that depended largely on North Korea’s own resources, this one would benefit from substantial Chinese support. If implemented successfully, improving relations with South Korea and the United States may become less urgent for Pyongyang.

These developments raise questions about whether Seoul is adequately prepared. U.S. President Donald Trump recently disclosed that North Korea was discussed during his summit with Xi. It is possible that Xi informed Trump of his planned visit to Pyongyang. Whether such information was fully shared with Seoul remains unclear.

There has been no indication that U.S. restrictions on intelligence sharing have been lifted, suggesting that relations with Washington remain less than smooth. At the same time, ties with Beijing appear strained by issues including Taiwan.

Accommodating China’s historical narrative of the 1950-53 Korean War will not make Beijing side with Seoul. Renaming North Korean defectors will not alter Pyongyang’s calculations, nor will claims of serving as a diplomatic facilitator automatically persuade Washington to grant South Korea a central role.

Trump recently posted a photograph of himself walking with Kim during their 2018 Singapore summit, a gesture many interpreted as signaling renewed interest in North Korea.

The future of the Korean Peninsula will not be determined solely in Pyongyang, Beijing or Washington. Whether South Korea becomes an active participant in shaping events or merely an object of change will depend on how accurately it reads the evolving environment and how thoroughly it prepares. The challenge is not simply a matter of rhetoric. It requires a fundamental reassessment of the changing regional landscape and Seoul’s place within it.