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Hegseth says Washington must 'balance' USFK views in wider discussions on Opcon transfer

Published: 01 Jun. 2026, 07:00

U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth gestures during a question and answer session in a plenary session of the International Institute for Strategic Studies Shangri-la Dialogue Defence Summit in Singapore on May 30. [EPA/YONHAP]

U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said Saturday that Washington must “find the balance” of where American soldiers could be respected for their service in the process of transferring wartime operational control (Opcon) from Washington to Seoul.

Hegseth’s remarks came as Seoul and the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) remained at odds over the timeline for the Opcon transfer.

They can be interpreted as a signal that the concerns of the USFK should also be taken into account. The USFK, which serves as the first evaluator of Opcon transfer readiness, previously expressed concerns about Korea’s plan to complete the transfer as early as next year.

As negotiations over the Opcon transfer gain momentum, some analysts say USFK Gen. Xavier Brunson — the key gatekeeper in the process — could emerge as a complicating factor.

“Frankly, it is a breath of fresh air for an ally to want to take more control more quickly,” Hegseth said during the plenary session of the Shangri-La Dialogue 2026 in Singapore on Saturday, when referring to the Opcon transfer issue.

The comment suggests that the U.S. Donald Trump administration, which has pushed allies to take a greater role in their own defense, is broadly supportive of the Lee Jae Myung administration's goal of completing the Opcon transfer during its term.

But Hegseth added: “I think we have to find the balance of where our military Oplans and the responsibilities that U.S. uniform members have had for decades [...] is honored.” Military Oplan refers to the military operational plan.

The remark suggests that Washington is placing considerable weight on the views of U.S. service members stationed in Korea.

USFK has argued that an Opcon transfer as early as next year would be premature because the required conditions have not yet been met.

“The general and I have [...] spent a good chunk of time recently talking about that,” Hegseth said, referring to Brunson. “We met recently in the Pentagon with the [Korean] Minister of Defense on that very topic.”

Combined Forces Command Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson delivers a keynote address at the Korea-U.S. Alliance Policy Forum held at the War Memorial of Korea in Yongsan District, central Seoul, on Dec. 29, 2025. [YONHAP]

Some analysts point to Brunson’s recent remarks at the U.S. House of Representatives, in which he publicly referenced the second quarter of fiscal year 2029 — January through March 2029 — as evidence of that view.

By contrast, the Korean government aims to complete the Full Operational Capability assessment at the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), scheduled to take place in Washington at the end of the year. Seoul also aims to establish a target year for the transfer at the upcoming meeting.

The Opcon transition process is expected to follow the established bilateral military decision-making mechanism.

The issue would move through the bilateral Permanent Military Committee (PMC), the Military Committee Meeting (MCM) between the chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the SCM between the defense ministers before receiving final approval from the state leaders of both nations.

Brunson is capable of formally presenting his views at the PMC stage as a senior United States officer assigned to Korea. Should he explicitly oppose the transition based on readiness indicators and assessment results, delays would likely become unavoidable.

That possibility has fueled concerns within and outside the military that tensions between Seoul and USFK could become more visible in the second half of the year as Opcon negotiations intensify.

Some within the government, however, believe that even if disagreements emerge at the PMC level, the matter could still advance to the MCM and SCM for political agreement.

That interpretation aligns with recent comments by a Korean Defense Ministry official, who described Opcon transfer as a “policy and political decision.”

The concern is that deeper friction with USFK could weaken the alliance's combined defense posture, even if Seoul secures agreement on its preferred transfer timeline.

In principle, the alliance’s post-Opcon defense structure is governed by the “Guiding Principles Following the Transition of Wartime Operational Control.”

The principles were approved in October 2018 by then-Korean Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo and then-U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis.

“As a symbol of the commitment pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, U.S. Forces Korea is to continue to be stationed on the Korean Peninsula and firmly fulfill the security commitment to the ROK,” the framework reads, using the initialism for Korea’s official name, the Republic of Korea.

“The national authorities of the ROK are to appoint a [four-star] General or an Admiral to serve as the Commander of the post-Opcon transition Combined Forces Command, and the national authorities of the United States are to appoint a [four-star] General or an Admiral to serve as the deputy commander of the post-Opcon transition Combined Forces Command,” the 2018 agreement said.

The Korean government believes the United States is unlikely, at least for now, to challenge that basic framework, given that the leaders of both countries share an interest in accelerating the transfer.

However, questions remain over operational command arrangements, force employment and the chain of command governing U.S. forces arriving from outside the peninsula in case of a contingency.

Those issues will require further bilateral negotiations, and many analysts expect USFK’s views to carry substantial influence within the U.S. administration.

Brunson also addressed his previous remarks about calling Korea “a dagger aimed at China” on Friday at the Shangri-La Dialogue.

“We have to change our perspective, which is why the East Up map is important,” Brunson said. “By changing our perspective, we take into account how others might see us in the region's abilities within the Republic of Korea, but we have to understand that those things still exist.”

In a recent podcast interview hosted by the U.S. Army War College, Brunson labeled Korea a “dagger” aimed at China and Japan a “shield.”

Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back, right, shakes hands with Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi during the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore on May 30. [MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE]

Separately, the Korean Defense Ministry announced Saturday that the Korean Navy and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force had agreed to resume a joint search-and-rescue exercise for the first time in nine years.

The move is seen as a military follow-up to the summit between President Lee Jae Myung and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Andong, North Gyeongsang, in mid-May.

The Korean and Japanese defense ministers also discussed a potential Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), according to officials.

“The ACSA issue is one that requires understanding and persuasion from the public of both countries, and I believe we still need to proceed carefully,” said Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back.

The initiative remains a priority for the Japanese side rather than the Korean government, according to officials.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
BY LEE YU-JUNG [[email protected]]