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Four years into Russia-Ukraine war, drones and North Korea reshape the battlefield

Published: 12 Feb. 2026, 00:04

Doo Jin‑ho

The author is the director of the Eurasia Research Center at the Korea National Strategy Institute.

As U.S. President Donald Trump aggressively pushes a “peace framework,” expectations are growing that the Ukraine war, now in its fourth year, could end in the first half of the year. Washington has sought to curb Russia’s war financing by using tariff negotiations with India as leverage to halt the purchase of Russian crude oil. At the same time, the United States is pressing Ukraine to fully withdraw from Donetsk and hold a presidential election, accelerating the pace of ceasefire talks.

Ukrainian national police officers stand near an antidrone net during the evacuation of residents from the Tavriiske and Yurkivka villages in Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia region amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in this screengrab from a video from Feb. 3. [REUTERS/YONHAP]

The more the proposed framework places Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at a disadvantage, the more Ukraine’s military must demonstrate its determination to defend sovereignty through operational capability and tangible results. At the same time, securing continued and expanded military assistance from partners remains urgent. One key approach has been a narrative of military innovation — developing low-cost unmanned systems and conducting creative operations that disrupt the calculations of Russia’s war leadership.

One striking example came last year when Ukraine reportedly used an underwater drone that cost roughly 300 million won ($205,000) to disable a Russian submarine valued at more than 500 billion won. Ukraine’s security service claimed that, for the first time, an underwater drone known as “Sub Sea Baby” had detonated beneath a Russian submarine, leaving it severely damaged and effectively inoperable.

Russia’s Black Sea Fleet denied any damage. However, Kyiv's security agency released footage showing a large underwater explosion and a towering column of water at the Novorossiysk naval base, embarrassing the fleet and reinforcing the psychological impact of the operation.

Ukraine’s use of inexpensive unmanned systems to neutralize high-value strategic assets has illustrated the logic of cost-effective warfare. Russia’s vast territory, combined with Ukraine’s cross-domain drone operations spanning sea and air, has repeatedly exposed surveillance gaps. These vulnerabilities help explain why Moscow is seeking to include provisions in peace negotiations that would formalize a halt to hostile drone activities.

Ukraine’s operational creativity reflects asymmetrical warfare by an underdog that lacks advanced strategic assets such as nuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles, advanced fighter jets and submarines. By leveraging innovation rather than scale, Ukraine has sought to offset Russia’s conventional advantages.

At the same time, the war’s technological lessons are spreading beyond Europe. According to Ukrainian intelligence, Russia last year brought in approximately 12,000 North Korean workers to the Alabuga special economic zone in Russia’s Tatarstan Republic to support mass production of loitering munitions.

As North Korea’s military involvement with Russia becomes more prolonged, cooperation between the two countries is likely to deepen through shared experience in unmanned systems and battlefield tactics. This process could significantly enhance the drone and counter-drone capabilities of North Korea’s special operations forces.

Pyongyang is expected to systematize lessons learned from overseas deployment and use the upcoming Ninth Party Congress later this month to declare a strategy of simultaneously strengthening nuclear and conventional forces. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s recent visit to the Ministry of National Defense, where he described this year as a “year of great transformation,” reflects this trajectory.

Against this backdrop, South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense has proposed training 500,000 “drone warriors” and advancing manned-unmanned integrated combat systems by incorporating AI and advanced technologies. As the security environment shifts rapidly with the military application of AI and North Korea’s expanding drone capabilities, exponential growth in unmanned forces is no longer optional.

This requires moving beyond the traditional view of drones as unit-level equipment and redesigning force structures around expendable unmanned weapons systems.

North Korean special operations troops conduct drone-based tactical training during a combined tactical exercise on May 13, 2025, according to North Korea's Korean Central Television the next day. [YONHAP]

Meanwhile, the government is reportedly considering dismantling the Drone Operations Command, which was established by the previous administration to respond to North Korean drone threats. Defense authorities should set aside political considerations and instead assess the operational environment on the Korean Peninsula, the characteristics of modern warfare and the missions, roles and command structure of existing drone units to improve operational efficiency.

It is also urgent to establish combined and joint drone doctrines and operational plans linked to the advancement of Seoul's three-axis system — the Kill Chain pre-emptive strike capability, the Korea Air and Missile Defense system and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation strategy.

The risks are not theoretical. On Dec. 26, 2022, five North Korean drones infiltrated Korean airspace along the Han River, flying across parts of the capital region. The incident exposed critical vulnerabilities in low-altitude air defense and counter-drone capabilities.

In a contingency, Korea must establish a joint air defense system capable of early detection, denial and interception of North Korean drone incursions, as well as immediate neutralization. Depending on the situation, precision response capabilities against launch sites should also be secured to deter hostile intentions behind what Pyongyang calls its “year of great transformation.”

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.