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Presidential office reiterates longstanding nature of Opcon transfer talks

Published: 11 Jul. 2025, 20:28 Updated: 11 Jul. 2025, 20:32

President Lee Jae Myung, right, speaks with National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac, left, during a National Security Council meeting at the presidential office in Yongsan, central Seoul, on July 10, in this photo uploaded to President Lee's social media. [NEWS1]

As Seoul and Washington hold package deal negotiations linking tariffs and security, questions have resurfaced over the transfer of wartime operational control (Opcon), from the United States to South Korea.

The presidential office on Friday denied the issue was new or part of any active negotiation, saying, “It is a long-standing matter, not a new one.” Multiple government officials confirmed that while Opcon transfer remains a topic of bilateral discussion since the 2006 agreement, it is not currently a central agenda item.

Still, some analysts warn that if the Trump administration returns and pushes for strategic "flexibility,” it could open the door to revisiting U.S. troop deployments in Korea, potentially accelerating talks on Opcon transfer under the logic that South Korea should handle its own defense.

Who currently holds operational control?

Operational control of South Korean forces was transferred to the United Nations Command during the Korean War in 1950 and later to the commander of the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) after its establishment in 1978. In 1994, South Korea regained peacetime control through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but wartime operational control remains with the CFC commander.

When was Opcon transfer supposed to happen?

The transfer was first agreed upon in September 2006 during the Roh Moo-hyun administration. It was originally scheduled for April 17, 2012.

However, rising threats from North Korea led the Lee Myung-bak administration in 2010 to delay the date to December 1, 2015. In 2014, under Park Geun-hye, Seoul and Washington agreed to reassess the timing and conditions of the transfer.

In 2015, the method shifted from a time-based plan to a conditions-based framework. President Moon Jae-in and U.S. President Donald Trump later reaffirmed cooperation to expedite the transfer under these conditions.

President Lee Jae Myung presides over a Cabinet meeting at the Yongsan presidential office in central Seoul on July 8. [PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE]

What are the conditions for transfer?

Three main conditions must be met: South Korea must possess the military capability to lead a combined defense, the alliance must have a comprehensive response system to North Korean nuclear and missile threats and the regional security environment must support a stable transition.

These are assessed jointly by the two militaries and reported to the Military Committee Meeting (MCM) and Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), which help guide the decision by both governments on when the transfer should occur. The fact that Opcon remains with the CFC indicates that the agreed conditions have not yet been fulfilled.

What is President Lee’s position?

As a presidential candidate, Lee Jae Myung supported early Opcon transfer but said it must be based on meeting necessary conditions. “I said we should do it quickly, not unconditionally,” he clarified during a February 2022 debate. He also questioned why conditions were needed but ultimately acknowledged the need to follow agreed procedures.

While Lee did not directly raise the issue during the 2022 presidential campaign, his party’s policy platform stated the goal of “recovering wartime operational control based on a strong Korea-U.S. alliance.” Notably, the term “recover” was used instead of the official term “transfer.”

During his first National Security Council meeting since taking office, President Lee reportedly asked multiple questions about the history, concept and implications of Opcon transfer, signaling interest in the matter.

President Lee Jae Myung presides over a meeting with senior secretaries at the Yongsan presidential office in central Seoul on July 10, ahead of presiding over his first National Security Council (NSC) meeting. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]

Why is the transfer back in the spotlight?

The current administration is linking security and tariff issues in its negotiations with the United States, raising the possibility that the transfer of Opcon could come up in discussions under the security track.

“The transfer of wartime operational control is a long-term issue we’ve pursued for years, across administrations,” National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac told reporters on Wednesday, shortly after returning from Washington. “I don’t know whether it will come up in the security dialogue, but we’re not there yet.”

“The transfer of Opcon has long been a matter of discussion between Korea and the United States, and it is not a new issue,” the presidential office said in a statement issued the same day. “We will continue close consultations with the United States on the matter.”

President Donald Trump speaks to reporters in the Oval Office of the White House, May 23, 2025, in Washington. [AP/YONHAP]

Could the issue be brought to the negotiating table?

The fact that it is not currently on the table does not preclude it from becoming a key agenda item in the future. If Seoul and Washington fail to find common ground on defense cost-sharing — the central issue in the security talks — other security matters, including Opcon transfer, could become part of a broader package deal.

Washington has been pressuring Seoul, as it does NATO members, to raise its defense spending to 5 percent of GDP. Korea’s defense budget currently accounts for around 2.3 percent of GDP.

When asked on Wednesday whether the Opcon issue could be part of the security consultations, Wi said, “The issues you mentioned, including defense spending, are among the topics of discussion. These talks are likely to be prolonged,” indicating the government is not ruling out that possibility.

U.S. soldiers salute during a change-of-command ceremony for the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and the United States Forces Korea (USFK) at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi, on Dec. 20, 2024. [AP/YONHAP]

What happens to U.S. Forces Korea?

The Trump administration has emphasized strategic “flexibility,” seeking to reduce U.S. costs while shifting more responsibility to allies and expanding their roles in countering China. This could mean downsizing U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) or repurposing them beyond North Korea deterrence.

In May, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Pentagon is reviewing a plan to reduce the USFK presence by 4,500 troops, from the current 28,500. Dan Caldwell, former senior adviser to US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, released a report on Wednesday calling for the number to be cut to around 10,000.

The U.S. review of overseas military deployments and costs could lead to greater burden-sharing demands on allies. A reduced troop presence might imply that South Korea is capable of defending itself — potentially allowing the U.S. to argue that Opcon conditions have been met.

Elbridge Colby, U.S. under secretary of defense for policy, speaks during an interview with the JoongAng Ilbo at his office in Washington on April 23, 2024. [JOONGANG ILBO]

Elbridge Colby, who served as deputy assistant secretary of defense, told the JoongAng Ilbo last April that South Korea should reduce its reliance on U.S. conventional forces and take the lead in its own defense.

However, some experts caution that transferring Opcon without meeting the necessary conditions could weaken South Korea’s defense posture or send the wrong message to North Korea.

“As recently as early this year, both Seoul and Washington agreed that several key benchmarks had not yet been met,” said a senior diplomatic source familiar with the matter. “The two sides need to engage in serious consultations, but it would be unwise to use this issue as a negotiating chip.”

Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
BY YOO JEE-HYE, LEE KEUN-PYUNG, YOON SUNG-MIN [[email protected]]