Alliance dilemma deepens as U.S.-Iran war tests Korea’s choices

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Alliance dilemma deepens as U.S.-Iran war tests Korea’s choices

Published: 13 Apr. 2026, 00:01

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Choi Hoon

The author is a senior columnist at the JoongAng Ilbo.

Korea’s biggest concern arising from the Iran war was U.S. President Donald Trump’s request to join operations in the Strait of Hormuz. Washington asked five countries, including Korea, China, Japan, Britain and France, to send naval vessels, warning that it would remember who participated. For Seoul, an outright refusal was not easy. The Korean War, in which 36,591 American troops were killed, still weighs heavily on the alliance.

People watch a TV screen showing a live broadcast of U.S. President Donald Trump's speech at the Seoul Railway Station in Seoul on April 2. [AP/YONHAP]

The episode highlights a central dilemma of alliances: entrapment versus abandonment. Entrapment means being drawn into an ally’s conflict and suffering losses or reduced autonomy. Abandonment means fearing that if such a request is refused, help may not come in one’s own crisis. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio justified Washington’s entry into the war as a pre-emptive response to an Israeli operation against Iran that could trigger attacks on the United States. That is precisely the logic of entrapment.

Abandonment and realignment are just as common. Until 1979, Iran was one of Washington’s key allies, valued for its resources, its strategic position in the Middle East and the pro-Western Pahlavi monarchy. Decades later, it became a wartime enemy. Korea’s dispatch of troops to Iraq under Roh Moo-hyun and its participation in the Vietnam War under Park Chung Hee were also shaped in part by fear that failure to support Washington could lead to a withdrawal or reduction of U.S. forces from Korea.

U.S. Vice President JD Vance (R) speaks during a news conference after meeting with representatives from Pakistan and Iran, as U.S. President Donald Trump's son-in-law Jared Kushner (L) and U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff (C) watch, in Islamabad on April 12. Iran and the United States failed to reach an agreement to end the war in the Middle East, U.S. Vice President JD Vance said April 12 after marathon talks in Islamabad, adding that he was leaving negotiations after giving Tehran the ″final and best offer″. [AFP/YONHAP]

A classic lesson appears in “History of the Peloponnesian War” (431 B.C.) by Thucydides, especially in the Melian Dialogue. Athens demanded that neutral Melos submit, arguing that the strong do what they can while the weak suffer what they must. Melos refused, trusting justice, the gods and Sparta. The island was destroyed, and Sparta never came. Thucydides’ point was stark: Moral conviction without a realistic reading of international conditions and without flexible compromise can bring ruin.

The Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty gives Seoul grounds to avoid participation in Hormuz operations, since it assumes an armed attack in the Pacific area against either party. The U.S. Congress, which holds the authority to declare war, also gave no prior approval. Trump seemed unprepared for the possibility of ground operations and a surge in oil prices. Above all, the future costs of involving Korea in one of the world’s most volatile regions would be difficult to bear.

No one knows how Trump will respond to allied reluctance. But the issue extends beyond his personal reaction. Christopher Chivvis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recently argued in Foreign Affairs that the United States should reassess its alliances and limit promises to those it is truly willing to keep. The standard, he wrote, should be whether an alliance strengthens the United States' competition with China. He noted that only a bare majority of U.S. citizens support sending U.S. forces if North Korea attacks, and said relations with Korea may also require reevaluation.

That suggests future disputes involving China, Taiwan, the South China Sea or the East China Sea could become major alliance risks for Korea. Seoul should first make its commitment to the alliance clear again to the U.S. government, public opinion and academic circles. The role of U.S. Forces Korea and extended deterrence backed by strategic assets must remain symbols of the alliance.

Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the U.S. and Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11. [REUTERS/YONHAP]

At the same time, the war may have reminded Trump that no international achievement is possible without allied support. Skipping prior consultation with allies was a mistake and exposed the limits of a businessman confronting the realities of international politics. On the basis of a strong alliance, Seoul and Washington need to clarify what kind of help can be given, and how, in a crisis.

Korea should also work more actively with middle powers to defend a rules-based international order. As Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney said in a notable Davos speech, middle powers in a fragmented world have a responsibility to uphold that order and bridge the gap between major camps. Korea, too, should speak more clearly with other middle powers. It should join discussions on a new system for managing the Strait of Hormuz, treating freedom of navigation there not as the property of Iran or a club good for U.S.-led members, but as an international public good. President Lee Jae Myung’s view that this crisis can also be an opportunity deserves to be applied across Korea’s diplomacy and economy.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.