Vessels sit near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from Musandam, Oman, Sept. 2.REUTERS/YONHAP
Chung Un-chan
The author, a former president of Seoul National University and former prime minister, is the chairman of the Korea Institute for Shared Growth.
As a university freshman in the 1960s, I was interviewed for an academic club known for rigorous intellectual debate. A senior member asked, “What do you think about Korea sending troops to the Vietnam War at the request of the United States?”
Korea was emerging from the devastation of the Korean War amid the Cold War. The United States had provided food and security assistance for more than a decade, making its request difficult to refuse. Yet young Koreans wrestled with the choice among national security, soldiers’ lives and economic interests.
I answered that participation offered both benefits and costs. Refusing could make Korea appear disloyal, while joining could secure U.S. trust and foreign capital needed for development. But entering a war condemned internationally could also isolate Korea. I failed the interview. Regardless, Korea’s troop deployment was already underway.
Sixty years later, I feel similar unease.
U.S. President Donald Trump complained that the Korean government had responded “No, thanks” to a request for cooperation regarding Iran. Seoul subsequently announced it was considering a military contribution around the Strait of Hormuz and the Middle East, possibly including noncombat assets. Koreans could then find themselves in the peculiar situation of the North conducting military operations alongside Russia while the South operates alongside the United States.
Today’s dilemma is fundamentally similar to last year’s detention of more than 300 Korean nationals during a raid at a Hyundai Motor-LG Energy Solution joint-venture plant in Georgia. While the United States is an ally that contributed enormously to Korea’s security and economic development, alliances ultimately operate according to national interests.
Hormuz tests that principle again. Just as Korea needs independence and firm principles when confronting "America First" policies in economic affairs, it cannot compromise matters involving national survival simply because Washington is an ally.
Iran has warned that deploying Korean forces to the Strait of Hormuz would constitute “direct participation in war” and trigger a strong response. For Korea, which depends heavily on the Middle East for energy and must navigate complex relations among major powers, deployment to a conflict zone goes far beyond friendship with Washington. It directly affects the safety of Korean residents and businesses in the Middle East as well as national security and people’s livelihoods.
That is why the Constitution requires parliamentary consent for overseas troop deployments. Decisions affecting citizens’ lives and the nation’s fate cannot be left solely to the executive branch.
The government must not settle the issue behind closed doors while saying only that it is “under consideration,” then reduce parliamentary approval to a formality. The decision should follow the disclosure of information and substantive debate, without predetermined conclusions.
First, the government must explain the deployment’s purpose, limits and form. Would Korean forces merely escort Korean vessels and remove mines, or would they provide reconnaissance, intelligence sharing and logistical support for U.S. operations?
The government must specify the operational area, duration, command structure, rules governing the use of force and conditions for withdrawal. It must also explain candidly the potential diplomatic and economic repercussions involving Iran and other Middle Eastern countries.
There would be greater grounds for consideration if the mission operated under a multinational framework with international legitimacy through the United Nations or another mechanism, and if its mandate was limited to protecting civilian shipping and freedom of navigation.
Korea must also avoid partisan political warfare and build public consensus through broad discussion encompassing security, economic interests, diplomacy and livelihoods.
When Korea sent troops to Iraq in 2003, the government made a difficult decision after considering the Korea-U.S. alliance and North Korea’s nuclear threat. Yet disputes over the war’s justification and the benefits of deployment left lasting scars.
This time, Korea must avoid both arguments that “we must go because our ally asked” and that “we must oppose it because it is a U.S. war.” Once a decision is reached through legitimate procedures, the country should unite behind its implementation while ensuring corresponding alliance commitments and protection of Korea’s national interests.
The Korea-U.S. alliance remains a pillar of our security, but it is not a relationship of obedience.
Korea is no longer the peripheral nation dependent on outside assistance that it was 60 years ago. It has more than 50 million people, per capita income approaching $40,000 and a major role in global high-tech supply chains.
Korea and the United States should be partners that respect each other’s citizens and sovereignty while sharing burdens and risks reasonably. A courteous refusal based on sound reasoning, or the proposal of an alternative, does not weaken an alliance. Between equals, it can make that alliance healthier and stronger.
The government’s foremost duty is to protect its people’s lives and national interests. Overseas deployment need not be treated as taboo, nor should it be accepted as an alliance bill that must automatically be paid.
What Korea needs is the judgment of a sovereign nation combining firmness with prudence. That is the broad principle Korea must uphold in the narrow waters of Hormuz.
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
