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Kurds should not become tinder in a war with Iran

Published: 10 Mar. 2026, 00:04

Park Hyun-do

The author is a professor at the Sogang Institute for Euro-MENA Studies at Sogang University.

On Saturday, U.S. President Donald Trump responded to a reporter’s question about whether Iran’s map would remain the same after the war by saying, “I can’t say that. It probably won’t.”

If Trump made the remark with a clear understanding of Iran’s ethnic composition and the complex geopolitical relationships of the Middle East, the implication goes beyond regime change in Tehran. It suggests a profound geopolitical shift surrounding Iran. The idea that Iran’s map could change carries the prospect of upheaval that might plunge the Middle East into turmoil for decades.

Iranian Kurdish fighters from the Kurdistan Freedom Party take part in a training session at a base on the outskirts of Erbil, Iraq, on Feb. 12. [REUTERS/YONHAP]

Iran is a multiethnic state. Only about 60 percent of newborns speak Persian, the country’s official language, from birth. The remaining roughly 40 percent grow up speaking other languages, including Turkic languages such as Azerbaijani and Turkmen, as well as Kurdish, which belongs to the Iranian language family. Among these non-Persian-speaking minorities, the largest groups are the Azeris, about 20 percent of the population, and the Kurds, about 15 percent.

Most Azeris live in northwestern Iran, bordering the Republic of Azerbaijan. People sharing the same language and culture formed the state of Azerbaijan north of the border, while those south of it remained part of Iran. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, reportedly killed in recent attacks by the United States and Israel, is himself of Azeri origin.

Many Azeris take pride in their role within the Iranian state and prefer to live as Iranian citizens. Still, a small number of activists advocate secession from Iran and eventual unification with Azerbaijan to the north.

Iran’s Kurdish population is estimated at between 8 million and 12 million, most living in the mountainous northwest bordering Iraq and Turkey. Kurds are not confined to Iran; they also live across four countries — Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran — as minority populations.

Turkey has the largest Kurdish population, with more than 16 million people mainly in the eastern regions. Syria is home to around 2 million Kurds, while Iraq has between 5 million and 8 million, the only Kurdish population that has established a form of autonomous government. Altogether, Kurds across the four countries number roughly 40 million.

Yet the Kurds have never formed a unified state. The mountainous terrain where they live has historically made political integration difficult. Moreover, the four countries where Kurds reside have all opposed Kurdish independence. If a Kurdish state were successfully created in one country, the others would likely intervene quickly, fearing the ripple effects within their own borders.

Another minority in Iran is the Baloch, who account for roughly 8 percent of the population. They live in a region where Iran borders Pakistan and Afghanistan. Like some Kurdish activists, certain Baloch groups have sought independence and the establishment of their own state. In recent years, Iran and Pakistan have launched military attacks in Baloch areas to suppress such movements.

About 2 percent of Iran’s population in the south consists of ethnic Arabs.

Against this complex backdrop, it was a wise decision for Trump to abandon plans to deploy Iran-affiliated Kurdish rebels based in Iraq into Iranian territory, a move that risked further complicating the war. As Iran has begun targeting U.S. military bases in neighboring countries, the conflict has already become more volatile.

If Kurdish insurgents had entered Iran as originally planned and sought to exploit internal unrest, the consequences might have gone far beyond weakening the Iranian government. The scenario could easily have plunged the entire Middle East into chaos.

Above all, Turkey would not stand by and watch a Kurdish success in Iran. If Kurds were to achieve independence there, the repercussions would quickly spill across the border.

Although Ankara’s stance toward the Kurds has become somewhat more conciliatory in recent years, Kurdish independence or even extensive autonomy remains largely unthinkable. Iraqi Kurds have also stated they will not join forces with Iranian Kurds in such a venture.

Having endured decades of marginalization, exclusion and discrimination, Kurdish communities have learned painful lessons from past conflicts, including the battles against the Islamic State and the Syrian civil war. They remain wary of being used again as expendable tools by outside powers.

Supporters of Iranian democracy and the overthrow of the regime wave the Kurdish-Iranian flag during a rally in Washington on March 7. [AP/YONHAP]

If minority grievances were exploited to destabilize Iran and several ethnic groups rose up simultaneously, the turmoil could spread across borders. In that case, Iran might come to resemble a second Balkan Peninsula — fragmented by ethnic conflict and geopolitical rivalry. That is the deeper implication behind talk of “changing the map.”

The Iraqi Kurdish region, which has effectively blocked such a scenario, was once home to Korea’s Zaytun Unit during its overseas deployment. Many Kurds still remember Korea favorably.

Rather than becoming tinder in the strategies of major powers, Kurds deserve the chance to stand as independent actors shaping their own future. At a time when global oil prices are surging, bringing the war to a swift end would also serve Korea’s national interests.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.