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The war in Ukraine is closer than you think

Published: 24 Feb. 2026, 14:54 Updated: 24 Feb. 2026, 18:22

Oleksiy Sorokin

The author is co-founder and deputy chief editor of the Kyiv Independent, Ukraine’s leading English-language media outlet. It was launched in 2021 by a team of journalists committed to editorial independence and press freedom.

We are terrified of a new world war — a spiraling chain of events that could engulf continents, redraw borders and shatter a global order that, however imperfect, has delivered decades of relative stability.

That fear is understandable. But fear can also be paralyzing. It can tempt democracies into denial — into pretending that if we lower our voices and avert our eyes, the storm will pass us by.

Workers remove insulation from a pipe at a compound of Darnytsia Thermal Power Plant, which was heavily damaged by recent Russian missile and drone strikes, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Feb. 4. [REUTERS/YONHAP]

It will not. The war in Ukraine is not only a regional conflict. It is a test of whether the current order can defend itself. The adversaries of democracy are studying, learning and adapting. And they are doing so together. Democracies are not. China’s role in Russia’s war has been careful but important. Beijing has not sent troops. It has not openly declared military support. But it has helped keep Russia’s economy afloat. Since the full-scale invasion in 2022, China has become Russia’s largest trading partner. It buys large amounts of Russian oil and gas, giving Moscow steady income to fund its war. Chinese goods — machinery, vehicles, electronics and industrial parts — continue to enter Russia, sometimes through indirect channels that weaken the impact of Western sanctions.

A Ukrainian member an Azov Brigade drone team — callsign Sava, 21 — launches a surveillance drone toward Russian positions, in the direction of Toretsk, eastern Donetsk region, on Feb. 4, 2025, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. [AFP/YONHAP]

Even more serious is the flow of dual-use technology — items that have both civilian and military purposes. Reports have shown that Chinese-made components have ended up in Russian drones and other weapons systems. There have been allegations of technical cooperation between Chinese specialists and Russian defense companies. China denies direct military involvement, but the overall picture is clear: Russia is not isolated. It has powerful backing. And China is watching closely. It is learning from Russia's mistakes.

The war has shown how decisive drones can be — small, cheap machines destroying tanks and ships worth millions. It has highlighted the importance of electronic warfare, satellite communications, cyberattacks and fiber-optic-controlled systems that are harder to jam. It has demonstrated how industrial production — especially artillery shells and missiles — still matters in large-scale war. China is observing all of this while studying how the West responds: how quickly weapons are delivered, how sanctions work, how united democratic governments remain over time.

North Korea’s involvement is even more direct. Pyongyang has openly aligned itself with Moscow and pledged full support. According to Western and Ukrainian intelligence assessments, North Korea has sent large quantities of artillery shells, rockets and possibly ballistic missiles to Russia. These supplies have helped Moscow continue its offensives when its own stockpiles were running low.

What’s more important is that North Korea has sent troops to support Russian operations. The rough estimates suggest that between 12,000 and 15,000 North Korean soldiers have taken part in the war 10,000 kilometers (6,214 miles) away. North Korean troops have first taken on frontline roles and, later on, more specialized tasks, such as artillery operations, engineering and drone-related missions. North Korean forces are gaining something extremely valuable: real combat experience in a modern, high-intensity war.

In exchange for assistance, Russia is believed to be providing North Korea with economic aid and military technology. That could include help with missile systems, satellites or other advanced capabilities. This creates a dangerous cycle. Russia strengthens its war effort in Ukraine. North Korea strengthens its long-term military power in East Asia. The pattern here is hard to miss. Authoritarian states are cooperating diplomatically and building a network of shared military experience. They are testing weapons, improving tactics and learning how to resist sanctions. They are preparing for future conflicts.

Meanwhile, many democracies remain hesitant. Defense spending has increased in some countries, but production remains slow. Weapons stockpiles are limited. Bureaucratic procurement systems are slow to move. Political debates often focus more on short-term economic costs than long-term security risks. Domestically, support for abstentionist, extremist forces is on the rise, limiting what democracies can offer. A united democratic front is a relic of the past.

Modern war is changing quickly. Cheap drones can overwhelm expensive defense systems. Artificial intelligence speeds up targeting and decision-making. Civilian technology can be adapted for military use in months. Authoritarian governments can bolster industries and manpower, without public debate. Democracies, by contrast, must build consensus — and that takes time.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, third from left, inspects sculptures, which honor the country's soldiers killed in the Russia-Ukraine war, at the Mansudae Art Studio in Pyongyang on Jan. 25, in this photo published by the Korean Central News Agency the following day. [YONHAP]

As this imbalance grows, the consequences will not remain confined to Ukraine.
Taiwan faces constant military pressure from China, which is studying not just invasion tactics but also blockades, cyber disruption and psychological warfare. South Korea lives under threat from a North Korea that may soon have better technology and more experienced troops. Other democratic nations near authoritarian powers are watching closely. They are asking a simple question: if one democracy is attacked, will the others truly stand firm?

No one wants a larger war. But preventing war requires strength and clarity. Deterrence works only when it is credible. That means strong alliances, resilient economies, modern armed forces and the political will to act before a crisis spirals out of control. The opponents of democracy are adapting to the wars of the 21st century. They are learning on the battlefield. They are tightening their partnerships. If democracies continue to move slowly, divided and distracted, the next test may not happen in Eastern Europe. And next time, the countries on the receiving end — Taiwan, South Korea or others — may find that the lessons learned in Ukraine have been turned against them.

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