Korea and Choson: Toward a proper relationship between two states

Park Myung-lim

The author is a political professor at Yonsei University.

The publication of amendments to the constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the official name for North Korea, adopted by the Supreme People’s Assembly in March, has reignited debate over the nature of the relationship between the Republic of Korea (ROK) — South Korea's official name — and Choson, the name North Korea uses for itself. To reflect its main argument, this article uses “Choson” to refer to the DPRK, although the JoongAng Ilbo normally uses “North Korea” in its English coverage.

Much of the current controversy, however, stems from excessive ideological interpretations and misunderstandings of both history and present realities.

According to Article 2 of the revised constitution, the territory of the DPRK consists of land bordered by the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation to the north and the ROK to the south, along with the territorial waters and airspace established on that basis. This is the first time that explicit provisions concerning territory, territorial waters and airspace have been included in the North Korean constitution.

When the DPRK was founded in 1948, no territorial clause existed. Instead, the constitution designated Seoul as the capital, effectively denying the existence and statehood of the ROK. In both content and structure, this position corresponded to South Korea’s constitutional claim to sovereignty over the entire Korean Peninsula.

Following the July 4 Joint Statement of 1972, Choson revised its constitutional framework. It designated Pyongyang as the capital and inserted provisions concerning national reunification. This marked formal constitutional recognition of division, de facto acceptance of South Korea’s existence and continued constitutional commitment to reunification.

South Korea followed a similar path. After the 1972 agreement, it also introduced reunification provisions into its constitution. Strictly speaking, those provisions created tension with constitutional claims that the entire peninsula constituted South Korean territory. Yet they also represented an unavoidable compromise between constitutional doctrine and political reality.

For decades, Choson maintained both the Pyongyang capital clause and reunification provisions. The 2026 revision fundamentally altered that framework. Reunification clauses were removed entirely and territorial provisions were added. The constitutional evolution can be summarized as a shift from “Seoul as capital” in 1948 to “Pyongyang as capital plus reunification” in 1972 and finally to “Pyongyang as capital plus territorial definition without reunification” this year.

Yet this constitutional change should not be confused with a “two-state theory.” In fact, the revised constitution has little to do with that concept. Choson now treats South Korea constitutionally as a foreign country, much like China or Russia. The relationship is defined not as two states within a special national framework but as neighboring foreign countries separated by an international border.

That distinction is crucial. Choson’s position represents what can be called a “two-foreign-countries theory,” not a “two-state theory.” South Korea should not accept the former as equivalent to the latter.

Historically, Pyongyang strongly opposed simultaneous membership in the United Nations by both Koreas, arguing that it would institutionalize permanent division. Today, however, it effectively treats South Korea as a foreign state. It has also advanced the view that Koreans constitute two separate nations rather than one people.

A proper two-state relationship on the Korean Peninsula would mean mutual recognition of statehood and sovereignty for the sake of peaceful coexistence while avoiding hostility, interference and conflict. At the same time, reunification would not be permanently abandoned but deferred under the principle that peace takes priority.

In this framework, two states coexist while still acknowledging the possibility of future unification. Such an approach rejects both sides’ historical claims to sole legitimacy, moves beyond nationalism-centered reunification doctrines and rejects the notion that South Korea and Choson are merely foreign countries.

South Korea gradually developed this position through a combination of the July 4 Joint Statement and simultaneous UN membership. The result was a carefully balanced formula: mutual recognition, peaceful coexistence and continued pursuit of reunification, while preserving South Korea’s distinct constitutional and diplomatic position.

That approach continued through successive administrations from Park Chung Hee and Roh Tae-woo to Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. It also informed agreements such as the Basic Agreement between South and North Korea. The reason South Korea’s push for simultaneous UN membership in 1991 was not widely criticized as pursuing a “two foreign countries” approach was precisely because it was understood within this broader framework.

In the years immediately following the 1950-53 Korean War and the end of the Cold War, some international organizations and major powers advanced positions that appeared to deny South Korea’s domestic and international claims regarding the future of the peninsula. South Korean leaders and citizens could not accept such views. Even Germany, which formally adopted a two-state approach, faced similar dilemmas before reunification.

South Korea and Choson should recognize and respect each other’s statehood and sovereignty. Both are members of the UN. Yet, they cannot simply be regarded as ordinary foreign countries under international law. Their relationship remains unique, shaped by division, coexistence and the unresolved question of future reunification.