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After the prosecution service, how will neutrality be guaranteed for the new agency?

Published: 01 Oct. 2025, 00:04

Park Jin-seok

The author is the editor of the investigative reporting bureau at the JoongAng Ilbo.

He was known as a “crazy judge.” The phrase was not an insult but a mark of respect. When former Judge Jang Hae-chang presided over the 21st Criminal Division of the Seoul District Court, now the Seoul Central District Court, defendants prayed their cases would not be assigned to him. In an era when critics accused judges of wielding gavels as if they were feather dusters, his was heavy and unyielding.

In cases of incest, he handed down 12 years in prison, harsher than prosecutors’ demands. A pyramid scheme operator received a life sentence. Former executives of the Daewoo Group were ordered to pay 26.4 trillion won ($18.8 billion) in restitution, the highest ever imposed.

The National Assembly votes on a government reorganization bill abolishing the Prosecution Service and creating the Serious Crimes Investigation Agency and the Office of Prosecution on Sept. 26. The photo shows the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office in Seocho District, southern Seoul, the same day. [YONHAP]

On Feb. 13, 2001, Jang lived up to his reputation again. A commercial bank branch manager and a small business owner were each sentenced to 12 years for arranging illegal loans. But that day also brought something unusual. He mentioned the role of a senior figure in the administration — someone who had not even been indicted.

Citing circumstantial evidence, Jang said he strongly suspected the political heavyweight had lobbied the bank’s leadership to approve the loans. Prosecutors, he noted, had investigated the official but never indicted him. The judge concluded that the case exemplified Korea’s culture of power and favoritism, where outside influence mattered more than principle. His remarks echoed media criticism that prosecutors had engaged in a “cover-up investigation.”

The prosecution service that failed in that case has now been abolished after 78 years. Few dispute that its demise was in some sense deserved. Yet the question remains: who was responsible for discrediting the institution? Beyond the prosecutors themselves, the greatest blame arguably lies with former president Yoon Suk Yeol and his allies, who cast themselves as champions of independence when in opposition but discarded that principle once in power.

But they were not alone. The example above involved a top aide during the Kim Dae-jung administration. The same government was rocked by the “Lee Yong-ho scandal,” when attempts to conceal the involvement of the president’s son and his aide were exposed. When then-Justice Minister Song Jung-ho resisted efforts to block the son’s arrest, he was dismissed.

Under the Moon Jae-in administration, prosecutors were applauded when they pursued cases of abuse of power by conservative governments and judges. But once they began investigating figures close to the ruling camp — starting with former justice minister Cho Kuk — the administration responded with sweeping personnel changes and disciplinary measures against the prosecutor general. Those episodes remain vivid even after only five or six years.

The record shows that progressive administrations also bear responsibility for undermining the prosecution. Yet when they regained power, they presented themselves solely as victims of prosecutorial overreach. The result was the abolition of the institution itself.

That leads to a pressing question: what comes next? Eliminating the prosecution service does not eliminate the challenges of ensuring neutrality and independence in criminal investigations. Strikingly, those who dismantled the institution on grounds of political interference have offered no clear plan to guarantee neutrality in its successor agencies.

The National Office of Investigation headquarters in Seodaemun District, western Seoul, is seen on Jan. 11. [KIM HYUN-DONG]

The new system will include the Serious Crimes Investigation Agency, a separate body handling indictments, the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials and the police — all under the watchful eye of political authorities. Without institutional safeguards, how will these agencies resist outside pressure? Simply changing the nameplate from “prosecution” does not automatically create independence. To assume otherwise is to invite suspicion that the reform is less about principle than about reconfiguring the judicial and investigative order to favor one side.

If the ruling camp wishes to dispel such doubts, it must use the one-year transition period wisely. Concrete mechanisms to ensure neutrality — whether through independent appointment procedures, budget autonomy or other frameworks — must be designed and legislated. The effort must be more thorough than the campaign to abolish the prosecution.

Otherwise, the inconveniences and harms to citizens from this restructuring will have been for nothing. Worse still, the move will be remembered not as progress, but as political engineering. If the government wants history to regard this as genuine reform, not a partisan maneuver, it must prove that the institutions replacing the prosecution will stand on firmer, more independent ground.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.