What was the president really lacking?

Kang Won-taek

The author is a professor of political science and international relations at Seoul National University.

Watching President Lee Jae Myung’s press conference last week, I wanted to know one thing: Why does he think his approval rating has fallen so sharply? The conference came as his rating sank to a record low, and I wanted to hear how he understood the shift in public sentiment.

Lee seemed to take the situation seriously. He looked somber and determined to show humility. JoongAng Sunday noted in a headline that Lee referred to his own shortcomings 13 times. Yet another question arose: What exactly does the president think he lacked?

Lee said he had fallen short “in the process and methods,” while insisting that “the direction we should take has not changed.” He did not clearly explain the phrase, but appeared to mean insufficient empathy, consideration, humility and communication. Under that diagnosis, restoring support would simply require more communication and more humble efforts to persuade the public.

But can the current decline really be reversed so simply? In a Gallup Korea poll released just before the press conference, real estate policy was the leading reason for negative assessments of Lee’s performance, followed by personnel appointments, the economy and livelihoods. Controversies have also accumulated, including the abolition of prosecutors’ supplementary investigative authority, disputes over the withdrawal of indictments and debate over a constitutional amendment allowing presidential re-election.

These are less about “process and methods” than fundamental policy direction, the administration’s governing approach and Lee’s leadership style. Poor communication and divisions among supporters may matter, but policy failures and declining confidence in the administration’s competence appear much more consequential.

Lee said he would be judged by “genuinely tangible results.” Yet it is questionable whether maintaining the current policy course will eventually produce them. Several policies appear likely to create side effects. It is difficult to assume, for example, that abolishing the prosecution service will improve public security and reduce corruption, or that abolishing the Korea Military Academy will strengthen national defense.

Lee’s response on housing was particularly striking. He described the recent pattern of falling home prices in Seoul’s Gangnam area and rising prices elsewhere as a process of “flattening.” The presidential office later offered an explanation, but Lee seemed to view the trend positively.

For ordinary people, however, that gap matters less than securing stable, affordable housing. If prices fall in Gangnam but rise elsewhere, making homeownership harder for young people and those without homes, can that be considered a “tangible result”? Negative assessments of Lee in Seoul stood at 64 percent, nine percentage points above the national average.

Lee emphasized pragmatism in his inaugural address and mentioned former presidents Park Chung Hee and Kim Dae-jung. Yet his policies since then have seemed ideological and backward-looking. Governing should not mean designating certain groups as forces of “injustice” and then defeating them “boldly and decisively” in the name of reform.

If pragmatism matters, policy should begin with solving problems that exist in the real world. Citizens judge a government by policy outcomes. When the results they experience fall short of expectations, disappointment follows, as the current approval ratings suggest.

Lee is no longer an outsider on the political periphery. He is the nation’s chief executive and the de facto leader of a large party that controls the National Assembly. Politics is the work of forging compromise and agreement among people with different views and interests. Democracy always contains competing demands.

To become, as Lee has said, “a president for all citizens,” he must not represent only one side among conflicting perspectives and interests. A president must reconcile those competing interests and develop solutions the broader Korean community can accept.

Public approval ratings matter not merely as measures of popularity but as signals of public sentiment that can help a government reassess its direction. When approval falls sharply, a president should consider whether a gap has opened between the course he believes is right and the course the public wants.

Once lost, public support is not easily recovered. If Lee cannot change direction now, the remainder of his term could become increasingly difficult. Without meaningful change or results the public can recognize, repeated promises that “I fell short” and “I will do better” are unlikely to win back those who have turned away. What the public is waiting for is not another pledge, but a different approach to governing.