Despite the drama U.S. allies will not go to 'Plan B'

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Despite the drama U.S. allies will not go to 'Plan B'

Published: 05 Feb. 2026, 00:03

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Michael Green

The author is the CEO of the U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and the Henry A. Kissinger Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

In January, U.S. President Donald Trump delivered the most unsettling series of provocations U.S. allies have faced in a generation. After the seizure of Venezuelan strongman Nicolas Maduro, Trump claimed he would next take Greenland from Denmark, a loyal and democratic NATO ally, and even suggested that military options could not be ruled out. At home, heavy-handed actions by Immigration and Customs Enforcement in Minnesota led to the killing of two peaceful protesters, while the same agency sent officials to police the Winter Olympics in Italy. Anti-Trump protests in Europe were almost as intense as those in Minnesota, underscoring the breadth of allied anger.

President Donald Trump, right, meets with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on the sidelines of the Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Jan. 21, 2026. [AP/YONHAP]

By January, frustration among America’s European partners reached a tipping point. At the Davos Forum, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney drew a standing ovation by condemning the bullying behavior of great powers, implicitly likening Trump to China’s leader Xi Jinping, and arguing that middle powers such as Canada needed to band together. In the same spirit, two former Biden administration national security officials wrote in the January issue of Foreign Affairs that Trump would only grow more disruptive and that U.S. allies therefore needed a “Plan B” to secure themselves without Washington.

Denmark's Veterans gather for a ″silent demonstration march″ from Kastellet in Copenhagen to the American embassy in Copenhagen on January 31, 2026. The march takes place to express dissatisfaction with Trump's statements about NATO soldiers in Afghanistan. [AFP/YONHAP]

There is no doubt that Trump’s behavior has forced allies to confront uncomfortable questions about whether the U.S.-led alliance system remains viable. Yet talk of a genuine Plan B, or of middle powers somehow going it alone without the United States, amounts to fantasy. Neither Carney nor the Foreign Affairs authors explained how such an alternative security architecture would actually function. The reason is straightforward: any Plan B would be prohibitively costly, risky and ultimately inferior to what already exists.

First, it is a mistake to build a long-term strategy around Trump’s frenetic statements and social media posts. The uproar over Greenland subsided quickly once stock markets and Republican lawmakers signaled their opposition, prompting Trump to back down. Similar dynamics played out after domestic backlash to immigration enforcement in Minnesota. Trump is unlikely to abandon his trademark “shock and awe” political style, but with each new shock, the public and Congress appear less awed. While this volatility corrodes alliance confidence, it is not a politically sustainable trajectory for U.S. foreign policy over the long run.

Second, American public opinion remains broadly supportive of alliances, even if it is skeptical of Trump’s tactics. Polls consistently show strong backing for alliances with Korea, NATO, Japan and Australia, despite or perhaps because of Trump’s confrontational approach. When Trump threatened to annex Canada, 85 percent of Americans said they respected and liked their northern neighbor, a figure more than double Trump’s own approval rating. Americans do want allies to shoulder more responsibility for their own defense, but there is little appetite for openly bullying them.

Third, the economic and strategic costs of a Plan B would be immense. Carney’s defiant rhetoric earned applause, but Canada spends far less per capita on defense than the United States and would struggle to defend itself without American support. The same holds for Europe. As NATO’s secretary general has repeatedly warned, European countries cannot effectively defend themselves alone. While defense spending is rising on both sides of the Atlantic, it remains far below what would be required for independent military action. Closing that gap would demand deep cuts to social welfare systems, sacrifices that electorates in Canada and Europe are unlikely to accept.

Fourth, the existing alliance system — Plan A — is not only intact but increasingly integrated. The U.S. military today is more closely linked with allied forces than ever before. Initiatives such as Aukus with Australia, new command and control arrangements in Japan, growing cooperation with the Philippines and the continued strength of the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command all point in the same direction. Rather than seeking autonomy from Washington, allied militaries are doubling down on interoperability with U.S. forces. Allies do want to expand their own defense innovation and production, but collective defense with the United States remains far cheaper and more effective than the illusion of independence.

Armored vehicles are unloaded from a U.S. military vessel at Pier 8 of Busan Port in Nam-gu, Busan, on Feb. 4, as the 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command of U.S. Forces Korea showcases the arrival of essential equipment and port operations for the incoming U.S. Army 2nd Infantry Division’s 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team. The brigade will replace the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team of the 4th Infantry Division, which is completing its mission this month, and will conduct operations in Korea for nine months. [NEWS1]

This collective framework also reflects a hard strategic reality. However difficult Washington may be as a partner under Trump, the challenge posed by China is far greater and one that U.S. allies cannot manage on their own. Deterrence against Beijing requires scale, integration and credibility that only a U.S.-centered alliance system can provide.

In the end, managing Trump’s volatility is a far easier task than attempting to construct an entirely new security order without the United States. What sometimes appears as hedging — higher defense spending, greater localization of defense production and stronger ties among allies — would strengthen the alliance system even if Trump were not president. These measures amount not to a Plan B, but to a reinforced and more resilient Plan A.

Trump is undeniably damaging trust. Surveys show confidence in the United States among allies has fallen to historic lows. Yet support for alliances has held steady or even increased among partners in Asia, and the American public continues to see alliances as central to U.S. security. For that reason, the alliance system is likely to outlast Trump himself. However disruptive the moment may be, alliances remain indispensable to American security, and both allies and Americans understand that reality.