North Korea’s shadow in the Iran war

Home > Opinion > Columns

North Korea’s shadow in the Iran war

Published: 22 Apr. 2026, 00:01

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Kim Byung-yeon

The author is a chair professor of economics at Seoul National University.

Why does North Korea come to mind when observing the Iran war? One reason is the persistence of U.S. President Donald Trump on nuclear issues. It is clear that U.S. military action aims to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Trump has said the world will be safer once the war ends, making Tehran's abandonment of nuclear ambitions central to any settlement. In this respect, the conflict recalls the North Korean nuclear crisis of 2016–17.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, top right, watches a Hwasong-11 Ra surface-to-surface ballistic missile on April 19, in this photo released by the North's official party newspaper, the Rodong Sinmun, the following day. [NEWS1]

In early 2016, North Korea carried out its fourth nuclear test, followed by two more tests and intercontinental ballistic missile launches. At the time, the first Trump administration seriously considered a so-called bloody nose strike. However, there was still hope that sanctions could lead to negotiations, and experienced officials prevented escalation. Trump’s confidence was also more limited. Had such a crisis occurred during his second term, the possibility of war might have been greater.

Another similarity lies in the role of third parties persuading Trump that the moment was ripe for a deal. Reports suggest Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu helped shape conditions leading to the Iran conflict. In 2018, negotiations with North Korea were facilitated in part by special envoys from the Moon Jae-in administration. Information conveyed by these actors appears to have reinforced Trump’s instinct that such strategic opportunities are rare and must be seized.

Yet the approaches to denuclearization diverged sharply. While the United States pursued negotiations with North Korea, it used military force in Iran’s case. The second Trump administration appears more willing than previous administrations to use force. This may increase pressure on adversaries, but it also raises concerns among observers. While such tactics may be effective in individual cases, they risk undermining the broader international order.

The Iran war has increased the likelihood of military conflict worldwide. In the roughly 70 years between the Korean War and the Russia-Ukraine war, major power-involved conflicts occurred about once every seven years. In contrast, two such wars have taken place in the past four years. The growing frequency of conflict may reduce policymakers’ reluctance to use military force, making war a more readily chosen option.

Conflicts can spread in unintended ways. When Hamas attacked Israel in October 2023, few experts anticipated escalation into a broader war involving Iran and eventually the United States. Yet that is what has occurred. War carries the risk of expansion, and as economic tools and military force are increasingly used together, the global environment becomes more dangerous. This moment may mark the beginning of such an era.

The key question is whether this wave of conflict will stop or evolve into a larger cycle affecting the Korean Peninsula. Korea must preserve peace. Preventing the spread of conflict requires addressing the North Korean issue. However, moving too quickly risks legitimizing North Korea as a de facto nuclear state. Given Trump’s focus on nuclear issues, attention may eventually shift from Iran to North Korea, though he is likely aware that rushed negotiations could give Pyongyang the upper hand.

At present, resolving the North Korean nuclear issue is unlikely to be a top U.S. priority. At the same time, excessive assertiveness by Trump could also pose risks. Frustration under unfavorable conditions might appear as signals of military confrontation on the peninsula. Even rhetoric similar to “fire and fury” could deliver a severe shock to South Korea’s economy in the current environment.

Seoul must wait for a strategic opportunity. When geopolitical shifts or internal changes in North Korea create such a window, it should be prepared to use it as a basis for negotiation. The South also needs to compensate for weaknesses in Trump’s transactional approach, including a tendency to underestimate geopolitical chain reactions and to act first and reflect later.

U.S. President Donald Trump, left, meets with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at the North Korean side of the border at the village of Panmunjom in the demilitarized zone on June 30, 2019. [AP/YONHAP]

One example is the tariff increase on China following the 2018 Singapore summit, which weakened Beijing’s cooperation on sanctions against Pyongyang. Seoul should therefore develop a comprehensive road map covering not only the timing of negotiations but also their process and outcomes, and communicate this clearly with the United States. It must avoid repeating past failures, when premature optimism led to missed opportunities for denuclearization.

Nor should South Korea be swayed by proposals to adopt “peaceful coexistence between two states” as the goal of inter-Korean relations. History shows that peace with abnormal regimes is rarely durable. The North Korean issue will not resolve itself. If left unaddressed, it will accumulate into greater risks and volatility.

In an era of uncertainty, only a multidimensional understanding of Trump, Pyongyang and geopolitics can ensure South Korea's survival.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.