U.S.-North Korea talks without denuclearization risk worst-case outcome

U.S. President Donald Trump publicly stated that North Korea possesses “57 very powerful nuclear weapons.” It is unusual for a U.S. president to cite a specific estimate of Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal. More concerning, however, was Trump’s response when asked about denuclearization while forecasting a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un within the year: “I don’t want to talk about that.”

The remarks cannot be dismissed because they suggest a possible shift in Washington’s North Korea policy. Concerns are growing that the United States could accept North Korea’s nuclear capability as a reality and pursue a deal centered on a nuclear freeze or arms control rather than denuclearization. Such a shift could fundamentally affect security on the Korean Peninsula.

The South Korean government’s assessment and response appear overly optimistic. Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back told the National Assembly on Thursday that North Korea may possess “around 80 to 120” nuclear weapons, while maintaining that South Korea cannot recognize the North as a nuclear weapons state and that Washington has not abandoned denuclearization.

Yet the government’s North Korea policy has increasingly emphasized pragmatism. President Lee Jae Myung previously cited Pyongyang’s capacity to produce nuclear material while proposing “a freeze first and denuclearization over the long term,” effectively postponing denuclearization. Stopping further expansion of the North’s nuclear arsenal is undoubtedly urgent. But Seoul must guard against allowing the line between acknowledging reality and accepting it to blur during negotiations, cementing North Korea’s nuclear status until denuclearization disappears even as an objective.

Another concern is that South Korea’s voice may not be sufficiently reflected amid these rapid changes. The abrupt reduction of South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises at Trump’s direction exposed shortcomings in alliance communication and raised concerns that Seoul was being left out of critical information. There is no guarantee that a reduction of U.S. Forces Korea would not similarly be announced without adequate consultation.

Nevertheless, Lee praised Trump’s decision to scale back the exercises as an effort to create conditions for dialogue and again offered to serve as his “pacemaker.” The government risks becoming so focused on facilitating U.S.-North Korea dialogue that it underestimates changes affecting South Korea’s own security posture.

Kim Yo-jong, deputy department director of North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party, said she was unaware of communication between Trump and her brother and dismissed the reduction in joint exercises as being of “no interest.”

With Washington moving while Pyongyang watches, Seoul cannot remain confined to the role of facilitator. The government should not regard dialogue itself as an achievement.

Seoul should work to prevent negotiations from shifting toward a nuclear freeze or arms control and make clear that U.S. Forces Korea, extended deterrence and the combined South Korea-U.S. defense posture cannot become bargaining chips. It urgently needs a proactive strategy to ensure South Korea’s interests are not excluded.