In the era of AI drone warfare, weapons procurement must move faster

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In the era of AI drone warfare, weapons procurement must move faster

Published: 26 Feb. 2026, 00:03

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Cho Sang-keun

The author is a research professor at KAIST and President of the Spearhead Combat Association.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which began in February 2022, has now entered its fifth year. Despite periodic discussions of a ceasefire, the war continues. One defining feature that distinguishes the conflict from past wars is the integration of drones with conventional combined-arms operations, fundamentally reshaping the battlefield.

Drones have emerged as a central means of warfare, with both sides reportedly deploying millions each year. As a result, not only major military powers but also smaller states are preparing to establish systems capable of rapidly mass-producing drones.

Police conduct an anti-terrorism exercise involving drones in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang on Oct. 20, 2025. [NEWS1]

North Korea is moving in this direction as well. Since last year, it has begun building facilities near Panghyon in North Pyongan to produce Shahed-136-type loitering munitions. In exchange for large-scale troop deployments, Pyongyang is believed to be receiving technology from Russia to enable mass production of long-range suicide drones.

South Korea’s situation stands in contrast. The military’s drone acquisition process remains complex and time-consuming. Companies that attempt to participate in procurement projects face extensive administrative requirements. During bidding, firms must submit lengthy proposals, technical documentation, cost estimates and numerous testing, inspection and certification materials. They must also provide Integrated Product Support analyses, which often require costly outsourcing.

Most drone manufacturers in Korea are small and medium-sized enterprises. If they fail to win a contract after investing significant resources in the bidding process, some face serious financial risk.

The procurement timeline is also lengthy. The process requires multiple stages, including operational requirement identification, approval, proposal submission and evaluation. Even under normal conditions, the process typically takes two to three years.

Meanwhile, drone technology is evolving at a pace that far exceeds traditional acquisition cycles. Many systems now incorporate artificial intelligence, accelerating innovation. In the Ukraine war, new models and capabilities have appeared within one to two months.

This mismatch between rapid technological change and a slow procurement system risks making newly acquired drones obsolete by the time they are deployed. Moreover, future defense acquisition procedures may become even more detailed and complex in the name of greater specialization, transparency and accountability.

Such trends could widen the capability gap with North Korea, which is accelerating drone force development through military cooperation with Russia. Recent military parades and training activities suggest that this risk is becoming more tangible.

The Ministry of National Defense has announced plans to transform the armed forces into an advanced, science-driven military built around intelligent manned-unmanned teaming. It is also promoting a policy to train 500,000 drone operators to support both military readiness and the domestic drone industry.

Each service branch is working with industry, academia and research institutions to acquire systems tailored to operational needs. The Army alone plans to purchase around 10,000 drones this year for training active-duty personnel and reservists.

Amid these efforts, however, the Drone Operations Command, established in 2023, is reportedly facing dissolution due to political issues. Over the past two years, the unit has conducted combat experimentation, research and development and rapid acquisition activities through civil-military cooperation, building valuable expertise.

Rather than disbanding the organization, it could be restructured to address the procurement challenges identified above. One option would be to transform it into a joint-level entity tentatively called a Joint Drone Acquisition Center, dedicated to research and rapid procurement of expendable drones.

Such a structure could accelerate force development across tactical and strategic levels simultaneously. More importantly, it would enable the military to acquire systems that reflect global technological trends in a timely manner and maintain operational relevance in multi-domain warfare.

North Korean special operations troops conduct drone-based tactical training as North Korean leader Kim Jong-un looks on during a combined tactical exercise by service branch on May 13, 2025, according to North Korea's Korean Central Television the next day. [YONHAP]

In the era of AI-enabled drone warfare, acquisition systems bound by rigid procedures risk creating capability gaps. High-cost, long-endurance platforms that require extended service lives should continue to be managed under the existing Defense Acquisition Program Administration framework.

However, low-cost, expendable drones designed for short-term use and mass production should be procured through a fast-track process managed by a specialized organization.

The speed of drone acquisition is directly linked to survivability, operational effectiveness and combat efficiency. Korea also faces a rapid decline in available military manpower due to demographic changes. This reality makes the rapid procurement of large numbers of drones not only desirable but necessary.

For these reasons, the drone acquisition system must shift its paradigm away from procedure-centered management toward a model that prioritizes speed and operational responsiveness.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.