Korea's nuclear future hinges on enrichment and reprocessing

Jun Bong-geun

The author is the president of the Korea Nuclear Policy Society.

South Korea’s nuclear industry stands at a critical crossroads.

Although it entered the nuclear age later than many advanced countries, South Korea has become one of the world’s leading nuclear power producers since bringing its first commercial reactor online in 1978. Today it operates 26 reactors. For decades, the country successfully relied on a model that imported all enriched nuclear fuel while storing spent fuel at reactor sites, effectively maintaining a nuclear industry without domestic uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing.

That model, however, is reaching its limits. The war in Ukraine and intensifying U.S.-Russia rivalry have exposed vulnerabilities in the global nuclear fuel supply chain. At the same time, demand for carbon-free electricity has surged as countries pursue carbon neutrality and AI-driven industries consume ever more power. Future reactors will also require advanced fuels, including high-assay low-enriched uranium, or Haleu, accident-tolerant fuels and transuranic fuels. Without enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, South Korea risks falling behind in the next generation of nuclear technology.

At the South Korea-U.S. summit in October last year, the two governments announced support for procedures, within the framework of the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement and U.S. law, that could ultimately enable South Korea’s peaceful civilian uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing. For the first time since abandoning those capabilities in 1975, South Korea gained a political foundation for pursuing a nuclear industry that includes enrichment and reprocessing.

That does not mean the path ahead will be easy.

Fourteen countries possess uranium enrichment technology and ten have spent fuel reprocessing technology. As the world’s fifth-largest nuclear power producer, South Korea might appear to be a natural candidate. Yet its ambitions collide with Washington’s long-standing nonproliferation policy.

The United States tightened controls on enrichment and reprocessing after India’s so-called peaceful nuclear explosion experiment in 1974. Former President Park Chung Hee’s nuclear weapons program became one of the first targets of that policy. Since 1975, only Pakistan, Iran and North Korea, all outside Washington’s alliance network, have acquired such capabilities. If South Korea were permitted to do so, it would become the first U.S. ally to receive such approval. The transition is therefore as much a diplomatic challenge as a technological one.

South Korea should prepare through three institutional reforms.

First, it should enact a Framework Act on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. The law should define the value, mission and national role of nuclear energy from the perspectives of national development, energy security and the national interest while establishing a governmentwide coordination system with clearly assigned responsibilities.

Current legislation rests mainly on the Nuclear Energy Promotion Act and the Nuclear Safety Act. One emphasizes research and industrial development while the other focuses on safety regulation. Consequently, nuclear energy has largely been treated as an industry requiring oversight despite its strategic significance for diplomacy, security and economic competitiveness.

A new framework law should affirm the peaceful use of nuclear energy, South Korea’s commitment to nonproliferation and transparency, its responsibility to strengthen energy security and its contribution to international peace. It should also elevate the Nuclear Energy Promotion Commission under the prime minister into the government’s highest coordinating body and strengthen its secretariat and expert participation. Finally, it should clearly explain the purpose and necessity of enrichment and reprocessing, providing a firm legal basis for future policy.

The second task is a Framework Act on Nuclear Nonproliferation.

Washington’s primary objection to South Korean enrichment and reprocessing has always been the risk of nuclear proliferation. That concern cannot be ignored when more than 70 percent of South Koreans reportedly support developing nuclear weapons.

Recently, President Lee Jae Myung and Foreign Minister Cho Hyun have stressed that a South Korean nuclear arsenal is neither realistic nor feasible given the country’s export-dependent economy and the importance of the South Korea-U.S. alliance. Such statements strengthen South Korea’s credibility, but they may not fully reassure overseas partners while public support for nuclear armament remains high.

Third, South Korea should consider establishing a South Korea-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Fund.

South Korea’s nuclear industry has developed in close partnership with the United States, which remains the global leader in next-generation reactor research and is expected to be the world’s largest nuclear market.

The proposed fund could support training specialists in nuclear policy and nonproliferation, establishing research centers, creating a South Korea-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation and Nonproliferation Information Center in the United States and sponsoring regular strategic dialogue between experts from both countries.

South Korea has been presented with a rare opportunity to advance its nuclear industry through enrichment and reprocessing. Expectations are therefore high for the government’s South Korea-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Task Force. Yet diplomacy alone will not resolve this challenge. Institutional preparation must come first.

An English proverb says, “If I had six hours to chop down a tree, I would spend the first four sharpening the axe.” The three reforms proposed above are precisely that preparation. By strengthening its legal and policy framework now, South Korea can build the international trust and institutional foundation needed to secure the future of its nuclear industry.