Failure to stop North's mine-laying also demands accountability

The circumstances surrounding the land mine explosions that injured three South Korean soldiers in the western demilitarized zone, or DMZ, are becoming clearer. The Joint Chiefs of Staff said North Korean mines were highly likely responsible, and investigators found another suspected North Korean plastic antipersonnel mine beside the blast site. Defense Minister Kang Shin-chul said the military suspected a North Korean mine the day after the Sept. 21 incident and called the case a clear violation of the 1950-53 Korean War Armistice Agreement.

President Lee Jae Myung’s first public remarks on the case eight days later were disappointing. While ordering a swift investigation, he mentioned neither North Korea nor an armistice violation. Calling it a “land mine accident,” Lee warned against “baseless conspiracy theories” that could jeopardize national security.

Caution against unsupported claims is appropriate. But the military had suspected a North Korean mine the day after the incident. The public is asking not for conspiracy theories but for facts about what happened, why it was not prevented and who bears responsibility. With the on-site investigation already delayed, Lee’s call for a “swift” investigation also came belatedly.

Some views within the ruling camp are also troubling. National Assembly National Defense Committee Chair Jin Sung-joon raised the possibility that the North Korean mines were defensive and said that it was difficult to conclude they were planted specifically to injure South Korean troops.

However, if North Korea planted mines south of the military demarcation line (MDL), that would constitute an armistice violation. With a North Korean mine already suspected at the site and the defense minister calling the incident an armistice violation, Seoul should not make proving an intent to kill a prerequisite for responding.

The South Korean military’s own response also demands scrutiny. Since 2024, North Korea has built roads and fortifications and laid mines around the MDL. Why did South Korea’s military and security authorities not protest more forcefully or act to prevent those activities? Their response to North Korea’s recent military activity and mine-laying must now be examined.

If that response was inadequate, failures in command and border security should be identified and accountability established. It is difficult to dismiss the possibility that tolerating North Korea’s mine-laying, or responding passively to it, ultimately helped create the conditions that led to this incident.