North Korea and China: Alignment or fracture?

Kim Byung-yeon

The author is a chaired professor of economics at Seoul National University. 

Last week, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited North Korea for the second time since 2019 and held a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Global attention focused on whether China would effectively accept North Korea’s nuclear status and whether the meeting signaled deeper geopolitical alignment between the two countries.

Notably, the word “denuclearization” disappeared from documents describing the summit. In an article published in the Rodong Sinmun before his visit, Xi introduced new phrases such as “the significance of the times” and “the mission of the times.” The language suggests that Beijing increasingly views relations with Pyongyang not simply as a bilateral matter but as part of a broader effort to reshape the international order. Many, therefore, see the summit as evidence of growing strategic coordination.

Yet it remains unclear whether the meeting marks closer alignment or foreshadows future friction. The two countries fundamentally want different things from one another.

Xi seeks to make North Korea a key asset in China’s vision for a reordered international system. As competition with the United States intensifies, Beijing places increasing value on North Korea’s geopolitical position. China also has reason to keep a militarily capable North Korea firmly within its orbit, particularly given the possibility of tensions over Taiwan.

The problem is that Pyongyang’s commitment to China is limited. During the U.S.-North Korea summits of 2018 and 2019, Xi moved to meet Kim first amid concerns that North Korea might drift toward Washington. More recently, Pyongyang has gained leverage through closer ties with Russia, increasing its strategic autonomy.

Xi’s goal appears to be binding North Korea more firmly to China through institutions and a shared long-term vision, turning the relationship into a strategic lever against the United States.

The most notable words in Xi’s Rodong Sinmun article were “blueprint” and “strategy.” He wrote that he and Kim had jointly prepared a blueprint for the future of bilateral relations. The article also made clear that this blueprint was tied to international order and opposition to hegemonism — language commonly directed at the United States.

Chinese media reported that Xi proposed expanding cooperation not only in economic affairs but also in diplomacy, military affairs and law enforcement. In essence, he presented a vision of comprehensive cooperation under a common strategic framework.

Kim appears to have a different blueprint.

In North Korea’s political vocabulary, a blueprint refers to the supreme leader’s core national strategy. Kim has generally used the term in connection with nuclear development or economic policy. In 2016, he spoke of a “grand blueprint” shortly before conducting a nuclear test. At the Eighth Party Congress in 2021, he described the country’s five-year economic development plan as a “scientific blueprint.”

China wants to incorporate North Korea into its geopolitical design. North Korea, by contrast, seeks to use China to complete its own blueprint centered on nuclear capabilities and economic development. Having largely achieved its nuclear objectives, Pyongyang’s most pressing concern is economic gain. Unlike Xi, who advocates a comprehensive strategic relationship, Kim appears to prefer selective cooperation focused on economic benefits.

This difference is reflected in the Rodong Sinmun’s coverage, which emphasized cooperation in trade, economics and culture while giving little attention to broader strategic integration. Xi’s proposal to link the two countries' development strategies is also likely to make Pyongyang uncomfortable.

China pursued reform and opening, whereas North Korea has strengthened state control over its economy since 2019. Expanded exchanges with China could expose North Koreans to outside realities and complicate regime stability. People who witness China’s prosperity may increasingly ask why their own country remains so far behind.

The key test for future China-North Korea relations may be whether China fully resumes imports of North Korean coal and iron ore. Despite sanctions imposed in 2016 and 2017, smuggling has continued through ship-to-ship transfers and falsified certificates of origin. Yet export volumes have declined sharply, and North Korea has been forced to accept steep discounts.

If China openly imports North Korean minerals despite United Nations sanctions, it would signal that bilateral relations have entered a new phase and that Beijing is prepared to absorb greater pressure from Washington. If exports remain largely unchanged, however, Pyongyang’s distrust of China is likely to deepen.

That is where the possibility of fracture begins. Once the summit’s rhetoric fades, structural interests will determine the future course of China-North Korea relations and, perhaps, the future of the Korean Peninsula.