Chinese President Xi Jinping, second from left, and his wife Peng Liyuan, left, pose for a photo with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, second from right, and his wife Ri Sol-ju, right, during a welcome banquet hosted by Kim in Pyongyang on June 8.XINHUA/YONHAP
John Everad
The author is a former British ambassador to North Korea.
One of the most significant outcomes of President Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea on June 8 to 9 may be that it slightly reduced the likelihood of dangerous behavior by the North toward the South and the wider region.
Many commentators argued that Xi's primary objective was to counter North Korea's rapidly expanding relationship with Russia. China had signaled its displeasure through low-level representation at North Korean events, the omission of a 2024 North-China Year of Friendship closing ceremony and terse official statements. But there is a substantial difference between expressing irritation and taking action. Had Beijing truly regarded the North-Russia partnership as a strategic threat, it would almost certainly have responded much earlier and more forcefully.
Nor was the visit primarily about celebrating the North-China alliance. Had that been the objective, Xi would likely have scheduled the trip around the 65th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance next month. The atmosphere also fell well short of a celebration. Despite the summit, the two sides issued no joint communiqué in marked contrast to the statement released after Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Beijing last month.
The more convincing explanation is that Xi's visit was driven not by Russia but by regional security, particularly Taiwan. Beijing remains deeply dissatisfied with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's statement last November that Japan could exercise its right of collective self-defense in the event of an attack on Taiwan. For Xi, who has repeatedly emphasized reunification with Taiwan, Japanese intervention would pose a serious obstacle. China, therefore, had a strong incentive to ensure that allies such as the North did nothing to complicate its broader strategic objectives.
In particular, Beijing does not want Pyongyang to provoke actions that would justify a larger U.S. military presence in the region, encourage further increases in Japan's defense spending or, in the worst case, trigger a conflict that could draw China into war. To reinforce that message, China ensured that North Korea's account of the summit explicitly endorsed the "One China" principle. Although Pyongyang had quietly accepted Beijing's position before, it had rarely highlighted it so openly.
One of the most revealing aspects of the summit was that both governments emphasized "strengthened strategic communication." In diplomatic language, this suggests that Beijing expects Pyongyang to follow China's strategic line more closely. Xi was signaling that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's room for independent action would become more limited.
Some observers noted that Xi did not publicly call for North Korea's denuclearization, unlike during his 2019 visit. That omission, however, should not be interpreted as Chinese acceptance of the North's nuclear program. It remains entirely plausible that Chinese pressure has been a key reason that Pyongyang has refrained from conducting a seventh nuclear test.
Conventional weapons were also likely on the agenda, as reflected by the presence of China's defense minister in Xi's delegation. North Korea has recently invested heavily in modernizing its conventional forces. One explanation is that Pyongyang may believe its adversaries increasingly doubt that it would actually use nuclear weapons. If the credibility of its nuclear deterrent weakens, strengthening conventional forces becomes a more believable means of deterrence.
From Beijing's perspective, those conventional capabilities pose a more immediate concern because they are more likely to be used in a way that could disrupt China's Taiwan strategy. China's influence may even help explain why language calling for the complete conquest of South Korea, which Kim had previously advocated, did not ultimately appear in North Korea's revised constitution. Beijing may also be prepared to restrain more dangerous provocations, including any attempt to challenge the Northern Limit Line.
None of this means Pyongyang's rhetoric will soften. North Korea has continued to reject denuclearization and respond aggressively to recent statements by South Korea and its partners. But China has little interest in seeing that rhetoric translated into military action. Its pressure is probably creating a welcome gap between North Korea's confrontational nuclear doctrine and its likely behavior in practice.
If so, Xi's visit to Pyongyang may indeed have left the region, if only slightly, a safer place.
