Urgent tasks for the Missile Strategic Command against North Korea’s nuclear threat

Nam Se-gyu 

The author is a former head of the Agency for Defense Development.

News of North Korea’s nuclear and missile provocations has become so routine that it hardly comes as a surprise anymore. Yet anxiety remains over whether a nuclear-free Korea can preserve peace on the Korean Peninsula. U.S. President Donald Trump’s remark that North Korea possesses 57 nuclear weapons and his order to shorten South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises make the need for “peace through strength” feel more urgent.

The Army Missile Strategic Command marks its 20th anniversary on Monday. Its rapid buildup of capabilities, together with Seoul-Washington conventional-nuclear integration, represents a new security milestone.

The key to deterring North Korea’s nuclear weapons is making its leadership realize that “the moment it presses the nuclear button, the aggressor itself will be finished.” The Missile Strategic Command is the force that physically demonstrates this deterrence through fear.

Instead of possessing nuclear weapons, South Korea has fielded missiles with greater destructive power and accuracy. They include the Hyunmoo family of high-powered ballistic missiles, cruise missiles capable of hitting the window of an enemy command post from more than 1,000 kilometers (621 miles) away and the Cheongung-II medium-range, medium-altitude surface-to-air missile system, which boasts an interception rate of more than 90 percent.

Under South Korea’s three-axis defense system, the Kill Chain strikes when signs of an impending North Korean missile attack are detected. If missiles are launched, Seoul's Korean Air and Missile Defense system is designed to intercept most of them. If a nuclear weapon strikes, the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation plan seeks to neutralize North Korea’s nuclear command. This framework has remained in place since it was first announced a decade ago.

But North Korea’s rapidly advancing nuclear and missile capabilities require the existing concept to evolve, making the Missile Strategic Command’s role crucial.

First, South Korea needs larger missile stockpiles. North Korea recently deployed 250 four-tube launchers for tactical missiles capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons and has even introduced conveyor systems for missile assembly. In June, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un ordered ballistic and cruise missile production capacity to be increased two-and-a-half-fold within five years.

Before the U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran in February, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned that Tehran had established the capacity to mass-produce 300 ballistic missiles a month in pursuit of an arsenal of 20,000. Iran’s ballistic missiles and underground missile cities are replicas of North Korean technology. Severe missile depletion in the Iran war and the Russia-Ukraine war has even affected the course of fighting.

The lesson is to dramatically raise missile stockpile targets. Under the proposal to “stockpile 10,000 missiles,” interceptors and strike missiles would each account for half.

Expanding missile inventories requires greater manufacturing infrastructure and automation. Extending missile service life is also important. Strategic missile production must not be pushed down the priority list because of defense exports. In particular, the Hyunmoo-5 needs to be fielded in large numbers quickly. Developing advanced explosives more powerful than conventional explosives could also be as effective as increasing warhead weight.

Second, South Korea must maximize the nuclear survivability and strike capacity of its launch platforms. The military should develop and deploy multiple mobile launchers as well as cost-effective containerized systems similar to the U.S. Typhon launcher. Nuclear protection is essential so they can survive a surprise nuclear attack and retaliate. In a nuclear war, launchers must be safer than bunkers for soldiers to carry out their missions with confidence.

Third, Seoul should shift toward an AI-based “Kill Web and massive punishment-and-retaliation system.”

Solid-fuel missile launchers are difficult to eliminate through the Kill Chain alone. A dedicated AI system should analyze indications of surprise attacks detected by surveillance and reconnaissance satellites and radar, automatically assign the optimal strike asset to each target in real time and destroy it within minutes, creating a hyperconnected strike network resembling a spider web.

The same system should maximize Seoul's massive punishment and retaliation capability. If even one nuclear weapon strikes South Korean territory, dozens of high-powered Hyunmoo-5 ballistic missiles should be fired simultaneously in salvos, delivering destructive power comparable to tactical nuclear weapons and devastating North Korea’s nuclear command and key areas.

Finally, South Korea-U.S. conventional-nuclear integration is a crucial piece in completing deterrence against North Korea at a turning point for national security. More than a promise of a nuclear umbrella, sophisticated integration of the conventional capabilities of Seoul's three-axis system with U.S. nuclear forces can expand nuclear and conventional options and enable effective retaliation under extended deterrence.

Peace that depends only on the goodwill of a nuclear-armed North Korea is like a castle built on sand. I hope the Missile Strategic Command, tasked with deterring North Korea’s Strategic Force and nuclear and missile arsenal, will emerge as the sharp spearhead of Korea’s strategic strike capability.