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Learning from NATO members on the transition of wartime operational control

Published: 27 Jan. 2026, 00:04

Ahn Ho-young

The author is a chair professor of North Korean studies at Kyungnam University and former ambassador to the United States.

The 2025 NATO Summit took place at The Hague last June. The meeting drew particular attention because it was the first NATO summit attended by U.S. President Donald Trump since his return to the White House and because he had continued to press European allies to raise defense spending to 5 percent of GDP. At the time, the summit was generally assessed as having concluded without major disruption.

From left, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, U.S. President Donald Trump and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte are seen at the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague on June 25, 2025. [UPI/YONHAP]

Behind the scenes, however, a sensitive issue exposed a widening gap in perception between the United States and Europe. Washington actively reviewed the possibility of appointing a European rather than an American as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, a post that has been held by a U.S. general since NATO’s founding in 1949. In the final stages of consultations, the United States reportedly decided not to formally raise the proposal. Why did Europe’s foreign and security elites react with such concern to the idea of replacing a U.S. commander with a European one?

There were two main reasons. First was anxiety about the alliance weakening. According to U.S. officials long involved in NATO affairs, appointing a European commander could be interpreted as a signal that the United States was stepping back from the defense of Europe. Second, for the same reason, Europeans worried that such a change could weaken U.S. extended deterrence, particularly in the event of a nuclear attack on Europe.

This issue is worth paying close attention to because European concerns offer important parallels for South Korea’s debate over the transition of wartime operational control (Opcon). The first parallel is the risk of alliance dilution. In its new National Defense Strategy, the second Trump administration stated that South Korea is capable of assuming primary responsibility for deterrence against North Korea while receiving more limited support from the United States. President Lee Jae Myung responded by saying that self-reliant national defense is fundamental amid an unstable international environment. In such circumstances, rushing the transfer of Opcon could inadvertently deepen perceptions of alliance weakening and demands special caution.

The second parallel involves extended deterrence. Europe differs markedly from South Korea in this respect. Britain and France each possess several hundred nuclear warheads, and roughly 100 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are deployed in Europe. NATO also conducts annual combined exercises to prepare for nuclear contingencies. The extended deterrence the United States provides to South Korea remains limited by comparison.

Following the South Korea-U.S. summit in April 2023, the two countries established the Nuclear Consultative Group. Under this framework, Seoul and Washington pledged joint decision-making and joint implementation to deter and respond to North Korean nuclear use. This was a meaningful step forward, but when measured against European arrangements, it remains at a very early stage.

Only by further developing the Nuclear Consultative Group, drawing up joint operational plans for responding to nuclear attacks and conducting annual combined exercises based on those plans can Korea and the United States approach the European level of deterrence. At a time when Europe itself firmly resists appointing a European supreme commander, it would be risky for South Korea, which faces greater security threats with weaker deterrence arrangements, to hasten the transfer of Opcon.

In 2014, South Korea and the United States agreed on the conditions-based Opcon transition plan. Rather than setting a fixed timetable, the two sides decided that the transfer would take place once specific conditions were met. They identified three core conditions: the acquisition of key military capabilities by the South Korean armed forces, the ability to counter North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats and a stable security environment. Over the past decade, the prevailing assessment is that little progress has been made on the first condition, and the second and third have deteriorated significantly. In this context, emphasizing a transfer within a single presidential term appears premature.

Cho Chang-rae, the director general for defense policy at Korea’s Ministry of National Defense, right, and Vipin Narang, the acting U.S. assistant secretary of defense for space policy, deliver opening remarks during a joint press briefing following the third Korea-U.S. Nuclear Consultative Group meeting at the Defense Ministry briefing room in Yongsan District, central Seoul, on June 10, 2024. [NEWS1]

Advocates of accelerating the transition often cite the need to enhance strategic autonomy. As the United States retreats from its role as guardian of a rules-based international order and practices great power diplomacy, strengthening strategic autonomy is indeed important. Doing so requires both self-reliance and solidarity with like-minded countries. But given South Korea’s security, technological and economic realities, weakening the South Korea-U.S. alliance is not the answer.

French President Emmanuel Macron emphasized autonomy in France’s 2022 National Strategic Review. He aimed to strengthen Europe’s capacity for self-reliance, reduce excessive dependence on the United States within NATO and thereby increase Europe’s voice while reinforcing the alliance itself. Autonomy was not intended as a substitute for the U.S. role.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.