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As hybrid warfare rises, Korea faces readiness questions

Published: 15 Apr. 2026, 00:03

Jang Seok-kwang

The author is the general secretary of the Academy of National Intelligence.

Gunfire may have subsided after armistice agreements, but war has not ended. It has merely changed form. Today’s conflicts increasingly take the shape of hybrid warfare, an evolution in which traditional combat loses clear boundaries and merges with diverse instruments of power.

The concept first emerged in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, where conventional and irregular warfare combined on the battlefield. It was later conceptualized by U.S. strategist Frank Hoffman in “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Warfare” (2007). The annexation of Crimea in 2014 marked a turning point, integrating information and cyberoperations. By the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war, military, cyber, informational and economic dimensions were operating simultaneously. More recent conflicts, including the Israel-Iran confrontation in 2025 and the Middle East tensions that have been ongoing since late February suggest that battlefields now extend beyond physical space to shape entire societies and perceptions.

This video still taken from social media on March 7 shows fire erupting at an oil depot in Iran's capital Tehran. [AFP/YONHAP]

Recent developments in the Middle East illustrate this trend clearly. A single attack can penetrate military, cyber, informational and economic domains at once. Cyberoperations disable command and communication networks, followed by airstrikes. Hacker groups act alongside or on behalf of states. Civilian infrastructure, such as corporations and data centers, becomes targets, while misinformation spreads rapidly through social media platforms, expanding the battlefield into public perception and opinion.

Hybrid attacks are inherently complex. A single act can simultaneously constitute military action, criminal conduct, intelligence activity and even a form of expression. Yet South Korea’s legal framework does not treat such threats as integrated phenomena. Instead, different laws and agencies address separate aspects. This fragmentation delays classification and jurisdictional decisions when incidents occur. If the perpetrator is unclear or operates beyond national borders, applying the law becomes even more difficult. Institutions exist, but responses lag behind evolving threats.

An incident from June 29, 1995, offers a point of comparison. When the Sampoong Department Store collapsed in central Seoul, an onsite investigation team tasked with assessing potential North Korean involvement responded immediately. Had the collapse been a terrorist attack, emergency alerts would have been issued nationwide. Upon arrival, the building’s central section appeared to have collapsed vertically, resembling a precision strike. However, investigators withdrew within two hours. There were no signs of explosive residue, no blast odor and no secondary damage from high-pressure shock waves. Goods inside remained relatively intact, and nearby apartments showed no impact damage.

At that time, clear physical indicators allowed authorities to distinguish between accident and attack. Decision-making frameworks were straightforward. But consider how such an incident might unfold in 2026. A large building collapses suddenly. Simultaneously, nearby communications networks fail. Social media fills with claims of terrorism. Some users circulate edited videos alleging explosions before the collapse. Drones appear over the site, filming rescue efforts, while intermittent communication disruptions affect command systems. Financial markets react, with related stocks falling and foreign capital withdrawing. Under such conditions, could authorities still assess and withdraw within two hours?

Agencies on the scene would struggle to determine whether the event was structural failure, cyberenabled terrorism or a coordinated external operation. Police might treat it as an accident, intelligence services might suspect hostile involvement and the military could hesitate to intervene. Meanwhile, misinformation would spread, markets would fluctuate and social instability would intensify.

In this era of hybrid warfare, threats do not follow fixed patterns. Cyberattacks, information manipulation, economic pressure and nonstate actors operate simultaneously, creating challenges that fall outside traditional legal categories. Differences in the authority and structure of intelligence agencies become decisive factors in determining how quickly and flexibly a country can respond.

The photo shows the scene of the Sampoong Department Store collapse in Seocho-dong, Seocho District, Seoul, on June 29, 1995. [YONHAP]

The United States, under Executive Order 12333, grants intelligence agencies broad authority to use all lawful means for national security while prohibiting specific acts such as assassination. Israel operates with even greater flexibility. Its domestic security agency Shin Bet, under a 2002 law, is tasked with safeguarding national security and countering terrorism and espionage, with considerable discretion in methods. Its foreign intelligence agency Mossad operates under the authority of the prime minister rather than a specific statute, allowing flexible mission scope.

Such structures enable rapid responses to hybrid threats. In contrast, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service is bound by Article 4 of its governing law, which enumerates specific duties such as foreign intelligence collection, counterespionage, counterterrorism and protection of state secrets. Activities outside these defined areas face delays or limitations when confronting new types of threats.

Germany has expanded the roles of its Federal Intelligence Service and domestic security agency to address cyberthreats and disinformation. Japan is also strengthening intelligence integration and overseas capabilities, with discussions underway to establish a national intelligence agency comparable to the CIA. Both countries historically imposed strict limits on intelligence activities after World War II, yet are now adapting to new realities.

In an era defined by hybrid warfare, the question remains what preparations South Korea is making to meet these evolving challenges.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.