Korea’s defense industry needs a strategy for after the party

Lee Jae-seung

The author is a professor of international studies at Korea University and head of the Ilmin International Relations Institute.

I visited Eurosatory 2026 in Villepinte, north of Paris, in June. The exhibition, which gathers more than 2,000 defense companies and delegations worldwide, was not just a weapons fair. Its halls were filled with tanks, howitzers, armored vehicles, drones, counter-drone systems, electronic warfare gear and cyber defense solutions. Since the war in Ukraine, Europe’s rearmament has become a tectonic shift reshaping industry, technology, infrastructure and alliance politics, not simply weapons production.

South Korean companies had a striking presence. Alongside the K2 tank and K9 self-propelled howitzer, they displayed the country's expanding defense spectrum, from next-generation systems to unmanned technology. South Korea has become a challenger, making traditional powers uneasy. But that success brings a new challenge.

South Korean defense firms have benefited from demand created by Europe’s defense gap. War came suddenly, Europe lacked production capacity and South Korea could supply quickly and in volume. But this first-round “party” is nearing its end. The market still remains. The easy phase, where suppliers dominated, is passing. Europe will now ask tougher questions: Where is equipment produced? Who holds design authority? Who is responsible for software updates and maintenance?

The countries most urgently seeking South Korean weapons are those on the eastern front line of the Russian threat, including Poland, Romania and the three Baltic states. For South Korea, this is a proving ground. The country must show how quickly equipment can be deployed, how reliably it operates in cold weather and field conditions and how sustainable its ammunition and maintenance systems are. But eastern demand alone is not enough. South Korea must gain “strategic certification” in the policy space linking Paris, Berlin and Brussels, the European Union-NATO center.

This triangle sets standards, discourse, industrial policy and security identity. To become a long-term partner in Europe, South Korea must prove in the east that its equipment works and win recognition in the west that it is trustworthy. Rheinmetall, KNDS and other European players do not simply welcome South Korea’s rise. Being cheaper and faster may help short-term sales, but it is a risky strategy. The country needs a refined message: It has not come to replace Europe but to speed the recovery of Europe’s defense capabilities.

South Korea’s defense industry must therefore shift its paradigm. First, it must build structural trust beyond products and address security itself. Defense is business, but also state strategy. Europe is asking where South Korea stands amid crises including the invasion of Ukraine and North Korea-Russia military cooperation. The South Korea-EU security and defense partnership and talks on protecting classified information are key gateways into Europe’s security ecosystem.

Second, South Korea must combine its cross-sector industrial capabilities. Defense capability is not completed by weapons alone. Without railways, ports, communications networks and other infrastructure, deterrence cannot function in practice. South Korea should use an industrial structure that can handle defense, heavy industry, construction and energy together to build a defense-infrastructure strategy. With a “Team South Korea” strategy including finance, the country can compete in Ukraine’s reconstruction, Eastern European infrastructure and markets in the Middle East and Central Asia.

Third, South Korea must secure core technologies in cyberspace. Next-generation defense systems depend on digitalization and networking. The modern battlefield is determined not only by armor and range but by digital operation and resilience. Cyberattack response and recovery, software stability and reliable information against fake news and manipulated opinion have become part of weapons systems. Cyber capability lets digitally advanced South Korea quietly strengthen its position. Defense diplomacy must be linked to science diplomacy covering cyber, space, AI and semiconductors.

Ahead of the 2026 NATO summit in Turkey, South Korea should reassess its multilateral diplomacy. NATO and its four Asia-Pacific partners — South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand — have coordinated security agendas at the highest level for years. The format remains open, but this platform has expanded South Korea’s diplomatic and security reach and will serve as leverage in relations with China and Russia. Diplomatic autonomy comes not from isolation but from carefully designed networks.

The image of “arms dealer South Korea” will not last. The country must become more than a country that sells "cheaper" and "faster." It must build together, operate systems over the long term and respond jointly in crises. Now that the first-round party is over, the forces that will open the next door are strategic trust, industrial scalability, science and technology and meticulous diplomacy.