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South Korea has own interests at stake in the Strait of Hormuz, IISS chief warns

Published: 24 Mar. 2026, 14:12 Updated: 24 Mar. 2026, 14:16

Bastian Giegerich, director-general of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, speaks in an interview with the JoongAng Ilbo at The Plaza Hotel in Jung District, central Seoul, on March 20. [KIM SEONG-RYONG]

For South Korea to refuse U.S. requests to join a deployment to the Strait of Hormuz could be shortsighted and ignore its national interests, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Director-General and Chief Executive Bastian Giegerich warned in an exclusive interview on Friday.

The IISS, founded in 1958, is a think tank headquartered in London. The IISS is considered one of the world’s leading institutions on international affairs alongside the U.S.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.

With a branch in Bahrain, the IISS hosts the Manama Dialogue each year, a major security and geopolitical conference held in the Middle Eastern country.

The IISS also publishes The Military Balance, an annual assessment of global military capabilities, and hosts the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, which brings together defense ministers from over 40 countries — including South Korea, the United States, China and Japan — to discuss defense policy and security issues.

Giegerich visited South Korea on Thursday to attend Hanwha Aerospace’s IISS Strategic Roundtable. The IISS launched a Korea Chair program last year with support from the Korea Foundation (KF) and Hanwha Group.

Reflecting the rapidly evolving situation in the Middle East, he added cautiously that he does not have a “crystal ball.”

The following interview has been edited for length and clarity.

A view of a residential building damaged by a strike during the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran in Tehran, Iran, on March 23. [REUTERS/YONHAP]

Q. The whole world is watching what is happening in the Middle East. Our readers would like to hear your perspective on the current situation. How do you expect the war to unfold?

A. My expectation, based on where we are now, is that U.S. President Donald Trump would prefer the war to be short. It is not popular domestically, and the economic effects are already becoming visible, with oil prices rising. It is also a midterm election year.

Israel, on the other hand, appears to believe there is more to be gained from continuing the war. However, as we have seen recently, it is coming under increasing pressure from the United States — and from Trump in particular — to limit its ambitions.

As for Iran, the regime is likely to frame its mere survival as a success if it manages to endure.

There is also a scenario — not one I consider very likely, but still plausible — in which the United States chooses to end its direct involvement, while others continue the war. That is a possibility we at least need to consider.

What is the likelihood that the United States might launch a ground campaign in Iran?

If you’re talking about the military requirements for an operation to open and secure the Strait of Hormuz, it’s important to recognize that this would not be an air-only operation. It would have to cover multiple domains — air, maritime and also a ground component. I would expect that contingency plans for such an operation exist. Whether it is under active consideration right now, I don’t know.

Cargo ships near the Strait of Hormuz are seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah in the United Arab Emirates, close to the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran on March 11. [REUTERS/YONHAP]

Do you think the war in Iran could become prolonged?

I think the United States has a clear interest in bringing the war to a conclusion relatively soon. Iran, however, still has options.

It has been hit very hard, and much of its capability has been degraded, but it also has a very high tolerance for pain. The primary goal of the regime in Tehran at this point is simply survival. So, I don’t think it is about to fold. From that perspective, the war could continue for some time.

There is a lot of speculation that it could last anywhere from a few weeks to several months, but I don’t know the answer to that. What we can say is that while the United States has strong incentives to end the war quickly, the incentives for Israel and Iran are somewhat different, and that might mean that it will continue for some time.

But I can’t give you a specific timeline — I don’t have that crystal ball.

Trump has said South Korea should join efforts in the Strait of Hormuz to support the United States. Do you think South Korea should take part?

The Strait of Hormuz is not fully closed at this point. There is still limited traffic passing through — roughly around 10 percent of normal levels. However, what Iran has demonstrated is the ability to sustain disruption through limited attacks, and that provides it with significant strategic leverage.

If that leverage were to be removed militarily, the United States would likely need to conduct a multi-domain operation — involving air, maritime and ground elements — to secure the strait. But even if such an operation were successful, it would take time for commercial operators to regain the confidence to resume normal activity. The disruption would likely continue for some time, possibly for months. At this stage, I am not aware of a fully credible and detailed military plan to guarantee safe passage through the strait.

That said, there is an important distinction that U.S. partners — including South Korea, European countries and Japan — need to make. On one hand, there is the question of how the war began and whether they agree with it. On the other hand, there is their own national interest in keeping the strait open for trade, energy supply and broader economic stability.

Taking the position that “this is not our war, so we will not get involved” may be too shortsighted, given the strategic importance of the strait. That is why we are beginning to see some countries — such as France, Britain, Germany, Italy and Japan — exploring ways to contribute to securing it.

No country has yet outlined in detail what that contribution would look like, but the issue is clearly now on the table. Ultimately, if a country has something to lose from a disruption in the strait, it will need to consider what role it is willing to play — potentially through both military and political means.

A banner with a picture of the late leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and the late Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Iran's new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, is displayed on a street, amid the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Tehran, Iran, on March 23. [REUTERS/YONHAP]

After the war ends, how do you foresee the future of the current Iranian regime?

The pain threshold for this regime is extremely high. Its goal is survival, and if the regime survives, it will spin that survival into a narrative of success — even of winning the war.

Given how significant the attacks have been, simply surviving will be turned into a story of success that they tell their supporters, as a form of consolidation.

A consolidation of a hard-line regime is a possibility. I think there are, of course, a number of people and experts who assume there could be domestically led regime change in Iran, but I don’t see many signs at the moment that this is imminent.

In its National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the United States emphasizes an “America First” principle and “peace through strength,” prioritizing the containment of China in the Indo-Pacific and strengthening defense in the Western Hemisphere. However, this war was not listed among its immediate priorities. Why do you think Trump decided to go to war against Iran?

I don’t know his thought process, but the rationale offered publicly has ranged from Iran posing an imminent threat to Israel being poised for imminent action against Iran.

But I don’t know why President Trump ultimately made this decision. From my point of view, the U.S. administration has not put forward a consistent explanation. There are different elements of an explanation out there, but at this point, they are not terribly consistent.

The United States carried out Operation Absolute Resolve against Venezuela and is conducting Operation Epic Fury against Iran. Some observers say the United States is undermining the rules-based international order it established after World War II. How do you expect the current order to evolve in the near future after this war ends? And how should a middle power like South Korea respond?

Well, what is generally referred to as the rules-based international order — I think we first have to acknowledge that it has been undermined and, at times, broken for quite some time now. I would point to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, now in its fifth year, as a primary example.

The broader point is that every time the international order is broken, and those who believe in that order do not defend it, it becomes weaker. I think we have now reached a point where several nations are asking themselves whether that order is, in fact, no longer functioning.

That raises a difficult question: Is it still productive for national security to remain bound by the conventions of that order if it is no longer operating? Some states clearly do not think so.

For middle powers like South Korea and other like-minded nations, I don’t think the answer is simply to stand by. Rather, they can strengthen alignment with each other and take initiatives in limited but well-chosen areas.

For example, South Korea is a high-tech nation. It could work with other middle powers with similar profiles to advance cooperation in areas such as artificial intelligence and other advanced technologies, particularly where they intersect with national security and defense.

This approach is useful because it gives these states agency and a role in shaping what comes next. So I think alignment among middle powers around specific issue areas is very important.

If I may add, the IISS has recently established a Korea Chair in London to work on exactly these issues and to support initiatives like this. We will be watching this very closely and hope to contribute to shaping the response to the world we now find ourselves in.

It was the United States that asked China to postpone the summit scheduled for early next month. Many expected the two countries to find a breakthrough on the tariff war at this meeting. What do you think will happen to relations between the two countries going forward? In particular, what impact will the outcome of the Iran war have?

I think the first point is that a lot of effort will already have gone into preparing the U.S.-China summit by the time President Trump asked for it to be postponed by a number of weeks. We will have to see when it eventually takes place.

Of course, we also don’t yet know the precise outcome of the war — how it will be settled and how it might ultimately affect the U.S.-China relationship in the medium- to long-term, if at all.

However, looking at the situation as it stands now, I would assume that the government in Beijing considers the war against Iran to be the United States' mistake, from which China might be able to benefit in the medium term. I think that is probably how they view the landscape at this point.

U.S. President Donald Trump walks to speak to reporters before boarding Air Force One at Palm Beach International Airport in West Palm Beach, Florida, on March 23. President Donald Trump said Monday that there are "major points of agreement" in U.S.-Iran talks, which he said must result in Tehran giving up its nuclear ambitions and enriched uranium stockpile. Trump said the talks, which Iran denies are taking place, were being conducted with a "top person" but not the country's supreme leader. [AFP/YONHAP]

There were high expectations that Trump would pressure China more aggressively in his second term. However, in the NSS, China is defined as a manageable competitor rather than a pacing threat. How do you anticipate the hegemonic competition between the two countries will unfold?

I do think the United States still sees China as the pacing threat — in the sense of the challenge that ultimately needs to be addressed, perhaps more in a narrower military context.

But taking a step back, I think strategic competition between China and the United States is a defining feature of our time. It encompasses political, economic, technological and military dimensions. China has shown that it knows very well how to use its leverage — for example, through export controls as a tool of economic statecraft, demonstrating that it can deploy them for national security purposes.

The hemispheric logic you alluded to — which is now part of official U.S. security discourse and reflected in the strategies you mentioned — carries a risk of overinterpretation. I don’t think it means that the United States and China will reach a stable equilibrium in which they simply focus on their respective hemispheres and coexist in that way.

Rather, these two very powerful states will continue to bump into each other and will need to find ways to settle their differences. I don’t think that is going to change because of the strategic redefinition we are seeing.

Next year has been cited as a possible time frame for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Chinese President Xi Jinping has also tightened his control over the military following purges of senior officials, including Zhang Youxia. What actions do you think China may take regarding Taiwan next year? If China invades Taiwan, would the United States and Japan intervene? And how should South Korea respond to such a crisis?

Speaking today, I would say that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan within the next 12 months is still less likely than not.

But there is another important conversation to have. China’s rapid military modernization and buildup of its capabilities continue. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has commissioned its largest and most capable aircraft carrier, along with at least nine new surface combatants in the past year. Between 2021 and 2025, China launched 10 new nuclear-powered submarines, and it has outpaced the U.S. Navy in both the number of vessels and total tonnage built during that period.

The PLA Air Force has also continued introducing modern combat aircraft, and China now possesses the largest fleet of low-observable combat aircraft in the Asia-Pacific region. The PLA has, of course, intensified its military activity around Taiwan.

At the same time, President Xi’s ongoing anticorruption campaign targeting senior PLA officials will, on one hand, give him tighter control. But it also raises questions about how these leadership changes within the armed forces may affect operational readiness and the ability to conduct a campaign.

On balance, however, I don’t think the changes we’ve seen — including the purging of some of the officials you mentioned — significantly alter the timeline that China may be considering.

People attend Eid al-Fitr prayers, marking the end of Muslim holy fasting month of Ramadan, amid the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Tehran, Iran, on March 21. [REUTERS/YONHAP]

The United States is reportedly running low on interceptor missiles and precision-guided munitions. In this situation, does it have the capacity to fight another war in the near future?

Even a country as powerful as the United States does not have infinite resources — that’s certainly true.

An asymmetric advantage the United States has long enjoyed, which has supported its ability to maintain a strong security presence in multiple regions, is its network of strong alliances and partnerships. However, Washington has increasingly made clear that it does not want its allies to be overly dependent.

As a result, U.S. allies in Europe and Asia will need to shoulder a greater share of their own defense. In my view, this presents an opportunity to invest in deterrence and defense capabilities. I continue to believe that the United States will value capable partners and is more likely to support those that have demonstrated such capacity.

Even so, U.S. support has limits — not only political limits, but also capacity constraints, as you noted. Right now, many experts question whether the United States can sustain two major wars against peer or near-peer competitors.

That said, we should also recognize that Iran is not a peer or near-peer competitor. So I don’t think the current situation constrains the United States in quite the way some commentators have suggested.

South Korea has pursued a strategy of aligning with the United States on security while maintaining economic ties with China. As U.S.-China strategic competition intensifies, this ambiguity-based approach is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. What strategy should South Korea pursue in this situation?

You use the word “ambiguity,” but I would perhaps suggest “hedging” as a more accurate term. But I agree that in the current environment, hedging is becoming more difficult — the space for it is shrinking.

For a country like South Korea, investing in its own defense is key. It should also find ways to strengthen the U.S.-South Korea alliance through economic and defense-industrial linkages, particularly in areas where the United States is actively seeking support.

At the same time, Seoul should look to strengthen its alignment with other middle powers around specific issue areas. Those strike me as important elements of a strategy in the current environment.

A cargo ship carrying vehicles sails through the Arabian Gulf toward the Strait of Hormuz on March 22. [AP/YONHAP]

President Lee Jae Myung has expressed a desire to cooperate with North Korea, but North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has rejected dialogue and declared inter-Korean relations to be hostile. What strategy can South Korea employ to create space for improving relations with the North?

I am not in a position to give detailed advice to policymakers in South Korea on this matter. But let me say this.

When faced with a counterpart that is unresponsive to offers of dialogue, it seems reasonable to invest in your own strength. That does not mean withdrawing the offer of dialogue — it should remain on the table — but it also should not be the only approach.

At the moment, I personally don’t see an opening. That leaves focusing on what you can do: strengthening your own position and preparing for a time when an opportunity for engagement might arise. I wouldn’t want to speculate further, as this is not really my field of expertise.

The Russia-Ukraine war has now exceeded four years. How do you expect the war to unfold?

Russia continues to pursue what can only be described as maximalist war aims — namely, the subordination of all of Ukraine. Ukraine, on the other hand, is doing its utmost to resist, because for Ukraine, its very survival is at stake.

At this point, both sides are materially capable of continuing the fight, and both believe — for their own reasons — that there is more to gain from continuing than from stopping. They also judge the costs of continuing the war to be politically tolerable.

What may appear from the outside as a stalemate on the battlefield actually reflects a somewhat unstable equilibrium. Ukraine has fewer resources but a very deep commitment and strong will to fight. Russia, meanwhile, has mobilized enough force to inflict severe pressure and suffering, but not enough to decisively defeat Ukraine.

From this perspective, as we enter the fifth year of the war, a political settlement seems unlikely. A colleague at the IISS, Nigel Gould-Davies, has argued that this equilibrium is inherently unstable and that escalation remains possible. Examples include Russia’s intense strikes on Ukrainian energy and infrastructure over the winter, as well as Ukraine’s efforts to carry out deeper strikes into Russia to disrupt economic and military production.

Ukraine’s biggest challenge at this point is manpower. For a long time, that was not Russia’s problem, as it was able to replenish its losses. But in recent months, Russia has also begun to face difficulties in replacing the large number of personnel it is losing. This raises a difficult choice for Moscow: whether to undertake broader mobilization — which would be politically unpopular — or continue to draw from increasingly limited sources of manpower.

Politically, the positions of the two sides remain incompatible. Russia’s maximalist aims are not acceptable to Ukraine, and as long as those aims persist, Ukraine cannot expect a stable peace settlement.

For these reasons, I do not expect a breakthrough in negotiations over a cease-fire or any form of political settlement in the near term.

People attend the funeral of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps spokesman Ali Mohammad Naini after Eid al-Fitr prayers, marking the end of the Muslim holy fasting month of Ramadan, amid the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Tehran, Iran, on March 21. [REUTERS/YONHAP]

Do you think North Korea and Russia will continue their cooperation even after the Russia-Ukraine war ends? And how will Kim prepare for the postwar situation?

I think the relationship between Russia and North Korea is likely to endure even after a settlement. It raises serious concerns about proliferation and technology transfers. The commitment that North Korea has made to Russia will likely lead to some form of reciprocal action, although we do not yet know what that might look like.

What is particularly concerning is that North Korea will learn military lessons from this war and incorporate them into its armed forces. It will gain insight into how its weapons systems perform in actual combat, which will be worrying for South Korea. There is also the possibility that North Korea could benefit from military technology transfers from Russia.

These factors are now part of the strategic environment we are operating in, and I would expect this relationship to continue — unless the way the war ends brings about systemic change in Russia. That is not very likely, but it is not impossible, and it could alter the situation significantly.

Trump has expressed disappointment with European allies over support in the Strait of Hormuz and has even mentioned the possibility of withdrawing from NATO. Would Europe be able to defend itself without the United States?

Europe — or rather, the European members of NATO — did not perceive a serious or existential threat to their security for many years after the end of the Cold War. As a result, they have structurally underfunded their armed forces and defense industries for roughly 25 to 30 years.

This stands in contrast to South Korea, which has faced a clear and persistent threat and has therefore invested heavily in its defense capabilities. As a consequence, European NATO members now face significant capability gaps and defense-industrial shortfalls that will take time to address.

At present, they remain dependent on the United States in key areas such as space-based assets, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as integrated air and missile defense. These are critical enablers where Europe still lacks sufficient capacity.

That said, this does not mean that Europe would be unable to defend itself at all. Much would depend on the specific circumstances and the nature of the conflict. If we assume the primary threat comes from Russia, current assessments suggest that, on present trends, Russia could rebuild and equip its desired force structure by around 2030, posing a significant conventional threat to Europe. Under the current leadership in Moscow, such capabilities would likely be matched by intent.

European NATO members, therefore, believe they have a limited window of time to reduce their vulnerabilities, strengthen their defenses and lessen their dependence on the United States — which is, in fact, something Washington has been urging them to do.

While these gaps will not be fully closed by 2030, it is important not to confuse shortfalls with helplessness. Europe has limitations, but it would not be defenseless without the United States.

Hanwha Aerospace and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) hold a strategic roundtable on March 19. Bastian Giegerich, director-general of the IISS, is fifth from left, and Son Jae-il, CEO of Hanwha Aerospace, is sixth from left. [HANWHA AEROSPACE]

What kind of cooperation could be possible with NATO and South Korea?

One key area is defense industry collaboration. South Korea has a highly capable defense industrial base that can produce at scale, at competitive cost and high quality. European NATO members are now seeking to rearm and expand their defense capacity quickly. While they will want to do much of this domestically, they will also look for external partners — and South Korea is a strong candidate.

There is also potential for cooperation across the defense industrial spectrum, from innovation and research and development to production and procurement. In addition, the intersection of advanced technology, security and defense — including areas like AI — is another shared priority where partnership could grow.

The IISS only established a Korea Chair last year, which some say came a bit late. What are your thoughts on that?

We were too late — well, at least we’re here now.

Of course, it would have been better to start earlier. But establishing a Korea Chair at the IISS is something we are very proud of. I also see it as a sign that South Korea’s foreign and security partnerships are expanding.

In the past, many initiatives like this were heavily focused on the United States, for understandable reasons. But now there is growing interest in the Korea-Europe dimension, as well as in areas like advanced technology and security. We are very pleased to be part of that shift.

I take your point that we could have done this sooner. But I am very grateful for the support we have received from the KF and Hanwha, which made it possible to establish the Korea Chair. We are also very pleased to have recruited an extremely capable person for the role.

Going forward, we want to ensure a regular program of Korea-related activities — including events, workshops, seminars and publications — both in Seoul and elsewhere in Korea. We intend to be more present and engaged and, hopefully, to contribute a valuable perspective to the ongoing policy debate.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
BY LEE CHUL-JAE [[email protected]]