Lukashenko’s North Korea-U.S. mediation could backfire on South Korea

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Lukashenko’s North Korea-U.S. mediation could backfire on South Korea

Published: 02 Apr. 2026, 00:03

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

John Everad

The author is the former British ambassador to North Korea.

I took a particular interest in the visit to North Korea by Aleksandr Lukashenko, the president of Belarus, on March 25 and 26, as I have served as an ambassador to both countries. Two questions arise from the visit.

First is the purpose of Lukashenko’s trip. The friendship treaty signed by the two leaders has not been released, though it reportedly covers areas such as agriculture, health care and science. Both sides described it as the start of a new relationship, but its substance is likely to remain limited. Both countries face economic constraints and are not natural trade partners. The new Belarusian Embassy in Pyongyang that Lukashenko announced is likely to be largely symbolic.

A welcoming ceremony for Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, left, who paid an official visit to North Korea at the invitation of State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un, is held at Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang on March 25, as reported by the North’s state-run Korean Central News Agency on March 26. [KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY/YONHAP]

The timing of the visit is also questionable. Although North Korean leader Kim Jong-un invited Lukashenko in September of last year, the arrangements appeared rushed. The welcoming crowds were small, Belarusian flags were scarce, and the official performance took place in a modest venue. Even allowing for differences from the reception given to Russian President Vladimir Putin in June 2024, such details are unusual for a country as attentive to protocol as North Korea.

Lukashenko’s visit can be understood in the context of changing relations between Belarus and the United States. He has recently shown interest in improving ties with the West. Engagement with envoys from President Donald Trump has led to the release of hundreds of political prisoners, including opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s husband. A visit to Minsk by U.S. envoy John Coale on March 19 further raised expectations of a possible summit with Trump.

Belarus could gain significantly from such a deal, including sanctions relief, expanded trade and investment. Lukashenko, who sees himself as a mediator, may be seeking to demonstrate his usefulness by facilitating communication between Washington and Pyongyang.

The war in Iran is another factor. Trump is under pressure to shift attention away from the conflict, particularly with midterm elections approaching. Lukashenko may believe that arranging talks between Trump and Kim would strengthen his position in negotiations with Washington. The rushed nature of the Pyongyang visit and references by Belarusian officials to relations with major powers suggest this possibility.

Kim, for his part, may also see value in renewed dialogue. North Korea faces potential fuel shortages as disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz affect energy flows. Reports that Pyongyang has asked Russia to increase oil shipments support this concern. Engagement with the United States could offer economic benefits, and Kim may calculate that Trump’s political urgency gives him leverage.

North Korea holds a performance on March 26 to welcome the visit of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, as reported by the North’s state-run Korean Central News Agency on March 27. [KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY/YONHAP]

For both Kim and Trump, Lukashenko offers a useful intermediary, reducing the risks of direct engagement. However, such mediation carries significant risks. Lukashenko may raise expectations unrealistically, increasing the chance of failure similar to the collapse of the Hanoi summit in 2019. A second failure would damage North Korea-U.S. relations.

A more serious concern is the potential marginalization of South Korea. Trump may prioritize a visible diplomatic success over long-term stability on the Korean Peninsula. Kim could exploit this by excluding denuclearization and sidelining Seoul while seeking concessions such as recognition of North Korea and economic support. The United States may accept such terms and shift the burden onto South Korea.

An early summit driven by Lukashenko’s initiative could therefore destabilize the Korean Peninsula. What appears to be a diplomatic opportunity may, in reality, carry substantial risk.