A Trump-Kim deal could leave South Korea bearing the nuclear threat

Park Won-gon

The author is a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University.

“President Trump is ready to speak with Kim Jong Un, either by phone or in person,” a senior U.S. administration official said in a telephone briefing on Sept. 18. “I think the ball is now quite clearly in North Korea’s court.”

U.S. President Donald Trump appears eager to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Key second-term objectives, from ending the Russia-Ukraine war to reshaping the Middle East, have become bogged down. Trump is now looking to the Korean Peninsula, particularly U.S.-North Korea dialogue, as a stage for his legacy.

Trump met Kim three times in 2018 and 2019 without producing results, yet has repeatedly emphasized their good relationship. In July 2024, he said Kim would want to see him and misses him. On his first day back in office last year, Trump said Kim would welcome his return. Last October, he called North Korea “sort of a nuclear power” and said he wanted to meet Kim.

On Aug. 16, Trump sharply scaled back annual South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises, saying they could send a hostile signal to North Korea. Three days later, he predicted he would meet Kim this year. He also spoke of North Korea possessing “57 very powerful nuclear weapons.” Asked whether denuclearization remained the goal, he declined to discuss it, suggesting it may not be the purpose of a meeting.

Unlike Trump’s rhetoric, official U.S. documents continue to state complete North Korean denuclearization as a goal. The South Korea-U.S. summit in November of last year reaffirmed that commitment, as did the sixth Nuclear Consultative Group meeting in June and a South Korea-U.S.-Japan foreign ministers’ statement in New York on Sept. 21.

Yet Washington’s policy debate is shifting toward accepting some level of North Korean nuclear capability rather than prioritizing complete denuclearization. Denuclearization was omitted from both U.S. party platforms in 2024. Since last year, the White House has repeatedly emphasized dialogue without preconditions while avoiding explicit references to denuclearization.

Victor Cha, Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, generated debate with his “cold peace” proposal in the May/June issue of the magazine Foreign Affairs, arguing for moving beyond a denuclearization-first framework to manage the North Korean threat. South Korean and American experts challenged him in the July/August issue, warning that Seoul could be sidelined. Still, risk reduction and arms control, with denuclearization deferred, have entered mainstream debate.

North Korea also wants dialogue — but nuclear arms talks, not denuclearization negotiations. At the ninth Workers’ Party Congress in February, Kim said relations could improve if Washington respected North Korea’s constitutional status and abandoned its hostile policy. In effect, he demanded recognition as a nuclear state and an end to joint exercises and U.S. strategic asset deployments.

In September of last year, Kim said he still had “good memories” of Trump. Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui’s rejection of the coexistence of confrontation and dialogue on Thursday can likewise be read as a conditional message: Talks are possible if Washington drops denuclearization demands.

Sanctions relief is North Korea’s strongest incentive for talks. Kim claims Pyongyang will not negotiate merely to lift sanctions, but that is rhetoric intended to increase bargaining leverage. Two objectives overlap.

First, North Korea seeks a path resembling India and Pakistan, which faced U.S. sanctions after nuclear tests but eventually consolidated their status as de facto nuclear-armed states. Second is economic reality. Despite Russian and Chinese support, North Korea’s official foreign trade remains below half its presanctions level and exports about one-sixth, according to the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency’s “Trends in North Korea’s Foreign Trade.” Sanctions are working, giving Pyongyang reason to seek a deal despite its public insistence that sanctions no longer matter in any future negotiations with Washington.

Trump may seek a narrative that he made the U.S. homeland safe from the North Korean threat. His priority could therefore be constraining intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking the United States.

North Korea might accept. Unsure whether it can penetrate U.S. homeland defenses, Pyongyang could maximize its nuclear leverage by holding South Korea, Japan and Guam at risk. The logic resembles Iran’s “horizontal escalation” through attacks on neighbors and threats to close the Strait of Hormuz.

If Trump decides protecting the U.S. mainland is sufficient, South Korea could remain exposed to the North’s nuclear threat. The Singapore joint statement’s formula linking improved U.S.-North Korea and inter-Korean relations may no longer function.

North Korea now defines South Korea as its “most hostile entity” and is pursuing an “alternative economic model” through China, Russia and the Global South. This reflects its call for a “fair and just multipolar world.” Even if U.S.-North Korea dialogue resumes, South Korea could face the worst outcome: no improved inter-Korean relations while continuing to bear the nuclear threat.

If Trump and Kim meet, dialogue must not become an end in itself. North Korean denuclearization must remain a goal. The credibility and implementation of U.S. extended deterrence must be strengthened. Above all, North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities targeting South Korea must be placed on the negotiating agenda.

With two years and three months left in Trump’s term, North Korea will seek its opportunity. Before negotiations begin, Seoul should secure Washington’s agreement on these three principles.