Revising espionage law demands broader economic security efforts

Park Sung-min

The author is a professor and dean of the College of Social Sciences at Sungkyunkwan University.

Since the Criminal Act was enacted in 1953, Korea’s espionage provisions remained largely unchanged for more than seven decades. Over time, however, they failed to reflect increasingly complex international relations and intensifying technological competition. The leakage of state secrets and advanced technologies is no longer confined to hostile states. It has expanded into a broader arena of information warfare involving a range of foreign actors and entities, including those from friendly nations. The National Assembly’s recent revision of the Criminal Act reflects this shift.

A new provision, Article 98-2, now criminalizes acts of detecting, collecting, leaking, delivering or mediating state secrets for a “foreign country or equivalent organization.” This adjustment realigns outdated legal boundaries with present realities and is therefore a welcome development.

The social benefits of the revision are clear. First, reducing legal blind spots strengthens deterrence. Until now, cases involving technology or information leaks tied to foreign intelligence agencies, organizations or companies often fell under fragmented legal frameworks, which weakened the enforcement of related laws. As the expected gains from such crimes increase, predictability and consistency in punishment become essential safeguards for national and industrial security.

Second, from the perspective of economic security, the revision reduces uncertainty in industrial settings. In strategic sectors such as semiconductors, AI, batteries and telecommunications, sensitive information exists not only in documents but also in data, processes, designs and equipment control systems. A single account breach or vulnerability at a partner firm can spread across an entire supply chain. In this environment, the law must establish clear baseline standards and lines of responsibility to support investment in technology protection.

Third, the benefits extend to the public. Lowering the number of technology leaks and disruptions to critical facilities helps protect jobs, regional economies and industrial competitiveness. It also enhances the stability of infrastructure, such as communications, ports and power generation, strengthening everyday safety. The damage from technology leakage does not end with corporate losses. When core processes or design data are compromised, contracts and investment plans may falter, and production bases may shrink. This can reduce revenues for partner firms, weaken employment and slow local consumption, ultimately affecting the broader economy.

But institutional reform is only a starting point. Its success will depend on implementation in practice. The new legal framework must not remain confined to intelligence or investigative agencies. It should connect core facility operators, industrial complexes, partner firms and research environments within a unified management system.

Four tasks are particularly important. First, a shared public-private framework should be established to detect, assess and share early warning signs of threats. When incidents occur, standardized processes should guide the preparation of evidence, containment, recovery and prevention of recurrence.

Second, responses must integrate technology and operations to address complex threats, including drones, cyberattacks and insider risks. Recent conflicts involving the United States, Israel and Iran have demonstrated how AI can combine human intelligence and signals intelligence to identify targets, followed by rapid execution through drones and remote precision strikes. As battlefields evolve in real time, counterintelligence is no longer conceptual but technological.

Third, urgent efforts are needed to protect data and links used in AI analysis and establish governmentwide oversight and interoperability standards. Detection, identification, neutralization and postincident analysis should be integrated into a unified control system, and ecosystems linking testing, evaluation, standards and certification to private investment must be fostered.

Fourth, permanent education programs that link the government, academia and research institutions are essential. Regular training involving mock incidents, forensics, supply chain security and drone response should include intelligence and investigative personnel, as well as corporate security officers, researchers, data managers and legal and policy experts.

In conclusion, the introduction of a foreign espionage provision is not about stronger control but about building stronger capabilities. It represents an institutional turning point toward transforming security from enforcement into a broader system of national governance. From the perspective of dynamic capabilities, risks can be reduced proactively when government, industry and research sectors continuously detect, learn and adapt, connecting these processes to performance management, budgeting, procurement and standards.

The revision of the Criminal Act will become an effective economic security safeguard against technology leakage in the AI era only when legal clarity and professional policy implementation are strengthened together. Above all, it should lead to a future defined by greater public safety and shared prosperity. Now is the time to establish an integrated economic security system that combines law, policy, technology and talent.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.