North's nuclear threat tests South's diplomacy

Park So-young
The author is an editorial writer at the JoongAng Ilbo. 

Twenty years have passed since North Korea conducted its first nuclear test on Oct. 9, 2006. After six tests through 2017 and the constitutional enshrinement of its nuclear status, its arsenal has become a reality difficult to reverse. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimated in January that the North possessed about 60 nuclear warheads. Some analysts believe that it can produce another 10 to 20 annually. During two decades of denuclearization efforts, Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities have only expanded.

As a result, President Lee Jae Myung’s phased approach of “halt, reduce and dismantle,” formally proposed last August, deserves consideration. It seeks to move from stopping nuclear expansion toward reductions and eventual dismantlement.

The problem is that the North rejects even the first step. Kim Yo-jong, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s sister and a senior Workers’ Party official, dismissed the proposal as a “farce,” and Pyongyang has ignored Washington’s overtures. Without a change in its position, even a freeze is unlikely. Nor should a freeze replace denuclearization. Halting further expansion must not amount to recognizing existing nuclear weapons.

Verification and follow-up measures are crucial. Any freeze must demonstrably restrict fissile material production and additional warheads. The 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework froze plutonium production at Yongbyon but ultimately collapsed. The demolition of Yongbyon’s cooling tower in 2008 likewise failed to weaken the North’s nuclear capabilities. Without access to undeclared uranium enrichment facilities, verification would be ineffective.

Inspections must confirm that nuclear activities have stopped, with sanctions relief tied to verified steps. Safeguards allowing concessions to be reversed if agreements are violated are equally essential. An unverified freeze could merely consolidate North Korea’s status as a nuclear-armed state rather than constrain its capabilities.

Pyongyang, meanwhile, is treating its nuclear status as irreversible while rejecting negotiations. At the United Nations General Assembly’s First Committee, its representative recently questioned what countermeasures anyone could take against a nuclear-armed state, signaling no intention of disarming.

The North also denied responsibility for a land mine explosion south of the military demarcation line that injured three South Korean soldiers. It threatened to expand tactical strike capabilities near the border and resume loudspeaker broadcasts toward the South. Signs of maritime infiltration exercises involving submersibles and intelligence vessels have also emerged. North Korean troops have gained modern warfare experience through deployment to Ukraine. Regardless of diplomatic efforts, the South must strengthen surveillance and response capabilities and respond firmly to provocations.

More troubling is the possibility that even successful U.S.-North negotiations could sideline South Korean security. U.S. President Donald Trump might pursue a “small deal” focused on intercontinental ballistic missiles threatening the U.S. mainland while leaving nuclear threats against South Korea intact.

An agreement limiting some nuclear and missile capabilities would have value. But reducing the United States’ exposure while leaving tactical nuclear weapons and short-range missiles targeting the South untouched would impose enormous security burdens on the latter. Seoul must establish principles with Washington before negotiations to prevent that outcome.

The bilateral alliance also requires attention. U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Michelle Park Steel recently described relations as experiencing “turbulence.” Disagreements persist over intelligence sharing concerning North Korea and the transfer of wartime operational control.

South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun reportedly told Steel during the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee audit two days ago that even when an aircraft encounters turbulence, passengers remain safe if they fasten their seat belts. His intention to reassure is understandable, but clever remarks cannot resolve alliance difficulties. As Pyongyang’s nuclear threat grows, Seoul and Washington must reconcile differences and develop concrete joint responses.

Twenty years of North Korean nuclear development demonstrate more than the difficulty of denuclearization. They show how much conditions can deteriorate when governments proclaim objectives without taking effective action.

Seoul must devise practical ways to constrain Pyongyang’s nuclear expansion and protect its security interests in Washington-Pyongyang negotiations. South Korea cannot force the North to enter dialogue. But it must prevent its own security from being left outside the negotiating room when the North finally agrees to talk.