Foreign Minister Cho Hyun answers lawmakers’ questions during a parliamentary audit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and related agencies by the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee in Yeouido, western Seoul, on Oct. 6.NEWS1
Park So-young The author is an editorial writer at the JoongAng Ilbo.
In diplomacy, national pride and national interest do not always point in the same direction.
In April 2001, a Chinese fighter jet collided with a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane near China's Hainan Island. The U.S. aircraft made an emergency landing on the island, and its 24 crew members were detained by China. With the two sides disputing responsibility and Beijing demanding a formal U.S. apology, relations approached a dangerous crisis.
Secretary of State Colin Powell drew a line: An “apology” would imply U.S. responsibility and was unacceptable. Instead, Washington expressed regret over the Chinese pilot's death and said it was “very sorry” that the EP-3 had entered Chinese airspace and landed without clearance. The United States did not abandon its position, but gave China room to back down. The crew was released. Washington upheld its principle while achieving its practical objective.
The opposite lesson can be found in South Korea-Japan tensions in 2012. Shortly before Liberation Day, President Lee Myung-bak became the first sitting South Korean president to visit Dokdo. The visit demonstrated South Korea's sovereignty over territory it effectively controls, but diplomatically it also drew international attention to the dispute.
Japan recalled its ambassador and pushed to take the issue to the International Court of Justice. Tensions widened further after Lee said that if the Japanese emperor wanted to visit South Korea, he should sincerely apologize to those who died fighting for Korean independence. Bilateral relations plunged to one of their lowest points since diplomatic ties were normalized in 1965.
The two cases demonstrate that proving “I am right” is not the same as obtaining what one wants in diplomacy.
The current dispute between South Korea and Ukraine over the transfer of North Korean prisoners of war should be viewed from this perspective. After Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy publicly disclosed plans for the prisoners to go to South Korea, Seoul accused Kyiv of breaking a confidential agreement and demanded an apology.
Appearing before the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee for a parliamentary audit Tuesday, Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said he had received a message containing apologetic language from his Ukrainian counterpart. But he said it fell short of what South Korea expected and warned of firm measures. Seoul is considering additional steps, including recalling its ambassador to Ukraine, he said, arguing that relations cannot improve while the truth is concealed.
That echoes President Lee Jae Myung's criticism on X that Ukraine had made the leader of another country “a liar.”
Yet when opposition lawmakers asked Cho to disclose materials concerning the confidential agreement, he said there was no need to make them public. His explanation was that South Korea must manage diplomatic relations with Ukraine and restore trust. If normalization is the goal, however, publicly raising the bar for an apology while threatening additional measures deserves scrutiny.
If Ukraine violated an agreement, responsibility must be established. With the prisoners' safety and human rights at stake, the issue cannot be brushed aside.
But South Korea must coolly ask what best serves its national interest: forcing the other side to bow publicly, or accepting an apology behind closed doors while securing commitments against a recurrence and protecting practical interests involving the prisoners' safety and postwar reconstruction.
The war in Ukraine is not remote from Korea. North Korea has deployed troops to Russia, while military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow has expanded. Ukraine's eventual reconstruction could also offer opportunities for South Korean companies.
Ukraine's recent objections to South Korean petroleum products being exported to Russia further show why the dispute cannot be reduced to a bilateral emotional quarrel. Europe continues to support Ukraine while maintaining strong sanctions against Russia, a broader strategic environment Seoul must consider.
What South Korea needs now is not an endless contest over who lied. Rather than escalating the dispute through public exchanges, Seoul should seek an exit through quiet negotiations.
Diplomacy requires knowing what must be defended and where compromise serves a larger purpose. The lessons of past diplomacy offer guidance: National dignity matters, but it should not be confused with national interest, especially when the stakes extend well beyond bilateral relations.
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
