The burden of being a ‘model ally’

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The burden of being a ‘model ally’

Published: 27 Jan. 2026, 00:03

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Yoo Jee-hye

The author is the head of the diplomatic and security news department at the JoongAng Ilbo.

The reception Korea extended to Elbridge Colby, the U.S. under secretary of war for policy and widely regarded as a key power broker at the Pentagon, was notably generous. On Monday, his visit began with a breakfast meeting with Foreign Minister Cho Hyun, followed by separate meetings with National Security Office Director Wi Sung-lac and Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back. Colby also had dinner with Ahn, meeting him twice in a single day. In effect, three ministers were mobilized to receive one vice minister-level official.

Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back meets with Elbridge Colby, U.S. under secretary of war for policy, at the Ministry of National Defense in Yongsan, Seoul, on the morning of Jan. 26. [MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE]

Strictly speaking, Colby’s counterpart would be Lee Doo-hee, Korea’s vice defense minister. Defense Minister Ahn is the counterpart of Pete Hegseth, the U.S. secretary of war and Colby’s superior. As suggested by the fact that Ahn’s meeting with Colby was officially described as a “courtesy call” rather than formal talks, the encounter did not align neatly with protocol. That Ahn nonetheless took the lead likely reflected the significance of the new U.S. National Defense Strategy, released on Friday. As the strategy’s chief architect, Colby was someone Korean officials very much wanted to hear from and someone to whom they had much to convey.

What Korea likely wanted to hear was: reassurance that the U.S. defense commitment to Korea remains unchanged; confirmation of smooth follow-up on the introduction of nuclear-powered submarines and revisions to the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement as outlined in the joint fact sheet agreed by the two presidents; and support for accelerating the transfer of wartime operational control within President Lee Jae Myung’s term.

What Korea likely wanted to emphasize was its status as a model ally. At the summit level, Seoul has already pledged to adopt the “Trump-style standard” of raising defense spending to 5 percent of GDP and to faithfully implement that commitment.

When senior U.S. officials tour Korea and Japan, logistic considerations usually lead them to visit Japan first. Colby’s decision to come to Korea before Japan may also reflect his view of Korea as a model ally. Yet the newly-released National Defense Strategy suggests that the weight carried by that label is heavier than it appears.

The country the strategy explicitly and repeatedly describes as a model ally is Israel. It notes that Israel repelled attacks by the Palestinian militant group Hamas largely on its own, without direct U.S. military involvement, and defended its territory through self-reliance.

Applying the Israeli model of alliance behavior to a contingency on the Korean Peninsula leads to a stark conclusion. The strategy’s statement that Korea bears “primary responsibility for deterring North Korea with critical but limited U.S. support” could be read as meaning that, in the event of a conventional attack by North Korea, Korea would largely be expected to handle the situation on its own.

Many experts see this as also implying that Korea should not expect significant U.S. reinforcement forces in a crisis. The strategy states that the U.S. military will focus on defending its homeland and deterring China, and adds that “a shift in the balance of responsibility” aligns with U.S. interests in modernizing the posture of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).

This effectively signals potential changes to the role or scale of U.S. forces stationed in Korea. Particularly noteworthy is the phrase “shift in the balance,” which contrasts with the language used for Europe. Regarding Europe, the strategy says the United States is “calibrating” the posture and role of U.S. forces in the European theater. With the results of the Global Posture Review expected to be released soon, this amounts to an advance notice of reductions in U.S. forces in Europe.

Put differently, the strategy could be interpreted as maintaining troop levels on the Korean Peninsula while shifting their mission from deterring North Korea to countering China. At the same time, it suggests that U.S. reinforcements would be limited even if North Korea were to attack.

Elbridge Colby, U.S. under secretary of war for policy, departs after a breakfast meeting with Foreign Minister Cho Hyun at the Four Seasons Hotel in Jongno District, Seoul, on Jan. 26. [YONHAP]

Regardless of Korea’s own self-reliant defense capabilities, changes to the role of USFK and limits on reinforcement could create serious security gaps. In a Taiwan contingency, Korea could even find itself serving as a rear base for sending reinforcements to the Taiwan Strait. In such a scenario, China, which has already pressured Korea at summit meetings to “stand on the right side,” would be unlikely to remain passive.

If the government’s full assessment of the new strategy is captured by Defense Ministry spokesperson Jeong Bit-na’s remark on Monday that it reflects U.S. recognition of Korea’s growing ability and willingness to play a more leading role in peninsula security, that assessment appears complacent. Asked whether U.S. involvement might be more restrained in the event of limited North Korean provocations, Jeong responded only that “various interpretations may be possible” and declined to elaborate further. Without meticulous preparation, Korea’s pride in being a model ally could boomerang into a justification for U.S. strategic disengagement.

Korea may now be facing an alliance unlike any it has encountered before. It may be an alliance that responds to the question, “Would the United States risk San Francisco to defend Seoul?” not with reassurance but with a counterquestion: “Why should we?”

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.